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TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Richard F. Dole, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Trademarks are devises used by business men to distinguish
their goods from those of others. 1 The utility of trademarks to purchasers lies in the identification of different lines of merchandise by
different trademarks.2 On the other hand, perhaps the greatest advantage of trademarks to business derives from the connotations associated with marks by skillful advertising.3 Legal protection of
trademark rights thus has a dual aspect: preventing others from copying marks both guards the identification function of trademarks and
maintains exclusive rights in the commercial value of trademarks
created by advertising. A Senate committee described the hybrid
nature of trademark protection as follows:

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. Formerly Cook Fellow and Legislative Analyst, Legislative Research Center,
The University of Michigan Law School, 1962-64. A.B., Bates College,
1958; LL.B., Cornell University, 1961; LL.M., Cornell University, 1963.
1. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 715 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). A
mark used to distinguish services is called a service mark. This comparatively recent refinement of terminology does not materially affect
the applicable legal principles. See id. at comment g.
2. See Brown, "Advertising and the Public Interest," 57 Yale L.J. 1165,
1185-87 (1948). Trademarks historically identified the origin of commercial goods. Medieval craft guilds, for instance, required members
to affix distinctive marks to their goods so that poor workmanship
could be traced, and the goods of nonmembers excluded from the area
of the guild monopoly. See Schechter, Historical Foundations of TradeMark Law 62-63 (1925). The evolution of a national economy characterized by labyrinthine channels of distribution has, however, stripped
marks of this capacity. Marks seldom identify a known source today.
Instead, if consumers have no experience with a product, trademarks
initially identify like goods by connoting that every article that bears
the same mark is alike and comes from, or is approved by, a single
"anonymous" source. Once consumers have tried a product, trademarks
identify known goods, permitting avoidance of brands that have not proved
satisfactory.
3. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has written: "The protection of trade-marks
is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it
is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase
goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to
believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity
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The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is
two-fold. One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where
the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and
money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by
pirates and cheats. This ts the well-established rule of
law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner.4

The development of the law of trademark protection has been
characterized by tension between the public and private reasons for
protection. Proponents of liberal protection have stressed the importance of the identification function of trademarks in urging extensive
protection for private interests,5 whereas opponents of strong protection have characterized trademarks as "monopolies, immunities
from competition11 6 and minimized their social value.7 Controversy
has raged over both the goods and the geographical area for which
protection should be accorded. 8
A dramatic confrontation of the opposing viewpoints was initiated in 1938 when advocates of liberal protection prevailed upon Congressman Lanham to introduce a bill to revise the federal trademark
laws. 9 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, motivated
by evidence that international cartels were utilizing trademarks to
(Footnote continued)
by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market
with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means
employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the
minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon
which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has
something of value." Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. s.
Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
The advertising value of
trademarks has been hailed and condemned as their predominant role.
Compare Schechter, "Rational Basis of Trademark Protection," 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 813, 818-19 (1927) with Brown, note 2 .!!!E!, at 1187-91.
4. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 (1946).
5. E.g., Rogers, "The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks,
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 173, 175-77 (1949); "The Democracy of TradeMarks," 34 Trademark Rep. 57 (1944).
6. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 957 (2d
Cir.) (Frank, J.), cert. den., 320 U.S. 758 (1943).
7. E.g., Auerbach, "Quality Standards, Informative Labeling and Grade
Labeling as Guides to Consumer Buying," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob.
362 & n. 1 (1949).
8. E.g., Schechter, "Rational Basis of Trademark Protection," 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 813, 819-24 (1927); Comment, "The Anti-Competitive Aspects
of Trade Name Protection and the Policy Against Consumer Deception,"
29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 371 (1962).
9. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
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implement their schemes,10 and by exaggerated fears that trademarks
could equal patents as major instruments of anticompetitive abuse,11
became the protagonist of the opposition. 12 The passage of the Lanham Act in 1946,13 replete with amendments intended to assuage the
Justice Department,14 transferred the controversy over the act's protectionist features to the courts, where the opposing viewpoints have
continued to clash.15
Though the Justice Department contended that the Lanham Bill
bristled with objectionable features,16 the principal documentation
related to division of territorial markets among competitors through
use of common trademarks. 17 This evidence was drawn on to illustrate how provisions of the Lanham Bill dealing with concurrent registration, 18 assignment, 19 and licensing20 could be used to cloak conspiratorial division of trade territory by competitors.21 Although these
are selected aspects of the Antitrust Division's position, the subject of
territorial trademark rights with respect to competing goods affords
a manageable microcosm in which to analyze competitive and noncompetitive aspects of trademark protection. Despite the fulminations
of the Antitrust Division, it is the contention of the author that the
Lanham Act provisions dealing with territorial trademark rights on
balance permit a more procompetitive. demarcation of territorial
trademark rights with respect to competing goods than common-law
principles. This contention will be developed by survey of the territorial scope of trademark rights with respect to competing goods before and after the passage of the Lanham Act, analysis of the arguments for and against strong protection of these rights, and consider ation of the relationship of these territorial trademark rights to the
antitrust laws.
10. See, e.g., Diggins, "Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade," 32 Geo.
L.J. 113 (1944).
11. 1942 Senate Hearings at 35 (remarks of Ernest S. Meyers).
12. The Justice Department's hypersensitivity to the abuses of trademark
protection was no doubt partially due to the elan imparted to the Antitrust Division by then Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold.
13. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1964).
14. These amendments originated in the Senate. Sen. Rep. 1333, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
15. E.g., s. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert.
den., 338 U.S. 860 (1949); California Fruit Growners Exch. v. Sunkist
Baking Co., 166 F .2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947); see Callmann, "The 'Sunkist'
Decision: Trade-Marks at the Crossroads," 38 TrademarkRep.304(1948).
16. 1944 Senate Hearings at 58-71 (statement of the Department of Justice).
17. See Timberg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Trade,"
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 360 (1949).
18. See Chapter II infra for discussion of concurrent registration.
19. See Chapter III infra for discussion of assignments.
20. See Chapter III infra for discussion of licensing.
21. See 1944 Senate Hearings at 63-64.

L WHAT PRICE TRADEMARK PROTECTION?
A. Nature and Extent of Common-Law Trademark Rightsl
Judicially cognizable trademark rights do not spring from
conception of an idea for a mark but are derived from "use, "2 a
term of art which refers to commercial distribution of goods3
identified by the mark.4 Temporal priority of use is a factor in
1. Since trademark rights depend on legal protection for their existence,
it is imprecise to speak of "property in" or "ownership of'' a trademark. See Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814-17 (1935); Goble, "Where and
What a Trade-Mark Protects," 22 Ill. L. Rev. 379-80 (1927).
2. E.g., United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); accord, Rolley, Inc.
v. Younghusband, 204 F .2d 209 (9th Cir. 1953); Russell v. CarolineBecker, Inc., 336 Mass. 161, 142 N.E.2d 899 (1957). There have been
proposals to permit reservation of trademark rights prior to use. See
Symposium, "Proposed Intention to Use Legislation," 53 Trademark
Rep. 963 (1963).
3. The distribution must be in the ordinary course of business and not
for the purpose of acquiring trademark rights. Eg., Gordon, Inc. v.
Handicraft Pub. Inc., 206 Misc. 1087, 136 N. Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.
County 1954), aff'd mem., 286 App. Div. 809, 143 N, Y,S,2d 620 (1st
Dep1t 1955).
4. At common law physical affixation of a trade identifier to goods or to
containers in which goods were sold was a sine gua non of trademark
protection. E.g., Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boller Co.,
142 Ill. 494, 30 N.E. 339 (1892). Unaffixed terms could only be protected as trade names which required evidence, dispensed with in
trademark cases, that purchasers associated the unaffixed terms with
the plaintiff's business. E.g., Johnson v. Hitchcock, 3 N.Y. Supp. 680
(Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1888). This common-law distinction between
trademarks and trade names is retained in modified form by the Lanham Act which makes "use in commerce'' a condition of registrability
as a trademark § 1, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1051
(1964). "Use in commerce" is defined as including display of trade
identifiers in association with goods as well as physical affixation of
trade identifiers to goods or to the containers in which goods are sold,
§ 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (1964). Trade
identifiers which are not used in commerce within this definition are
regarded as unregistrable trade names. E.G., In re Lyndale Farm,
38 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 825, 186 F .2d 723 (1951). Despite the continuing technical distinction between trademarks and trade names the common-law principles applicable to both are similar, see Restatement
(Second) Torts § 717 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), and cases involving
both trademarks and trade names will be cited hereafter although textual discussion will refer to trademarks.
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determining which of two or more concurrent users of the same
mark will prevail, but priority alone is not conclusive.5 Trademark protection is a traditional equitable subject matter and the
principles of equity, including the concept of "balancing equities,"
have conditioned its development. The respective interests of the
parties are invariably considered in order to ascertain whether
protection should be granted in a particular instance.6 The identification function of trademarks means that the social interest in
avoidance of purchaser deception is also involved, but the courts
principally utilize the presence or absence of probable purchaser
deception as a gauge in measuring the substantiality of the parties 1
interests. This is evidenced by the fact that courts generally inquire only whether probable purchaser deception will occur, not
whether purchasers will be harmed if they are in fact misled. 7
The core of the interests . for which a senior user is able
to obtain protection is an interest in avoiding loss of sales to a
junior user because of purchaser confusion, an interest in avoiding tarnishment of his reputation as a result of the character of
the junior use, and an interest in avoiding curtailment of the area
in which, or the goods on which, the senior user can use the
mark.8 The principal coordinate interest of a junior user lies
in retaining the expectation of future patronage which he has created through advertisement of his brand and sales made to satisfied customers.9 These interests of senior and junior users do
not, however, exhaust the range of factors considered by the court1:
in determining whether to grant trademark protection. The nature
of the word or words used as markslO and the reason for the
5. Chandon Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F .2d 531
(2d Cir. 1964).
6. See ibid., Restatement (Second), Torts § § 729, 731, 732 (Tent. Draft
No. 8, 1963).
7. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37-43 (2d Cir. 1945)
(conclurring opinion); see "Trademarks and the 'Free Ride' Doctrine,"
16 Stan. L. Rev. 736, 740-41 (1964). It has been questioned whether
the courts could successfully administer a test for trademark infringement which required evaluation of the quality of the defendant's and
the plaintiff's products. Comment, "Misrepresentation and the Lindsay
Bill," 70 Yale L.J. 406, 432-33 (1961). But see Avon Shoe Co. v.
David Crystal, Inc., 279 F .2d 607 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 364 U.S. 909
(1960) (considering the respective reputations of the parties' products).
8. S. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. den.,
338 U.S. 860 (1949).
9. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., note 7 supra.
10. Trademarks may consist of variegated combinations of words, names,
symbols, devices, letters, numerals, or pictures, see Restatement
(Second), Torts § 715 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), but words are most
common and discussion will focus on word-marks.
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adoption of a particular mark are also important considerations.
Distinctive nondescriptive language, often referred to as a
common-law or technical trademark,11 qualifies for protection as
soon as use commences.12 On the other hand, because of reluctance to recognize exclusive rights in the ordinary meaning of
words, or in words in common use as marks, descriptive language
adopted to distinguish goods, and even nondescriptive language
which is in common use as a mark, is not customarily protected
unless there is evidence that purchasers associate the particular
word or words with the plaintiff. 13 Descriptive language and
words in common use as marks that have attained significance
as an indicia of source are said to have acquired secondary meaning.14
It is not always easy to ascertain whether secondary meaning is a prerequisite to trademark rights. The initial inquiry is
whether a term is a "weak" mark, in the sense of being a word
in common use as a mark. If it is, secondary meaning will generally be required even if the term originated as a coined word.
However, if the term is a "strong" mark, a term that has seldom
been used as a mark, attention should next be directed to whether
the term was coined for use as a mark or had a pre-existing
11. At common law a "trade name" was a descriptive term used to distinguish goods whereas a nondescriptive word used for the same purpose was referred to as a "trademark." Common-law trade names
were not protected unless there was evidence that the descriptive language had acquired "secondary meaning' through purchaser recognition
of its function of source identification; common-law trademarks were
protected regardless of secondary meaning. See Handler & Pickett,
"Trade-Mark and Trade Names," 30 Colum. L. Rev. 168-70 (1930).
In modern-parlance any word used to distinguish goods is a trademark
whether the word is descriptive or nondescriptive. See Restatement
(Second), Torts § 715, comment .£ (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). However,
this distinction between common-law trade names and common-law
trademarks persists in another form: a word which requires secondary meaning to function as a trademark is referred to as a secondarymeaning mark, and a word that does not require secondary meaning
is referred to as a common-law or technical trademark.
12. E.g., Waldes v. International Mfrs' Agency, 237 Fed. 502 (S.D.N.Y.
1916).
13. E.g., Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347 (4th
Cir. 1941) (word in common use as mark); American Waltham Watch
Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85, 53 N.E. 141 (1899)
(descriptive term).
14. Use of "secondary meaning" to refer to the primary commercial connotation of words has been called "a triumph of unintended obfuscation."
Kaplan & Brown, Cases on Copyright, Unfair Competition, and other
Topics 490 (1960).
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meaning. Coined words are protected regardless of secondary
meaning because other businessmen are unlikely to coincidentally
adopt them as marks. On the other hand, words with pre-existing
meanings may or may not require secondary meaning for protection depending on the probability that others might accidentally
adopt them. If the words describe qualities of the goods, e.g.,
"Allwite" for white shoe polish, or a geographical area pertaining
to the goods, e.g., "Elgin" for watches manufactured in Elgin,
Illinois, or the personal name of the manufacturer of the goods,
e.g., "Ford" cars, secondary meaning is usually requisite. But,
if words with a descriptive denotation are arbitrarily used wtth
respect to goods unrelated to that denotation, e.g., "Brilliant"
peas, "The Atlantic" magazine; "Dickie" trousers, or merely imaginatively suggest qualities of the goods, e.g., "Coppertone" suntan lotion, secondary meaning is usually held to be unnecessary.
The superficial intricacy of the secondary meaning concept
should not be allowed to obscure its function as an aid in determining whether the interests for which a senior user claims protection overbalance the interests of a junior user. The presence
of secondary meaning with respect to a weak mark or descriptive
language used to distinguish goods indicates that a senior user's
interests in avoiding loss of sales, tarnishment of his reputation,
and confinement of his operations are more substantial than if the
public did not recognize his mark as a source-symbol. Furthermore, the presence of secondary meaning decreases to some extent the possibility that a junior user inadvertantly selected a substantially similar mark. In weighing the respective interests of
a junior and a senior user, the courts have always given careful
consideration to the circumstances surrounding the development
of concurrent use.15 Judicial solicitude for a junior user's interests is markedly cooled by evidence that the junior user intended to capitalize on the reputation of the senior user and sometimes even by evidence that the junior user had notice of prior
rights when he selected his mark.16 This is a reflection of the
equitable principle that allocation of the responsibility for hardship is a major factor in determining whether the harm to the
plaintiff's interests justifies the harm which an injunction will inflict on. the defendant's interests.17 Judicial distaste for junior
users who have deliberately copied the senior user's mark is
15. E.g., Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., note 7 supra.
16. Compare Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F .2d 830, 833-36 (7th
Cir. 1963) with Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Internat'l
Corp., 308 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1962).
17. See 4 Restatement, Torts § 941, comment!?, (1939),
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so great that some courts have enjoined such junior use where
descriptive language was involved despite an avowed absence of
proof of secondary meaning.IS
There are four principal situations in which the courts may
have to balance the interests of senior and junior users: (1) a
junior user may sell competing goods-goods which satisfy the
same purchaser needs that the senior user's goods satisfyl9-in
the senior user's trade territory; (2) a junior user may sell noncompeting goods in the senior user's trade territory; (3) a junior
user may sell competing goods in a different trade territory; or
(4) a junior user may sell noncompeting goods in a different trade
territory. A senior user will have difficulty in obtaining relief in
situation 4 because of the relatively slight effect that the junior
use can have on the senior user's interests.20 The chances for
relief in situation 2 are greater because the presence of a common trade territory measurably increases the probability of purchaser confusion and the senior user has a significant interest in
preserving his reputation from tarnishment and his ability to diversify the goods on which he uses his mark in his actual market.
Nevertheless, the fact that the concurrent use is on noncompeting
goods means that the senior user's interest in avoiding loss of
sales is not directly involved. If actual extension of the senior
use to competing goods is improbable in situation 2 and the junior
user sells high quality goods so that the danger of tarnishment is
likewise slight, the junior use may be allowed to continue despite
likelihood of purchaser confusion-provided that the junior user
has not prejudiced his case by deliberately copying the senior
user's mark. 21 On the other hand, in situation 1 the senior user
can almost always obtain relief as long as he has a protectible
interest in his mark. The senior user's interests in avoiding loss
of sales and tarnishment of his reputation are so directly affected
by a junior use on competing goods in the same trade territory
that relief may be available regardless of the junior user's good
faith in adoption of his mark and regardless of the actual quality of
the junior user's goods. 22 In situation 3, like situation 4, the
18. Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F .2d 774 (2d Cir.
1964) cert. den., 380 U.S. 913 (1965); ~ . Lincoln Restaurant Corp.
v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc., 291 F .2d 302 ( 2d Cir.), cert. den., 368 U.S.
889 (1961).
19. See "Development in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,"
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 843-44 (1955).
20. E.g., El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1954).
21. E.g., Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., note 7 supra.
22. E.g., LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F .2d 115 (2d
Cir. cert. den., 329 U.S. 771 (1946); see Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v.
Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1960).
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senior .. user's ability to obtain relief is in doubt because the difference in trade territories weakens the impact of the junior use
on the senior user's interests. Nevertheless, because the concurrent use in situation 3 is on competing goods, the senior user's
int~ests are sufficiently involved to make situation 3 more analoto situation 2 than to situation 4. Indeed, a senior user may
actually obtain relief more often in situation 3 than in situation 2.
Because a senior user is more likely to be expanding the area in
which he uses a mark than the goods on which he uses a mark,
it is often easier to establish substantial injury to the interest in
avoiding territorial curtailment of use than to the interest in avoid. ing curtailment of the goods on which the mark can be used. 23
Insofar as situation 3, the principal subject of analysis, is
concerned, two leading Supreme Court decisions struck a balance
between the interests of senior and junior users in a fashion that
is still customarily followed at common law today. In the 1916
decision of Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 24 the Court held
that the prior user of "Tea Rose" for flour could not enjoin junior
use in a separate trade territory where the junior user had adopted
the mark without knowledge of the prior use and the senior user's
mark was unknown in the junior user's territory. Two years later
in United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.,25 a case with similar facts, the Court reaffirmed Hanover despite the apparent presence of likelihood of purchaser confusion in denying an injunction
to a sen~or user whose selling zone had gradually extended to the
periphery of a good faith junior user's trade territory. Dictum in
the Hanover and Rectanus cases suggested that a senior user might
be able to enjoin a junior use on competing goods despite a difference in selling zones if the junior user adopted his mark with
the intention of benefiting from the senior user's reputation26 or,
regardless of the junior user's intent, if at the time that the junior user adopted his mark, the senior use was known in the junior

gous.

23. This ls not necessarily true with respect to "housemarks," trademarks
used on a number of different products each generally bearing a separate individual trademark. See "Trademarks in the Marketplace," 53
Trademark Rep. 687, 697-98 (1963).
24. 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
25. 248 u.s. 90 (1918).
26. "But where two parties independently are employing the same mark
upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets wholly remote
the one from the other, the question of prior appropriation is legally
insignificant, unless at least it appear that the second adopter has
selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of the
first user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods,
to forestall the extension of his trade, or the like." Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916).
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user's marketing area27 or that area was within the senior user's
probable zone of expansion. 28
Although the doctrine of concurrent territorial trademark
rights elaborated in the Hanover and Rectanus cases was part of
the federal common law disavowed by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,29
the doctrine has persisted after Erie due to reception into state
law30 and the tendency of the federal courts to apply "indeterminant general law" to claims of nonstatutory trademark infringement.31 Subsequent adjudications have confirmed the implications
that a senior user's trademark rights may be protected in areas
beyond his actual selling zone where his goods are advertized 32
or known by reputation33 or to which the senior user can demonstrate a probable imminent extension of his operations.34 A line
27. "Mrs. Regis and her firm, having during a long period of years confined their use of the "Rex" mark to a limited territory wholly remote from that in controversy, must be held to have taken the risk
that some innocent party might in the meantime hit upon the same
mark, apply it to goods of similar character, and expend money and
effort in building up a trade under it• • . ." United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103 (1918).
28. "We are not dealing with a case where the junior appropriator of a
trade-mark is occupying territory that would probably be reached by
the prior user in the natural expansion of his trade, and need pass
no judgment upon such a case." Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,
240 u.s. 403, 420 (1916).
29. 304 u.s. 64 (1938).
30. See Direct Service Oil Co. v. Honzay, 2il Minn. 361, 2 N.W.2d 434
(1941); Ambassador Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Sherman Co., 226 Ill. App.
247 (1922); Brady v. Servisoft, Inc., 338 s. W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960).
31. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F .2d 538,
540 n. l (2d Cir. 1956). But see Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized
Corp., 335 F. 2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 913 (1965).
32. Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Jones, 27 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1928); accord,
Adam Hat Stores, Inc. v. Scherper, 45 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Wis. 1942)
(alternative holding). See also Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros.
Co., 252 F.2d 945, 955 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829
(1958). But see Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Sanders Co., 328 F.2d 496
(8th Cir. 1964).
33. Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc., note 18 supra;
accord, Ambassador East, Inc. v. Orsatti, Inc., 257 F .2d 79 {3d Cir.
1958); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F .2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948);
Seegmiller v. Hunt, 391 P.2d 298 (Utah 1964); see Yarbrough, "Protection of Territorial Rights in Corporate Names and Trade Names,"
19 Bus. Law 925, 927-28 (1964).
34. Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp 473 (D. Utah 1962); accord,
J. A. Dougherty's Sons, Inc. v. Kasko Distillers Prods. Corp., 35F\
Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1940); see Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland
Grocery Corp., 301 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.), cert. den., 371 U.S. 817 (1962);
Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., 166 So. 2d 711 (Fla.
App. 1964).
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. o(. ~ority following comments in Mr. Justice Holmes• concurring
opini9n in Hanover35 indicates that a senior trademark user who
can ~stabliSh territorial rights through any of the above circum. stances.-is prima facie entitled to statewide rights;36 but there is
a co~licting tendency to limit territorial rights in secondarymeaning marks to the area of secondary meaning37 unless the
junior 1J5er adopted his mark with the intention of capitalizing on
·-.·;tbe reputation of the senior user or with the knowledge that the
·,senior user would soon expand into his trade area. Absent laches
·,. or acquiescence on the part of the senior user, a junior user who
- -deliberately or recklessly initiates concurrent use on competing
goods iS seldom given any consideration regardless of the nature
of the mark or the location of his use. 38
· ·B. The Validity of Strong Trademark Protection
The common-law decisions which determine that the impact
~91 junior use upon the senior user is not sufficient to justify
35. Hanover Star Mllling Co. v. Metcalf 240 U.S. 403, 424 (1916).
36. Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 224 F .Zd 100 (2d Cir. 1955); accord,
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Oil City Refiners, Inc., 136 F .2d 470 (6th
Cir.), cert. den. 320 U.S. 798 (1943); Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Jones,
27 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1928); Blanchard & Co. v. Charles Gilman &
;1 - Son, 145 U.S.P.Q. 62 (D, Mass 1965); Forzly v. American Distilling
h'. Co., 142 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Younker v. Nationwide Mut.
I:ns. Co,, 175 Ohio St. 1, 191 N.E.2d 145 (1963). But see Yarbrough,
note 33 ~ at 929-30. Territorial rights beyond the area of actual
use may,ol'course, be forfeited by laches. Jacobs v. Iodent Chem.
Co., 41 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1930).
37. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Square Deal Market Co,, 206 F .2d 482
(D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. den., 346 U.S. 937 (1954); Applebaum v. Senior,
154 Cal. App. 2d 371, 316 P.2d 410 (1957); Zimmerman v. B. & C.
Motel Corp., 401 Pa. 278, 163 A.2d 884 (1960); cf., O'Hara v. Lance,
77 Ariz. 84, 267 P.2d 725 (1954) (term in common use); Seegmiller
v. Hunt, 391 P.2d 298 (Utah 1964) (term in common use). See also
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 264 F .2d 88 (6th Cir.

ap.

1959).

White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle System Corp., 90 F.2d 67
(6th Cir.), cert. den., 302 U.S. 720 (1937); accord, Fry v. LayneWestern Co., 282 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1960); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Lakeland Grocery Corp., 301 F .2d 156 (4th Cir.), cert. den., 371 U.S.
817 (1962). But see Yellow Cab Co. v. 8achs, 191 Cal. 238, 216 Pac.
33 (1923). Sachs was termed unique in ."Developments in the LawTrade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 858 &
n.326 (1955). A fortiori, the junior user is invariably enjoined when
his adoption of the mark was intended to forestall expansion by the
senior user. Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet 11 1611 Shop, Inc., 15 F .2d 920
(8th Cir. 1926); accord. Triangle Pub. Inc. v. Central Pub. Co., 117
F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v.
Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 8 App, Div. 2d 228, 188 N. Y.S.2d 132 (3d Dep1t
1959).
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enjoining the junior user permit some junior users to benefit gratuitously from the reputation of established marks. It is the privileged existence of these junior users that underlines much of
the dispute concerning the validity of strong trademark protection.

1. The Cry of Monopoly
The hue for strong trademark protection has long been countered with the cry of monopoly. This imprecise word, charged as
it is with negative connotations, has generated far more heat than
light on the validity of trademark protection.39 In 1742 after hear
ing the first recorded attempt to obtain equitable relief for trademark infringement, Lord Hardwicke correctly dismissed the bill
on the ground that to grant protection would be to enforce an illegal monopoly. 40 This ratio decidendi was fully justified because
the plaintiff's right to his mark derived from an exclusive charter
for the manufacture of playing cards granted in defiance of Parliament by Charles the First.41 In 1936 Harvard economist Edward
Chamberlin was equally warranted in pointing out that trademarks
have monopolistic characteristics in terms of economic theory because the existence of marks impairs the product homogeneity
characteristic of theoretical pure competition. 42 But the cry of
monopoly is also raised by defendants in trademark infringement
suits in an effort to cloud the issues and to create a specious aura
of illegality. In this context the cry of monopoly is usually used
as a counterpoise to a claim of exclusive rights in words or in
an effort to trade on the condemnation of certain monopolies by
the antitrust laws.
·
a. Trademarks as Word Monopolies
Now and again a judge will fervently denounce an attempt
to "monopolize" words through the assertion of trademark
39. See Pattishall, "Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia," 42 Trademark
Rept. 588 (1952).
40. Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484, 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (Ch. 1742) (alternative
holding).
41. Darcy v. Allein, 11 Co. Rep 846, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602), the
celebrated "Case of Monopolies," had invalidated a similar royal dispensation. See Fox, Monopolies and Patents 128 & n.21 (1947).
42. In economic terms "monopoly'' means control over supply and therefore control over price. See Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Com·
petition 7 (1st ed. 1936). Theoretical pure competition postulates that
no producer has control over price because all producers supply identical goods for an identical market. Ibid. Trademarks are accordingly monopolistic because they differentiate producers' goods creating
an opportunity for producers to acquire some control over the price
of their goods. Id. at 56-70.
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rights.43 This is seldom a flash of insight, however, for the quintessence of trademark protection is the creation of a degree of
exclusivity in the use of words. 44 A more fundamental question
is ''When and to what extent should trademark rights be recognized?"
The courts have traditionally answered this question by restricting the ambit of exclusive rights to commercial uses which
materially affect a senior user's interests and by denying complete exclusivity within the area of significant impact if this is
necessary to preserve competition. A noncommercial use by
another of a word used as a mark, for example, reference to the
term in a magazine article or news report, is not actionable, 45
nor is a good faith commercial use by another which is unlikely
to be confused by purchasers with a prior use. 46 Moreover, exclusive rights are recognized solely in distinctive nondescriptive
language used to distinguish goods.47 No rights are recognized
in descriptive language unless purchasers associate the descriptive language with a particular tradesman and even then the degree of protection varies. Only limited rights can be acquired in
common descriptive names like "chair" or "bread" because competition would be unreasonably hampered if competitors could not
use these familar terms in describing their wares. 48 Highly descriptive language which is in fact commercially necessary for
competitors to use is similarly treated. For example, if the
senior user's mark is "Spanish Tile" for tile arches of Spanish
design, a junior user may be permitted to use "Spanish Tile" to
describe his goods accompanied by explanatory matter differentiating the users. 49 In view of the number of words available for
43. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine &. Boat Co., 226 F.
Supp. 716 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
44. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.),
cert. den., 320 U.S. 758 (1943),
45. See Derenberg, "The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antldilution Statutes," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 439, 463-69 (1956),
46. See Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 717, 731, 732 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1963).
47. s. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F,2d 176, 180 (2d Cir,),~
~., 338 U.S. 860 (1949) (dictum).
48. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 720, comment ,Q (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1963); cf. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 48 C,C,P,A, (Patents)
952, 289 F.2d 496 (1961). Product names may serve as components
of II composite trademarks, 11 e,g ., 11 Bond Bread." See Restatement
(Second), Torts supra, at § 724. The user of a composite mark only
acquires rights in his distinctive use of the common descriptive name,
e.g., the user of "Bond Bread'' might be able to prevent another from
marketing "Band Bread" especially if both marks are in similar script,
but he could not prevent the sale of "stroehmann's Bread,"
49. R, Guastavino Co. v. Comerma, 184 Fed. 549 (C,C,S,D,N,Y, 1911).
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adoption as marks,50 and the truncated scope of protection, a cry
of "word monopoly" is devoid of import as long as the commonlaw limitations on trademark rights are properly applied.
b. Trademarks as Antitrust Monopolies
An intimation that trademarks are in any way akin to the
monopolies condemned by the antitrust laws is even more unwarranted. The basic antimonopoly provision of the antitrust laws is
section 2 of the Sherman Act which declares:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdeameanor. . . .51
As is apparent from the fact of the statute, section 2 condemns
not monopoly but monopolization, which has been defined as the
possession by a single enterprise of the power to fix prices or
exclude competition within a relevant market plus purposeful use
or preservation of this power.52 A trademark "monopoly" is patently not a violation of the Sherman Act in and of itself.
It is possible, however, that the use of trademarks could
indirectly result in violation of section 2. The market within
which monopoly power is measured is delineated both in terms
of area and products53 so that trademarks are significant to the
extent that they affect product market determination. If the mere
existence of a trademark ever justified definition of the relevant
product market in terms of a trademark user's brand of goods,
the trademark user would ipso facto possess "monopoly power"
in every relevant geographical market because of his "general
right" to sell his goods to vendees of his choice at prices of his
own determination,54 and it would follow that a trademark user
who deliberately perpetuated this "monopoly power," for example,
by refusing to license a competitor to use the mark on the competitor's goods, would be engaging in illegal "monopolization."55
Since this interpretation of section 2 would naturally tend to induce
50. Courts some times refer to the "infinity" of terms available as marks.
E.g., stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F .2d 348, 361 (9th Cir. 1948).
51. § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 2 (1964).
52. Att1y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 43 (1955).
53. Indiana Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293
u.s. 268, 279 (1934).
54. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953).
55. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F .2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
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accession to a competitor's request for a trademark license, it
is interesting to note that Justice Department representatives have
pointed out with some justification that the sharing of marks by
competitors is an open invitation to collateral antitrust violations:'>6
In any event, the Supreme Court has rendered untenable an ass er tion that a trademark "monopoly" necessarily creates monopoly
power by making it abundantly clear that the relevant product
market must constitute a meaningful economic market. In Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, Chief Justice Warren summarized the
pertinent considerations as follows:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and
substitutes for it. However, within this broad market, welldefined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes. • • . The
boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the
product• s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.57

In view of the inquiry into substitute products required by Brown
Shoe, it is inconceivable that a single brand of a generic product
could constitute a product submarket under section 2 unless the
trademark user in fact monopolized the generic product market
itself,58 Though a celebrated trademark may offer some shelter
56. E.g., Timberg, "Trade-marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 356 (1949); see United States
v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N,J. 1949),
57. 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). Although Brown Shoe involved § 7 of the
Clayton Act, § 7, 38 stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 18
(1964), which forbids stock or asset acquisitions if the effect may be
to substantially lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly,
the Court has indicated that the same general principles apply to product market determination under § 2 of the Sherman Act. International
Boxing Club v. United states, 358 U.S. 242, 249-52 & n. 8 (1959). The
variances that do exist in product market determination under§§ 2 and
7 are not material to the point made in the text. See, e.g., United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 u.s. 441, 447-58 (1964) (§ 7 relevant product market includes products in different industries which
have the same uses); United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956) (dictum) (§ 2 relevant product market does
not include all products in different industries which have the same
end uses),
58. E.g., United States v. Klear Flax Linen Looms, 63 F. Supp. 32 (D.
Minn. 1945).
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from competitive pressures, it would be paying an unwarranted
(and unwanted) compliment to Madison Avenue to conclude that
consumer hypnosis foreclosed competition from other brands. 59
Yet this is precisely what a lower federal court concluded in
United States v. Guerlain, Inc. 60 Needless to say, the facts were
unusual.
The defendant, the exclusive American distributor for a
French toilet goods manufacturer, had obtained American trademark registrations for his supplier's marks61 and filed copies
with the Secretary of the Treasury. This enabled the defendant
to take advantage of section 526 of the Tariff Act 62 which directs
customs officials to bar importation of foreign merchandise bearing marks that infringe registered American trademarks. The
Justice Department charged that the defendant's resort to section
526 constituted both monopolization and an attempt to monopolize.
Before reaching the Sherman Act question, the court held that
section 526 did not immunize the defendant's actions because the
statute was not available to an American business that was contractually controlled by a foreign manufacturer. The court then
determined that the relevant market was the trademarked toilet
goods sold by the defendant in the United States. Since the defendant's exclusive distributorship established the existence of
monopoly power within this relevant market, use of the Tariff Act
to prevent other persons from importing the trademarked goods
was held to constitute monopolization. The Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction in Guerlain,63 but before the Court heard
argument the government obtained leave to vacate the judgments.64
59. See Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition 62 (8th ed. 1962).
60. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Three consolidated cases with similar facts were involved. A fourth case was terminated by consent
decree. United States v. Empro Corp., 1954 Trade Cas. ,r 67778
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (consent decree). The conclusion had previously been
discredited. See United States v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 Fed. 499,
506-07 (N.D. Ill. 1916) (dissenting opinion), appeal dismissed, 253 U.S.
499 (1920) and Hale & Hale, Market Power: Size and Shape Under
the Sherman Act 97-98 (1958).
61. An exclusive distributor who has an assignment of his supplier's
American trademark rights can obtain registration. E. Leitz, Inc.,
v. Commissioner of Patents, 152 F. Supp. 631 (D.D.C. 1957), a.ff' cl.
254 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1958); accord, Roger & Gallet v. Janmarie,
Inc., 44 c.c.P.A. (Patents) 965, 245 F .2d 505 (1957).
62. § 526, 46 Stat. 741 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1964).
63. Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 937 (1958); Parfums Corday,
Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 951 (1958).
64. Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958). The district
court subsequently dismissed the suit with prejudice. United States
v. Guerlain, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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The Justice Department dropped the suits at the last minute because. of intragovernmental conflict, the Bureau of Customs being
constr;i.ined by the Tariff Act to abet the controverted conduct. 65
The crucial and •vulnerable aspect of Guerlain is its determination of the relevant product market. The defendant advisedly
argued that all reasonably interchangeable toilet goods should have
been included.66 Although agreeing that the defendant's evidence
suggested the objective interchangeability of several brands of highly advertised toilet goods, the district judge stated that the significance of objective interchangeability was negated by "lack of objectivity in consumer demand. 11 67 He drew this inference from
the defendant's evidence that highly exploited trademarks sold more
perfume than quality content did, and from defendant's failure to
introduce evidence of the responsiveness of sales of one brand to
changes in the price of another. This was unjustified. Under the
applicable precedents the government bore both the risk of nonpersuasion and the burden of going forward with evidence to counter objective interchangeability. 68 The district judge sought to
· buttress his position by contending that the defendant's obvious
intent to exclude competition made a limited market determination
appropriate.69 This was equally untenable insofar as the defendant was charged with single-firm monopolization. The ban on monopolization forbids misuse of actual economic power not improper
intent alone. 70 It is not surprising that the Guerlain theory of
65. See Stern, "Solicitor General's Office," 46 A.B.A.J. 154, 157 (1960).
At the same time the government futilely sponsored legislation to make
§ 526 of the Tariff Act inapplicable if a "branch-factory, parent-subsidiary, agency, licensee, partnership, or similar relationship" existed
between an American trademark registrant and foreign business units.
H.R. 9476, § 501 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). See Derenberg, "The
Seventh Year," 44 Trademark Rep. 991, 996-1000 (1954).
66. The "reasonably interchangeable" text was enunciated in the Cellophane
case, United States v. E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956) and reaffirmed in Brown Shoe. See text accompanying note 5 7
supra.
811. 155 F. Supp. 77, 85.
68. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., note 66 supra, at
381, 404; accord, United States v. International Boxing Club, 150 F.
Supp. 397, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'cl. 358 U.S. 242 (1959); see Turner,
"Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 303
(1956); Note, 67 Yale L. J. 1110, 1116 n. 16 (1958); 56 Mich. L. Rev.
309, 310 (1957).
&g~

155 F. Supp. 77, 85-86.

70. See United States v. E. I. du Pont .de Nemours & Co., note 66 supra,
at 394-95 & n. 23; Handler, "Trademarks-Assets or Liabilities?" 48
Trademark Rep. 661, 669-70 (1958). On the other hand, the defendant
was also charged with an attempt to monopolize. If the district judge

18

TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS

market determination has met the same fate as the decision itself. The only specific citation to the opinion is in a dissent to
the Sixth Circuit decision in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co. 71 with respect to a point not considered by the Supreme Court
in its subsequent disposition of Tampa Electric. A few lines from
the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. E. L du Pont de
Nemours & Co. that have endured portray the true relationship of
trademarks to section 2 of the Sherman Act wherever product
market definition is material to establishing the offense charged:
One can theorize that we have monopolistic competition72
in every nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer
having power over the price and production of his own product. However, this power that, let us say, automobile or
soft-drink manufacturers have over their trade-marked products is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be appraised in terms of the competitive
market for the product. 73

One of the subtleties of innuendoes that trademarks are akin
to monopolies condemned by the antitrust laws is the fact that
market definition is not a prerequisite of all section 2 offenses
so that in some instances it may superficially appear that a brand
of goods constituted the relevant product market. In addition to
monopolization, section 2 condemns combinations, conspiracies,
and attempts to monopolize.74 Combinations to monopolize are
(Footnote continued)
was right in holding that section 526 of the Tariff Act did not immunize the defendant's conduct, the judge was correct in finding an
attempt to monopolize, the difference being that market determination
is superfluous at least when an attempt to monopolize results in actual
exclusion of competition. See Smith, "Attempt to Monopolize," 27
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 227, 237-38 (1958). See also note 87 infra and
accompanying text.
71. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F .2d 766, 780 (6th
Cir. 1960) (dissenting opinion), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 320
(1961).
72. This is Professor Chamberlin's term for the economic effect of product differentiation. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition
6-9 (8th ed. 1962).
73. United states v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., note 66 supra, at
393. This language was cited with approval in Nelligan v. Ford Motor
Co., 262 F2d 556 (4th Cir. 1959); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., 243 F .2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den., 355 U.s. 822
(1957), Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 149 F. Supp. 790 (M.D.
N.C. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 252 F .2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958). See
also A-1 Business Mach. Co. v. Underwood Corp., 216 F. Supp 36
(E.D. Pa. 1963).
74. § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
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permanent amalgamations of businesses which result in the attainment of monopoly power75 whereas conspiracies and attempts to
monopolize refer respectively to group and individual conduct motivated by a specific intent to monopolize regardless whether monopoly power is actually achieved. 76 Since deliberately anticompetitive group action poses considerable danger to competition, conspiracies to monopolize are unlawful wherever an appreciable
amount of commerce is involved. 77 In contrast, combinations to
monopolize, which involve more equivocal conduct, require greater
attention to the relevant market. The principal views are that the
product mark.et should consist of any distinctive commodity with
qualitatively distinct substitutes prima facie excluded 78 and that
reasonably interchangeable substitutes should be prima facie included as in the case of monopolization. 79 The dispute is largely
academic because the government currently tests combinations
under the more rigorous legal standards of section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act, 80 but reconciliation is
possible. The narrow view of product market determination is
predicated upon horizontal combination cases. 8l On the other hand,
in a vertical combination case 82 decided under section 1 of the
Sherman Act 83 the Supreme Court concluded that all products that
75. See Turner, note 68 supra, at 305.
76. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (conspiracy
to monopolize); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,
531-32 (1948) (attempt to monopolize).
77. United states v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir.
1961); see United states v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., note 66
supr11, at 395 n. 23; Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Service Co. v. WorldWide Automobile Corp., 34 F .R.D. 134 (D.N.J. 1963). But see Packard
Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., note 73 supra; United States
v. Johns-Manville Corp., ATRR 157: A-13 (7/14/64). See Smith. "Attempt to Monopolize," 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 227, 240-41 (1958); Turner, note 68 supra, at 304-05. See contra, Handler & Robinson, "A
Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act," 61
Colum. L. Rev. 629, 645 (1961).
78. See Turner, note 68 supr~ at 304-07.
79. See Whipple, "Problems of Combination-Integration, Intra-Corporate
Conspiracy and Joint Ventures," 1958 CCH Antitrust Symp. 34, 36.
80. E.g., United states v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665
(1964) (§ 1); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963) (§ 7).
81. See Turner, note 75 ~ at 286-89, 305-07. Horizontal combinations involve competitors.
82. Vertical combinations involve businesses on different levels of production or distribution, i.e., a supplier and a customer.
83. § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1964). § 1 forbids
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of
trade.
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could be conveniently manufactured by the same production facilities were within the relevant market.84 Although Brown Shoe
makes clear that product market determination is primarily a
question of fact, 85 a distinction between the factual inquiries necessary in vertical and horizontal combination cases has continued
theoretical validity under section 2. 86 The extent to which attempts to monopolize require consideration of the relevant product market is presently unclear. 87 The Supreme Court recently
denied certiorari of a holding that product market definition is
irrelevant. 88
Review of the relationship of trademarks to section 2 of the
Sherman Act makes clear that trademarks are unrelated to the
monopolies condemned by the Sherman Act. If product market
definition is material to a section 2 offense, the market delineated must be a meaningful economic market for a generic product or products. On the other hand, if product market determination is not integral to a section 2 offense, the existence of
trademarked goods is likewise immaterial. The cry of monopoly
has little legitimate antitrust content.
c. Trademarks as Sources of Economic Monopoly
Abjuring misleading and discredited charges of antitrust monopoly and word monopoly, modern critics of liberal trademark
84. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). The combination in Columbia Steel also had a horizontal posture which the
Court found nonviolative of § 1. Although the Court has recently restricted the Columbia Steel decision to its "special facts" with regard
to horizontal combinations, United states v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964), the aspect of the decision dealing with the
product market in vertical combinations was cited with approval in
Brown Shoe. Brown Shoe Co. v. United states, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42
(1962).
85. See Handler, "Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments," 17
Record of A.B.C.N. Y. 411, 435 (1962).
86. Though the production flexibility test of Columbia Steel is subject to
criticism, see Note, "Product Market Definition Under the Sherman
and Clayton Acts," 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 861, 867-68 (1962), more leeway should be permitted vertical combinations because they are not
as patently anticompetitive. Cf. Handler, "Recent Antitrust Developments," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159, 176-77 (1963).
87. Compare Handler & Robinson, "A Decade of Administration of the
Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act," 61 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 645 (1961);
Turner, "Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case," 70 Harv. L. Rev.
281, 304-05 (1956); Smith, "Attempt to Monopolize," 27 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 227, 233-38, 243-44 (1958).
88. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 377
U.S. 993 (1964). But see United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., ATRR
157: A-13 (7/14/64).
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protection condemn trademarks for producing economic monopoly.
In economic terms monopoly entails control over the supply of a
product with consequent control over its price.89 Trademarks
were accordingly classified as having monopolistic consequences
by Harvatd economist Edward Chamberlin because the differenti, ation of a generic product into various brands gives each seller
an economic monopoly over his own brand with control over price
realizable to the extent that consumer preference can be established for a brand. 90 Chamberlin pointed out that regardless
whether sellers of competing brands succeeded in gaining significant control over price, the apparent opportunity to do so led to
vigorous sales promotion, increased costs, and higher industry
prices.91 Although trademarks only constituted an example of
product differentiation in Chamberlin's general analysis of the
need for a new economic theory of value, he went on in an appendix to suggest that trademark protection might be ill-advised.92
Chamberlin noted, for example, that repudiation of trademark protection would allow competitors to whittle away the product differentiation caused by trademarks, pro tanto, restoring the product homogeneity characteristic of pure competition, and that any
diversion of trade accompanying the copying of established marks
would merely siphon off monopoly profits attributable to product
differentiation. 93
Chamberlin's economic theory has gained far more acceptance than his suggestions concerning abolition of trademark protection. 94 This was not altogether unexpected for Chamberlin
himself has indicated unwillingness to convert his suggestions into
recommendations.95 One of the reasons for his reluctance is undoubtedly that the abandonment of trademark protection which he
89. Chamberltn, Theory of Monopolistic Competition 7 (8th ed. 1962).
90. Id. at 65-68.
91. This aspect of Chamberlin's thesis is neatly summarized in Bain,
Pricing, Distribution, and Employment 367-68 (rev. ed. 1953).
92. Chamberlin, note 89 !!!I?!:!, at 270-74.
93. These analytical arguments seem principally intended to provoke reexamination of the premises of trademark protection. See Chamberlin "Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy," 40 Am. Econ. Rev.
85-86 (1950); ~- Cohen, 11 Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
ApProach,11 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814-17 (1935).
94. Compare Borden, Advertising in our Economy 40-42 (1945); Brown,
"Advertising and the Public Interest," 57 Yale L. J. 1165, 1171 n.
29 (1948) with Comment, "The Anti-Competitive Aspects of Trade
Name Protection and the Policy Against Consumer Deception," 29 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 371, 380 (1962).
95. See Chamberlin, note 93 supra. For an inference that Chamberlin
overstressed the disadvantages of product differentiation see Bain,
note 91 supra, at 366-74.
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proposed was linked to the concomitant adoption of large-scale
government grade labeling. 96 Since the latter has not come to
pass, Chamberlin's analysis indicates that he concedes trademark
protection is justifiable at least where purchaser deception is
probable and the junior user is selling an inferior product. 97

2. The Cry of Restriction
Chamberlin's economic analysis, in league with a skepticism
toward trademark protection fueled by the T.N.E.C. hearings and
hostility to the excesses of advertising, has produced demands for
a restrictive attitude toward trademark protection.98 If there is
any doubt whether a claim of trademark rights is in the public
interest, restrictionists contend that protection should be denied.
The cardinal tenet of the restrictionists is that trademark protection should be limited to preservation of the identification function
of trademarks because the private interests of a senior user are
considered worthy of protection only where they coincide with the
social interest in avoiding deception of purchasers.99 In essence,
the cry of restriction is an articulation of the metaphorical cry
of monopoly.
3. The Cry of Dilution
The case for strong trademark protection is succinct.
I. Schechter, an ardent protectionist, put it this way:

Frank

The owner of a trade-mark who expends large sums of
money in making his mark known to the public as a symbol
and guarantee of the excellence of his product should receive the same protection from the courts for his investment in advertising his trademark that he would undoubtedly
be entitled to receive for investment in plant and materials.100
There is little doubt that the pecuniary value of an established
trademark and the expectancy of custom which the mark both
96. Chamberlin, note 89 supr:1., at 273. See Auerbach, "Quality Standards,
Informative Labeling, and Grade Labeling as Guides to Consumer
Buying," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 363 (1949) for presentation of a
possible government grade labeling program.
97. Chamberlin, note 89 supra, at 273.
98. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F .2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir.
1945) (Frank, J. concurring); Brown, note 94 supra, at 1205-06; Oppenheim, "The Public Interest in the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property," 40 Trademark Rep. 613, 615-16 (1950).
99. E.g., Brown, note 94 supra, at 1184-1206; cf. stern & Hoffman, "Public Injury and the Public Interest," 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 935-41, 970-71
(1962).
100. Schechter, Historical Foundations of Trade-Mark Law 171 (1925).
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symbolizes and stimulates have been powerful factors in molding
judicial attitudes toward trademark rights.101 One commentator
has neatly illustrated Mr. Schechter's point by analogizing trademark protection to the legal principles governing trespass to land.102
Not content with explaining the status quo, however, Schechter
utilized his aphorism to justify the strongest possible trademark
protection. Schechter argued that the only rational basis of trademark protection was preservation of the uniqueness of marks.103
Businessmen who invented terms for use as marks or who assiduously promoted the distinctiveness of their marks should be able
to prevent others from using those marks in broad territorial markets and on noncompeting as well as on competing goods. On the
other hand, businessmen who elected to use words in common use
as marks should receive a narrow ambit of protection consonant
with the lack of distinctiveness of their symbols. Schechter's
theory is known as the "dilution" theory of trademark protection
because he contended that the user of a distinctive trademark
should be able to enjoin all junior users in order to prevent "dilution" (diminution) of the mark's uniqueness. He believed that
the senior user of a distinctive mark had a legitimate interest in
ensuring that the term was solely associated by purchasers with
his product.104
Although the distinctiveness of a mark is one factor considered by the courts in determining whether a junior user is apt to
be associated by purchasers with a senior user, in the absence of
probable purchaser deception most judges have rejected dilution
as a ground of relief at common law. 105 Proponents of the dilution theory have accordingly sought legislative approbation of the
theory, and with some success. Five state currently have anti101. E.g., National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp.
499, 506 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd, 140 F .2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944) (dictum).
102. Willcox, "Territorial Extent of Trade-Mark Rights," 25 Ill. L. Rev.
485, 489-92 (1931).
103. Schechter, "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection," 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 813, 830-31 (1927).
104. Id., at 825-26.
105. Compare Champion Paper & Fibre Co. v. National Association of
Mutual Insurance Agents, 148 F. supp. 123 (D.D,C.), aff'd. 249 F .2d
525 (D.C. Cir. 1957), with Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc.,
147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. SUpp. 459 (SU.p. Ct. N. Y. County) aff'd per
curiam, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y. SU.pp. 821 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd
.!!!fil!!•, 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933). See Derenberg, "The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes," 44 Calif.
L. Rev. 439, 450-51 (1956); Middleton, "Some Reflections on Dilution,"
42 Trademark Rep. 175, 184-87 (1952). But see Day, "State AntiDilution Without a Statute," 54 Trademark Rep. 590 (1964).

24

TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS

dilution statutes, 106 and hearings were held on a proposed federal
act in June of 1964.107 Nevertheless, the courts have generally
restrictively construed the anti-dilution statutes to the chagrin of
exponents of liberal trademark protection.108
C. Interplay Between the Cry of Dilution and the Cry of Restriction With Respect to Concurrent Territorial Use on Competing
Goods
Since the restrictionist approach takes a "show me" attitude
toward the asserted desirability of trademark protection, there is
no necessary conflict between dilutionist and restrictionist positions with respect to territorial trademark rights. Indeed, it is
the thesis of this monograph that the social interest in free competition, which ordinarily overrides the social interest in avoiding
deception of purchasers, 109 favors strong territorial trademark
protection with respect to competing goods.
The Hanover and Rectanus cases are readily understandable
in their historical context. The cases were decided before radio,
television, and national magazines made possible widespread exploitation of vast territorial markets and facilitated the development of farflung marketing systems by mail order houses, chain
stores, and franchisors.110
Moreover, the felicitous dicta of the
Supreme Court made it easy for the lower courts to adjust to the
revolution in marketing through rigorous application of the exceptions to the recognition of concurrent territorial rights; namely,
where a junior user adopted his mark with intention of benefiting
from the senior user's reputation, or where, regardless of the
junior user's intent, the senior use was known in the junior user's
marketing area or that area was within the senior user's probable
106. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 35-lli(c)(1963); Ga. Code Ann. § 106-115
(1956); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1955); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 110, § 7A (1954); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d.
107. Hearings on H.R. 4651 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964),
108. See "Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O' the Wisp?;" 54
Trademark Rep. 184, 192-95 (1964). But see Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963); Tiffany & Co. v. Boston
Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964).
109. See Handler, "Trade-Marks and Antitrust Law," 38 Trademark Rep.
387-91 (1948).
110. The Department of Commerce's 1958 census of business indicated
that there were 182, 735 multiunit retail organizations in the United
States. 1 Census of Business 4-2 (1958). See also Weiss, Merchandising for Tomorrow 10-13 (1961) (discussing the trend toward giant
retailing). With respect to franchising see Hall, "Franchising-New
Scope for an Old Technique," 42 Harv. Bus. Rev. 60 (1964).
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zone of expansion at the time that the junior user adopted his mark.
Nevertheless, a junior user who can establish inadvertent adoption
of a senior user's mark in a discrete trade territory to which the
senior user's reputation had not spread can generally rely on the
Hanover and Rectanus cases to block orderly expansion of territorial markets by the senior user .111 Because the collision of
interests frequently does not occur until a senior user has invested substantial sums in his mark, he is forced to choose between (1) purchasing the junior user's rights, (2) proceeding at
his own peril, {3) adopting a new mark,112 or (4) staying out of
the junior user's territory.113 The first alternative may be impracticable if the junior user demands an exorbitant price;114 the
second may be stymied by an infringement suit brought by the
junior user; 115 the third may lead to later conflict with another
good faith concurrent user; and the fourth results in a noncompetitive division of trade territories.
The validity of recognition of
concurrent territorial rights where marks are used on competing
goods is further undercut by the premium it places on financial
resources. Smaller firms which can ill afford to adopt a new
mark or to buy out a concurrent user are more likely to be forced
to curtail their market expansion than more affluent competitors.116
In the long run this may not only exclude a potential competitor
from a junior user's trade territory but impair a smaller firm •s
ability to compete against the giants of its particular industry.
The unsatisfactory state of territorial trademark rights at
common law is easily illustrated. International cartel arrangements allocating world markets sometimes require participants to
adopt identical trademarks for like goods. After each participant
111. E.g., Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Sanders Co., 328 F.2d 496 (8th Cir.
1964); accord, Katz Drug Co. v. Katz, 188 F .2d 696 (8th Cir. 1951).
112. This might be done by adopting an entirely new mark or by adopting
a second mark for use in the area of concurrent use. Both are expensive but the latter involves serious distribution problems as well.
See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,"
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 900 (1955).
113. See Browne, "Three Major Trademark Problems in the United States,"
2 PTC J. Res. & Ed. 135 (1958).
114. E.g., Symposium, "Trademarks in the Market Place," 53 Trademark
Rep. 687, 696-97 (1963). During the legislative hearings on the Lanham Bill it was suggested that courts should be given discretion to
order sale of concurrent territorial rights at a reasonable price.
1941 House Hearings at 187 (remarks of Louis Robertson).
115. E.g., Conley v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 125 u.s.P.Q. 2 (N.D. Cal.
1959).
116. See also Hopkins, Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Competition
25 (4th ed. 1924).
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acquires enforceable rights in the mark within his allotted territory, use by his co-conspirators of the same mark permits utilization of remedies for trademark infringement to enforce the allocation of markets both against fellow participants and third parties.117 This collusive manipulation of territorial trademark
rights is clearly illegal as an unreasonable restraint of trade
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.118 Although the coincidental
allocation of trade territories within the American market fostered by the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights carries no similar taint of antitrust illegality,119 the result is analogous to that
of the cartel arrangements. Consider, for instance, the ironic
interaction between trademark and antitrust law that followed the
1911 dissolution of the Standard Oil combination.120 Prior to divestment of its corporate empire Standard Oil of New Jersey had
divided the country into districts and turned over the oil business
in each district to a marketing subsidiary which acquired territorial rights to the "Standard" name and mark.121 After these
subsidiaries were separated from Standard Oil of New Jersey, the
doctrine of concurrent territorial rights enabled each former subsidiary to prevent the others from expanding their operations over
the borders of the old districts under the "Standard" mark, 122
The various "Standard" oil companies possessed sufficient resources
117. See Timberg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 334-41 (1949).
118. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. supp, 114 (S.D, Ohio 1954),
aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). See also United States v.
Bayer Co,, 135 F. SUpp. 65 (S.D.N. Y. 1955). § 1 forbids contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. § 1, 26 Stat.
209 (1890), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1964).
119. A parallel agreement for concurrent territorial use would, however,
be of doubtful validity under § 1. See "Developments in the LawTrade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 899-900
(1955).
120. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See Sherman,
"Trademark Problems as I See Them," 52 Trademark Rep. 1190-91
(1962).
121. The subsidiaries included Standard OU Co. of California, Standard
Oil Co. of Indiana, Standard Oil Co. of Iowa, Standard Oil Co. of
Kansas, Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky, Standard Oil Co. of Nebraska,
Standard Oil Co, of Ohio, and Standard Oil Co. of New York.
122. Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 98 F .2d 1 (8th Cir. 1938);
accord, Standard on Co. of Indiana v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 141
F. SUpp. 876 (D. Wyo. 1956), affld. 252 F.2d 65 (loth Cir. 1958); see
Note, "Use of Confusing Brand Names by Standard Oil Companies,"
48 Yale L.J. 332 (1938). See also Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil
Co., 239 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Mo. 1965) (proceeding to modify 8th Cir.
decree). In one instance the right to prevent market penetration has
been held waived by contract. Humble Oil Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil
Co., 229 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
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to develop new trademarks and trade names with which to penetrate one another's territories, 123 but companies with more modest
means might not find this possible.124
In view of the foregoing, it is difficult to accept the Justice
Department's contention during the hearings on the Lanham Bill
that "legitimate rights of the owners of trade names and trademarks are adequately protected by the principles of law prohibiting unfair competitive practices." 125 Insofar as territorial trademark rights are concerned, by ignoring the noncompetitive consequences of the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights this
statement exalts principles of trademark law over the social interest in free competition in exactly the same manner as the Justice Department charged that the supporters of the Lanham Bill
sought to do. It became evident during the hearings that the Justice Department fell into this inconsistency because of misconception of the consequences of the Hanover and Rectanus cases. At
one point, a Justice Department representative stated:
There is no occasion for a controversy to arise except in
those cases where territorial expansion may bring them
[concurrent territorial users] altogether; and in those
cases the courts work out, under decrees, arrangements
whereby, if the Florida and Washington men did expand to
Illinois, for example, there would be an arrangement whereby there would be a designation of the source so as to indicate the different ownership. [ matter in brackets supplied,] 126

The reference was to what was erroneously conceived to be the
common practice in trademark cases of permitting several persons to use the same term as a mark accompanied by qualifying
clauses or explanatory matter differentiating the users. E.g., If
"Toasted Corn Flakes" were the mark, a junior user might be
permitted to sell "Quaker Toasted Corn Flakes" accompanied by
a statement disclaiming association with the Kellogg Toasted Corn
Flake Co., the original manufacturer of "Toasted Corn Flakes. 11 127
Qualified decrees are utilized with some frequency to permit competitors to utilize generic or highly descriptive language which has
123. See Sherman, note 120 ~ at 1191.
124. Even the Standard on companies find the maintenance of multiple sets
of trademarks and tradena.mes "inefficient" and are currently endeavoring to develop new marks and names in which they can obtain nationwide rights. Ibid.
125. Statement of the Department of Justice, 1944 Senate Hearing at 59.
126. Id. at 40 (remarks of Elliott H. Moyer).
127. Cf. Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 Fed,
657 (6th Cir. 1916).
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acquired secondary meaning and to permit businessmen to use
marks comprising their personal names,128 but the Justice Department compounded its error concerning the prevalence of qualified
decrees by assuming that they were specifically used to adjust
conflicts between concurrent territorial users selling competing
goods. The Standard Oil Co. cases are proof positive that this
has not been so. In Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,129 for instance, the defendant had voluntarily used the words "Not Connected with Standard Oil Company (Indiana}" in conjunction with
its display of "Esso," but the Eighth Circuit nonetheless affirmed
the grant of an absolute injunction in the following terms:
It is urged that the so-called explanatory words, "Not
connected with Standard Oil Company (Indiana)," were sufficient to avoid the charge of unfair competition. First, it
may be noted in passing that manifestly defendant recognized
that without this explanation, confusion or deception might
result. The court found that notwithstanding the explanatory
words, actual deception and confusion did result. The marks
are simply words, or letters of the alphabet, not derivative
of the product . . . . They mean "Standard Oil," and "Standard Oil" in the named states means Standard Oil Company
of Indiana.130

Furthermore, the Standard Oil Co. cases do not stand alone. Because a trademark user's interests in avoiding loss of sales and
tarnishment of reputation are so intimately involved, absolute injunctions against concurrent use on competing goods in the same
territory have been the rule rather than the exception when a conflict has developed between concurrent territorial users. In J. A.
Dougherty's Sons v. Kasko Distillers Products Co.,131 for example,
128. See Handler & Pickett, "Trade-Marks and Trade Names," 30 Colum.
L. Rev. 168, 184-89, 196-200 (1930).
129. 98 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1938). A proceeding has been initiated to modify
this decree. Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 239 F. Supp. 97
(E.D. Mo. 1965).
130. 98 F.2d at 7, In Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65
(10th Cir. 1958) the Tenth Circuit similarly affirmed an absolute injunction against use of II Sohio" in marketing operations in Standard
of Indiana's trade territory.
131. 35 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1940); accord, Cohn-Goldwater Mfg. Co. v.
Wilk Shirt Co., 147 F .2d 767 (2d Cir. 1945); Hemmeter Cigar Co. v.
Congress Cigar Co., 118 F .2d 64 (6th Cir. 1941); Blanchard & Co.
v. Charles Gilman & Son, 145 U.S.P.Q. 62 (D. Mass. 1965); LayneWestern Co. v. Fry, 174 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Mo. 1959), rev'd on
other grounds, 282 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1960); Oakford Co. v. Kroger
Co., 157 F. Supp. 453 (S.D. Ill. 1957); cf. Farbenfabriken Bayer,
A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 307 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. den.,
372 U.S. 929 (1963).
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the senior user was absolutely enjoined from using "Country Gentleman" on whisky in Pennsylvania and the junior user was absolutely enjoined from using "Country Gentleman" on whisky in territories served by the senior user or within his normal area of
expansion. The Justice Department accordingly failed to controvert, or even to acknowledge, the fact that the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights nurtures noncompetitive divisions of trade
territory that are immune from challenge under the antitrust
laws.132
It could, of course, be contended that the courts and not the
Justice Department are wrong and that qualified decrees should
be employed more frequently to prevent the noncompetitive consequences of concurrent territorial use by sellers of competing
goods. The difficulty with this solution is that it palliates the
consequences of concurrent territorial use without affecting its
incidence. Furthermore, a qualified decree may neither prevent
purchaser confusion nor satisfy either trademark user. In a number of cases qualified decrees have actually resulted in years of
further litigation.133 Although the qualified decree is a legitimate technique, it is by no means a panacea.
One commentator has suggested that the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights indicates a judicial preference for encouragement of unfettered competition by junior users in lieu of
encouragement of large-scale production and expansion by senior
users.134 If this is true, the judicial logic is patently specious. ~
Where junior use originates in a territory unexploited by the senior user, there is obviously no competition between the senior
user and the junior user at that time. Furthermore, once a market overlap becomes possible, the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights places an additional obstacle in the way of the development of competition by arming the junior user with legal remedies
for trademark infringement to ward off sorties by the senior user
under his original mark. The net result is that the doctrine of
concurrent territorial rights actually discourages both large-scale
production and expansion and market competition. It is submitted,
132. This was not necessarily because the disadvantages of the Hanover
and Rectanus doctrine were overlooked. See Diggins, "Trade-Marks
and Restraints of Trade," 32 Geo. L.J. 113, 120 & n. 25 (1944).
Compare Hall, "Possible Monopoly Implications in the Trade-Mark
Bill," 32 Geo. L.J. 171, 174 (1944).
133. E.g., John B. Stetson Co. v. Steven L. Stetson Co., 14 F. Supp 74
(S.D.N, Y. 1936), mod., 85 F .2d 586 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. den., 299
U.S. 605 (1936), contempt proceedings, 128 F .2d 981 (2d Cir. 1942);
133 F .2d 129 (2d Cir. 1943).
134. Goble, "Where and What a Trade-Mark Protects," 22 Ill. L. Rev.
379, 382-83 (1927).
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however, that the deficiencies of the doctrine are not due to judicial obtuseness but are inherent in judicial demarcation of territorial trademark rights. If businessmen who wish to adopt valid
trademarks have no means of ascertaining what marks are in use,
the limitations of human ingenuity make it inevitable that multiple
good faith adoptions of similar marks will occur. When courts
are asked to resolve the subsequent conflicts, it is consonant with
fundamental principles of equity that good faith junior users should
not be penalized for the law's failure to provide them with a meaningful opportunity to avoid concurrent use. The scope of territorial trademark rights with respect to competing goods is fertile
ground for legislative innovation.

IL IMPACT OF THE LANHAM ACT ON
TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS

A. Background of the Lanham Act
1. State Legislation
State legislation has had virtually no influence on territorial
trademark rights. The trademark registration statutes which exist
in every statel are uniformly restricted to procedural and remedial provisions2 with the exception of the Texas Trademark Act,
which follows the common-law decisions extending rights throughout a state by making registration constructive notice of a claim
of trademark rights throughout Texas.a Indeed, a majority of state
registration statutes expressly provide that registration does not
prevent acquisition of common-law rights by other persons, 4 and
courts considering statutes without this express provision have
generally reached the same conclusion. 5 The anti-dilution statutes
in force in several states6 are equally innocuous. These statutes
prohibit dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark and likelihood of injury to the reputation of a trademark user so that in
1. See 53 Trademark Rep. 1008-11 (1963).
~
2. See Sacks & Stokes, "Statutory Treatment of the Model State Trademark Bill in the Areas of Service Marks and Conflicting Federal Registrations," 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 353, 354-55 (1959).
3. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 851-C, §§ 5, 14 (1962); see generally
Pravel, "New Texas Trademark Act," 44 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 486 (1962).
4. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 35-llk (1963); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 140,
§ 21 (Smith-Hurd 1955). This is a key provision of the Model State
Trademark Bill sponsored by the National Association of Secretaries
of State, the Council of state Governments, and the United States
Trademark Association. See generally Groen, "Recent Changes in
state Trademark Statutes," 47 Trademark Rep. 679 (1957); March,
"Judicial Interpretations of the Uniform state Trademark Law," 47
Trademark Rep. 687 (1957). Registration statutes derived from the
Model Bill are presently in force in twenty-seven states including
Texas. See 53 Trademark Rep. 1008-11 (1963).
5. E.g., Allen v. standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 210 F. Supp. 844
(W.D.N.C. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 323 F .2d 29 (4th Cir. 1963);
Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 777 (M.D.N.c. 1962);
see generally, Broman, "State Trade-Mark Registration Statutes," 39
Trademark Rep. 673 (1949).
6. E.g., Conn. Gen. stat. Ann. § 35-lli(c) (1963); Ga. Code Ann. § 106-115
(1956); m. Ann. stat. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1955); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 110, § 7A (1954); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d.
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order to qualify for protection a mark must possess distinctiveness or be known by reputation within the state. 7 Insofar as territorial trademark rights with respect to competing goods are concerned, the anti-dilution statutes accordingly do little more than
codify the common-law decisions extending territorial rights to
areas where a trademark user's mark is advertised 8 or known by
reputation. 9 California and Montana have a unique statute providing that "any person who has first adopted and used a trade-mark,
whether within or beyond the limits of this State, is its original
owner." 10 The statute could be construed to give the initial user
of a mark anywhere in the United States superior rights in California and Montana, but it is not surprising that the reported cases
in which out-of-state users have utilized the statute have all concerned bad faith junior users.11 It is extremely unlikely that the
statute would ever be applied to deprive good faith junior users of
their marks because the statute provides no mechanism,12 and,
indeed, no state has ever provided one, by which local businessmen can discover whether or not a mark is presently in use elsewhere in the United states. Furthermore, the statute's declaration that the initial user is merely the "original owner" of a mark
leaves the courts free to hold that the original user of a mark in
Portland, Maine, who commences use in Montana or California
after good faith local use by another, has forfeited his "original
ownership" by delay.13 The insubstantiality of the California and
7. Sterling Brewing, Jnc. v. Cold Spring Brewing Corp., 100 F. Supp. 412
(D. Mass. 1951).
8. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe, & Jack v. Pilavin, 77 u.s.P,Q. 265 (D. Mass.
1948); accorg, Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Jnc., 231 F. Supp. 836
(D. Mass. 1964).
9, Food Fair Stores, Jnc. v. Food Fair, Jnc., 83 F. Supp. 445 (D. Mass.
1948), aff'd, 177 F .2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949); accord. Great Scott Food
Mkt., Inc., v. Sunderland Wonder, Jnc., 203 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. Sup. Ct.
1965).
10. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14270; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 85-104 (1947),
Compare Gallo v. Safeway Brake Shops, Jnc., 140 So. 2d 912 (La. App.
1962).
11. See Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F .2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948); Derringer
v. Plate, 29 Cal. 293 (1865); Evans v. Shockley, 58 Cal. App. 427, 209
Pac. 42 (1922). The Montana statute has never been construed in a
reported decision.
12. The California statute permits registration of marks used in California,
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14230, whereas· the Montana statute permits
registration of marks used anywhere in the co\Dltry, Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. § 85-102 (1947). Neither statute, however, requires registration
in order to perfect senior rights acquired by out-of-state use against
good faith local users.
13. Compare Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 u.s. 403, 419-20
(1916).
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Montana statute is evinced by Utah's repeal of a similar provision14
in favor of an innocuous trademark registration statute which

~essly provides that registration does not affect rights "acquired in good faith at any time at common law." l5
The lackluster existence of the California and Montana statute indicates that the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights can
not be obviated by a legislative coup de grace which ignores the
problem that the Supreme Court sought to resolve. The judicial
conscience will not brook forfeiture of the advertising expenditures
and good will of good faith concurrent users because of lack of
, temporal priority alone. If there is no way in which businessmen
can find out what marks are already in use, judges are loathe to
penalize them for making an incorrect guess. On the other hand, ,
a trademark registration statute which provides fair notice concerning marks that are in use should substantially reduce these
judicial inhibitions. If businessmen can find out what marks are
in use, the noncompetitive consequences of the Hanover and Rectanus cases supply justification for preferring the interests of the
senior user when an overlap in territorial markets develops. State
registration statutes, however, have never created a sufficiently
meaningful file of reliable information concerning marks in use in
the United States to justify penalizing businessmen who adopt marks
conflicting with those in use elsewhere.16 Indeed, Texas is the
only state to penalize businessmen who fail to check the registry
concerning marks in intrastate use.17 State trademark registries
would become more adequate if registration were mandatory but
the Bar and powerful commercial interests have adamantly opposed
-any steps in this direction because of the time, expense, and duplication involved.18 This upshot is that only a federal registration
statute can alter the balance of interests that lies in the heart of
the Hanover and Rectanus cases.
14. Utah Code Ann. § 70-1-6 (1953), repealed, Utah Sess. Laws 1955, ch.
159, § 21.
15. Utah Code Ann. § 70-3-15 (1959).
16. Several commentators have questioned whether state registration statutes perform any useful function. 4 Callmann, Unfair Competition and
Trade-Marks 2090 n. 59.1 (Supp. 1963); Pollack, "State Trade-Marks
and Marks of Ownership," 14 Ohio St. L.J. 381 (1953). But see Deren.:· berg, "The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 439-40 (1956).
l'I~ Tex. Rev. Civ. stat. Ann. art. 851-C §§ 5, 14 (1962).
18~ See, e.g., Broman, "state Trade-Mark Registration Statutes," 39 Trademan: Rep. 673 (1949); Liddy, "The Problem of state Trade-Mark Registrations," 39 Trademark Rep. 667 (1949); Perry, "state Trade-Mark
Legislation," 37 Trademark- Rep. 283 (1947).
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2. Pre-Lanham Act Federal Legislation
The first federal trademark legislation was enacted in 1870.19
Because the Constitution does not mention trademarks, the legislation was based on article 1, section 8 of the Constitution which
empowers Congress
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;20

Both this statute and a related law providing criminal penalties
for the counterfeiting of registered marks21 were declared unconstitutional in the celebrated Trade-Mark Cases of 1879. 22 The
Supreme Court found no warrant for trademark legislation in the
congressional power to protect authors and inventors because
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery. . • • It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It is simply founded
on priority of appropriation. We look in vain in the statute
for any other qualification or condition.23

The Court intimated, however, that federal trademark legislation
could be based upon the commerce power24 if scrupulously limited
to commerce subject to the control of Congress. Congress took
this advice so literally that the Act of 1881 merely permitted registration with the Commissioner of Patents of common-law trademarks used in commerce with foreign nations or the Indian tribes.2
The bizarre Act of 1881 was replaced in 1905 by a statute which
extended registrability to common-law trademarks used in interstate commerce as well as to secondary-meaning marks used in
any commerce subject to control of Congress for ten years prior
to 1905.26 The Act of 1905 remained the major federal trademark
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Act 'of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 210-12.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141.
United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
Id. at 94.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502. A supplementary statute
made clear that the Act of 1881 applied to marks in use on the date
of enactment. Act of Aug. 5, 1882, ch. 393, 22 Stat. 298.
26. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724. The Act of 1905 repealed
all inconsistent laws except insofar as they applied to existing registrations under the Act of 1881. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592 § 30,
33 stat. 731. Renewals of 1881 registrations were to be treated as
registrations under the Act of 1905. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592,
§ 12, 33 Stat 727.

u.s.
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legislation previous to the Lanham Act despite the enactment in
1920 of a statute intended to enable users of secondary-meaning
marks that were unregistrable under the Act of 1905 27 to obtain
trademark rights in foreign countries in which protection was conijngent on registration in the home country.28 Consonant with its
limited objective the Act of 1920 permitted registration of virtually any mark which had been in "bona fide" use in commerce for
one year.29
The immediate consequence of the Trade-Mark Cases was
the invalidation of the first federal trademark legislation, but the
long-run effect, perpetuated by judicial dicta,30 was to raise doubts
concerning the constitutionality of federal legislation which altered
the common law of trademarks.31 The Act of 1905 reflected this
doubt in its procedural composition: registration provided standing
to sue in federal court,32 the ability to enforce an injunction in
any United States court, 33 and prima facie evidence of trademark
rights,3 4 but there was scant correlation between the right to use
and the right to register a mark. The common law governed the
acquisition of trademark rights, whereas registrability turned on
the narrower wording of the statute. Furthermore, the attainment
of registration was in no way determinative of the right to use.
Aside from affording slightly greater opportunity for actual notice
of a registrant's use,35 registration had no effect on the acquisition of concurrent territorial rights.36 One writer commented:
27. Acquisition of secondary meaning within the ten years prior to 1905

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.

was the sine qua non of registrability. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592,
§ 5, 33 Stat. 726.
Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533; see 4 Callmann, Unfair
Competition and Trade-Marks 2057-58 (2d ed. 1950).
Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 104, § l(b), 41 Stat. 533-34.
E.g., American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 381 (1926)
(dictum).
See Derenberg, Trade-Mark Protection and Unfair Trad~ 10-11 (1936).
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 17, 33 Stat. 728-29. This has been
singled out as the chief value of a 1905 registration. See Martin,
"Incentives to Register Given by the New Trade-Mark Act," 36 Trademark Rep. 213, 214 (1946).
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 20, 33 Stat. 729.
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 728.
Theodore Rectanus Co. v. United Drug Co., 226 Fed. 545, 553-54 (6th
Cir. 1915) (dictum); affld on other grounds, 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918) (Act of
1881); Griesdieck Western Brewery Co. v. Peoples Bre~ Co., 149
F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1945) (Act of 1905). The converse was not true.
Concurrent territorial use of registered marks was one of several
situations that deprived the federal register of meaning and consequently discouraged registration.
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11 [I] n doubtful cases the common law and not the Federal Act prevails. Every registered right must, without exception, yield to a
better common law right. 11 37
A procedural federal trademark statute may have been feasible when, as the Supreme Court noted in the Trade-Mark Cases,
"a very large amount of commerce, perhaps the largest•••• "
was intrastate; 38 but the helter-skelter development of interstate
commerce after 1879 soon outmoded the procedural Act of 1905.39
It was the devitalizing dogma that Congress was powerless to alter
the common law of trademarks, rather than adequacy, which perpetuated the statute.40 Although a Senate committee favorably reported a bill to revise the trademark laws in 1924,41 and similar
bills were introduced in four succeeding Congresses with House
passage attained three times,42 it was not until the latter 193O's
that a climate of opinion conducive to actual enactment of new
legislation began to crystalize. In 1936 Frank I. Schechter published an influential appeal for substantive federal legislation. 43
The next year a committee report of the A.B.A. Section of Patent,
Trademark, and Copyright Law declared that substantive federal
trademark legislation was both necessary and desirable. 44 When
Congressman Lanham introduced the committee's recommendations
as H.R. 904145 in 1938, the high road to legislative action was in
sight.
The road proved to be a long one.46 The Lanham Bill was
not signed into law until July 5, 1946, with the effective date deferred for a year in order to afford time to consider expedient

37. Derenberg. note 31 supra, at 19. The Act of 1905 expressly provided:
"That nothing in this Act shall prevent. lessen, impeach. or avoid any
remedy at law or in equity which any party aggrieved by any wrongful
use of any trade-mark might have had if the provisions of this Act has
not been passed." Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 23, 33 Stat. 730.
38. United States v. steffens. 100 U.S. 82. 96 (1879).
39. See generally Schechter, "Fog and Fiction in Trade-Mark Protection,"
36 Colum. L. Rev. 60 (1936). Compare IV Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 205-221 (Rosenman ed. 1938).
40. See Derenberg, note 31 supra, at 13 n.23 & 20 n.80; Schechter, note
39 supra. For post-Lanham Act acceptance of congressional disability
to change the common-law of trademarks see Browne, "Territorial
Scope and Effect of Federal Trademark Registrations," 44 Trademark
Rep. 1357, 1359-60 (1954).
41. See Robert. The New Trade-Mark Manual 233 (1947).
42. See Carter, "Legislative History of the New Trade-Mark Act." 36
Trademark Rep. 121-22 (1946).
43. Schechter, note 39 supra; see, e.g •• Derenberg, note 31 supra. at 12-13,
44. 1937 Comm. Rep•• A.B.A. Section PTC Law at 23-24.
45. 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
46. s. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 6-7 (1946).
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amendments. 47 The Acts of 1881, 1905, and 1920 were repealed
on the effective date of the Lanham Act.48 1881 and 1905 registrations were continued in effect for their unexpired terms and
upon expiration could be renewed under the Lanham Act. 49 In
contrast, registrations under the Act of 1920 were to expire within six months after the effective date of the Lanham Act or twenty
years from the date of registration, whichever was later, and could
only be renewed if renewal was required to support foreign registration. 50
B. The Substantive Clauses of the Lanham Act
The A.B.A. committee reported which preceded Congressman
Lanham 's introduction of H.R. 9041 51 urged consideration of the
following "substantive changes" in federal trademark legislation:
1. Registration might be made constructive notice so
as to prevent any one acquiring rights in the same mark,
at least in interstate commerce, subsequent to such registration.
2. The words "owner of a trade-mark'' might be defined.
3. The presumption of ownership might be made conclusive after the trade-mark has been on the register unassailed for a certain time.
4. As a corollary, the right to petition for cancellation
of a registered trade-mark might be limited• . . . 52

47. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444; see 1944 Senate
Hearings at 144 (remarks of Congressman Lanham). Though an amendatory bill was introduced within six months after the act became effective, S. 1919, 80th Cong., 1st Sess (1947), the noncontroversial features of the proposed amendments were not enacted until 1962. 15
u.s.c. ch. 22 (Supp. IV, 1963); see Hoge, "The Lanham Act's Housekeeping Amendments," 52 Trademark Rep. 1245 (1962). The establishment in 1958 of a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in the Patent
Office has been the only other noteworthy revision of the statute. § 17,
60 stat. 434 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1067 (1964); see Law,
"The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board," 50 Trademark Rep. 1019
(1960).
48. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444-45.
49. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 stat. 445. 1905 registrations
and 1881 registrations renewed under the Act of 1905 have twentyyear
terms as do Lanham Act registrations. See Vandenburgh, Trademark
Law and Procedure 352 (1959). Renewal under the Lanham Act is for
the same term. § 9, 60 Stat. 431 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1059
(1964). Renewal is accomplished by filing a verified application with
the Patent Office setting forth the goods in connection with which the
mark is still in use in commerce or showing that nonuse is excusable.
A specimen of the current style of the mark must be attached. Ibid.
50. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 stat. 445.
-51. 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
52. 1937 Comm. Rep. A.B.A. Section PTC Law at 28. There were other
recommendations not germane to this monograph. Id. at 29.
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Virtually the same proposals had been advanced as "procedural"
amendments to the Act of 1905 several years earlier,53 but the
substantive characterization was more accurate because the committee envisioned a statutory scheme in which the consequences of
registration would annul certain common-law principles and in
which registration would be immune from attack except as provided in the federal statute itself.54
There were several reasons for these recommendations. In
1934 organizations specializing in state trademark registration had
attempted to capitalize on the insignificance of the Act of 1905 by
launching a campaign for compulsory registration statutes in several states. The proposed legislation generally required registration in the enacting state as a condition of trademark protection
and provided that marks unregistered by the senior user within
six months of enactment could be registered by any applicant,55
The prospect that forty-eight disparate state laws might otherwise
fragment trademark rights galvanized the Bar into action. New
federal legislation containing substantive provisions was advanced
in order to remove any need for state action and in order tolessen the significance of state law in general. 56 Another motivation
behind the proposals derived from the function of a trademark
registration statute. The registry maintained under the Act of
1905 was never a meaningful source of information concerning
marks in use because the benefits of registration were so slight
as to compare unfavorably with the time and expense required to
obtain it. 57 The A,B.A. committee believed that the integrity of
the federal registry would be enhanced by substantive provisions
which affected the right to use and provided incentives to register,58
53. 1935 Comm. Rep., A.B.A, Section PTC Law at 9-13.
54. See, e.g., Schechter, note 39 supra, at 72 & n. 32. The A.B.A. proposals concerning assignment and licensing were also substantive in
this sense. They are treated separately in this monograph because
of convenience and because they were drastically modified as a result
of the hearings on the Lanham Bill.
55. See Rogers, "The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks,"
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 173, 178 (1949).
56. 1937 Comm, Rep., note 52 supr~ at 23, The congressional declaration of intent appended to the Lanham Act states: "The intent of this
chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress. . •
to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference
by State, or territorial legislation••.•" § 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964).
57. See Martin, 11 Incentives to Register Given by the New Trade-Mark
Act," 36 Trademark Rep. 213-14 (1946).
58. See ibid. The defects of the Act of 1905 so galled supporters of the
registry concept that the major proposed revisions of the federal trademark laws up to and including the initial version of the Lanham Bill
required deposit in the Patent Office of all marks used in interstate
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The Lanham Bill was recast countless times during the long
debate which preceded enactment, yet the recommendations of the
A.B.A. committee proved durable.59 The Lanham Act contains no
definition of trademark "ownership" so that the right to register
continues to depend basically on prior adoption and use of a mark
in accordance with common-law principles, 60 and the evidentiary
effect of registration can be regarded as substantive because it
alters the burden of proof, 61 but otherwise the substantive clauses reflect the A.B.A. recommendations:62 registration is made
(Footnote continued)
commerce regardless whether registration was sought or even possible. E.g., H.R. 9041, tit. Ill, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); see Derenberg, Trade-Mark Protection and Unfair Trading 731-32 (1936), The
provision was eventually discarded as unduly burdensome. E.g., Brief
of the United States Trademark Association, 1938 House Hearings at
64.
59. Edward s. Rogers, the co-chairman of the committee, helped guide
the bill through Congress. See Rogers, note 55 suprl!., at 180; Shniderma.n, "Trade-Mark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy and Fact," 14 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 248, 249, 250 (1949).
60. See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 48 C.C.P,A. (Patents) 952, 289
F .2d 496 (1961). An applicant for registration must swear that he is
the "owner'' of the mark, § l(a)(l), 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended,
15 U,S,C. § 105l(a)(1)(1964), and a deliberate falsehood renders registration subject to cancellation at any time. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946),
as amended, 15 U,S,C, § 1064(c) (1964); Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles,
Ltd. v. F.T.C., 48 c.c.P.A. (Pa.tents) 933, 289 F.2d 665 (1961). It
remains an arguable proposition whether state or federal law controls
the determina.tioo. of "ownership," compare s. C. Johnson & Son v.
Johnson, 175 F .2d 176, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 338 U.S. 860 (1949)
with Time, Inc. v. T ,I.M.E., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 446, 453 (S.D. Cal.
1954) but there is discernible tendency to apply general federal standards sub silentio. See Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Sea.son-All Window Corp., 160 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), a.ff'd, 259 F .2d 314 (2d
Cir. 1958); Dudad Lure Co. v. Creme Lure Co., 143 u.s.P.Q. 358 (Tm.
Bd. 1964). "Use in commerce'' is a separate prerequisite of federal
registration, § 1 (a.)(l), 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 105l(a)(l) (1964);
R. J. Moran Co. v. Gordon, 101 u.s.P.Q. 206 (Comm'r 1954). However, this embraces "all the commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress," § 45, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (1964),
so that the requirement is easily met. A single instance of sale or
transportation of trademarked goods a.cross state lines has been found
sufficient. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F .2d
538 (2d Cir. 1956) (sale); New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190
F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1951) (transportation).
61. § 7(b), 60 Stat. 430 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1057(b) (1964). Cf. Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S.
208 (1939).
62. This is not to say that the substantive provisions coincide with the
details of the initial A.B.A. proposals. See generally Martin, note 57
supra.
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constructive notice of a claim of trademark rights;63 the grounds for
cancellation of registration are restricted after a five-year period;64
after a mark has been on the register for five years certain incontestable rights may be obtained. 65
The substantive clauses of the Lanham Act apply solely to
registrations on the Principal Register 66 established by the Act.
Registrations on the Supplemental Register, which continues the
l
limited function of the Act of 1920, 67 are excluded from coverage. 68 1
The benefits of registration on the Principal Register, with the
exception of the opportunity to acquire an incontestable right to
use and a limited immunity from cancellation,69 also apply to 1881
and 1905 registrations. 70 In order to avail themselves of the expected provisions 1881 and 1905 registrants must republish their
registrations under the Lanham Act, i.e., file an affidavit with the
Commissioner of Patents, notice of which is published in the Official Gazette of the Patent Office, setting forth the goods on which
the mark is presently in use in commerce and stating that the
registrant claims the benefits of the Lanham Act for his mark. 71
If 1881 and 1905 registrants so choose, their registrations can
be renewed under the Lanham Act without republication. 72
The 1881 and 1905 registrations to which the substantive
clauses apply are primarily common-law trademarks, 73 but section
63. § 22, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1964).
64. § 14, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1964).
65. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964).
66. §§ 1-22, 60 Stat. 427-35 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. §§ 1051-72 (1964).
67. See Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 63-65 (1947).
68. § 26, 60 Stat. 436 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1094 (1964). The supplemental
register was established by §§ 23-28, 60 Stat. 435-36 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. §§ 1091-1096 (1964).
69. Act of Juiy 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 Stat. 445; § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433
(1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(d) (1964); § 15, 60 Stat. 434 (1946),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964).
70. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 Stat. 445.
71. § 12(c), 60 Stat. 432 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1062(c) (1964).
72. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 Stat. 445. 1881 and 1905
registrations that are merely renewed remain unqualified for an incontestable right to use and limitation of the grounds of cancellation
until republished. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c.
§ 1064(d) (1964); § 15, 60 Stat. 434 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. §
1065 (1964).
73. The Act of 1881 did not provide for registration of any secondarymeaning marks. The Act of 1905 merely permitted registration of
secondary-meaning marks used exclusively in commerce for ten years
prior to February 20, 1905. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33
Stat. 726. Although the "ten year proviso" was slightly liberalized in
1920, Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 9, 41 Stat. 535, it was legitimately, if somewhat ingenuously, said of the clause: "Everybody knows

IMPACT OF LANHAM ACT

41

2 of the Lanham Act permits registration of most secondary-meaning marks on the Principal Register.74 Although section 2(e) forbids registration of marks that are "merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive," "primarily geographically descriptive or
deceptively misdescriptive," or "primarily merely a surname," the
ambit of these prohibitions is narrower than their counterparts in
the Act of 1905. 75 For example, if geographical terms are used
arbitrarily, e.g., "The Atlantic" for a magazine, 76 or if a term
has ordinary meanings apart from use as a personal name and is
used on goods unrelated to those ordinary meanings, e.g., "Douglas,"
which is a personal name but also refers to a Scottish clan, a fir
tree, and a squirrel, for poultry feed,77 or if a word is suggestive
rather than merely descriptive, e.g., "Audio Fidelity" for phonograph records, 78 registration may be available without proof of
secondary meaning. 79 Moreover, section 2(f) authorizes registration of virtually every mark that would otherwise fall within the
prohibitions of section 2(e) if secondary meaning can be established.SO The Commissioner of Patents can accept as prima facie
evidence of secondary meaning:
(Footnote continued)
that secondary meaning can be acquired otherwise than by exclusive
use from 1895 to 1905." 1935 Comm. Rep. A.B.A. Section PTC Law
at 11.
74. § 2(e) & (f), 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1052(e) & (f) (1964).
75. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,"
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 825-26 (1955).
76. Cf., Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., 197 F. Supp.
524 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). But see Ex parte The London Gramaphone Corp.,
98 U.S.P.Q. 362 (Comm'r 1953).
77. Ex parte Omaha Cold Storage Co., 111 u.s.P.Q. 189 (Comm'r 1956).
78. Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. London Records, Inc., 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents)
1429, 332 F .2d 577 (1964).
79. See generally Leeds, "Trademarks-the Rationale of Registrability,"
26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 653, 662-64 (1958).
80. The major exceptions are marks that run afoul of public policy. E.g.,
In re Deister Concentrator Co., 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 952, 289 F .2d
496 (1961) (no trademark rights will be recognized in product configurations in the public domain). Section 2 expressly prohibits registration, regardless of secondary meaning, if a mark " (a) Consists of or
comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter, or matter which
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or
dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute. (b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of
arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof. (c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name,
signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the United States
during the life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of
the widow." § 2(a), (b), & (c), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a),
(b), & (c) (1964).
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proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof
as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years
next preceding the date of filing of the application for its
registration. 81

An averment in the application may be accepted as proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use for the five year perioct. 82
Use for five years is not even necessary if secondary meaning
can be demonstrated without resort to the section 2(f) presumption. 83 Relevant evidence includes the duration, extent, and nature
of use, advertising expenditures, and affidavits, letters, or statements from the trade or the public or from both.84
C. Analysis of the Substantive Clauses

1. Evidentiary Advantages
The Act of 1905 stated that a certificate of registration was
prima facie evidence of trademark ownership85 and the courts
treated registration as prima facie evidence of the validity of a
claim of trademark rights. 86 It was never authoritatively determined, however, whether registration shifted the burden of proof
as well as the burden of going forward with the evidence.87 Section 7 (b) of the Lanham Act makes an unexpired registration 88
prima facie evidence of the validity of registration, ownership of
a mark, and the exclusive right to use a mark on the goods specified in the certificate. 89 Essentially, this means that registration
§ 2(f), 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1964).
82. See Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 92 (1959). The Commissioner may, of course, require additional evidence, 37 C.F .R.
j
§ 2.41(b) (1960), see generally Beran, "Trademark or Mere Unregistrable Matter-Where Do You Draw the Line," 52 Trademark Rep. 9531
(1962); Hmcock, "Evidence under Section 2(f) of the Trade-Mark Act
of 1946," 42 Trademark Rep. 877 (1952), but the applicant does not
have to establish exclusive use. See McCormick & Co. v. Summers,
141 u.s.P.Q. 258 (Tm. Bd. 1964).
83. Ex parte Fox River Paper Corp., 99 U.S.P.Q. 173-74 (Comm'r 1953)
(dictum).
84. 37 c.F .R. § 2.41(a)(l960); see In re Hollywood Brands, Inc., 41 c.c.P.A.
(Patents) 1001, 214 F .2d 139 (1954).
85. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 728.
86. E.g., Barbasol Co. v. Jacobs, 160 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1947).
87. National Nu Grape Co. v. Guest, 164 F .2d 874 (10th Cir. 1947), cert.
den., 333 U.S. 874 (1948); accord, House of Westmore, Inc. v. Denney,
151 F .2d 261 (3d Cir. 1945); Gort Girls Frocks, Inc. v. Princess Pat
Lingerie, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (dictum).
88. An expired registration has no effect. Imperial Sugar Co. v. Imperial
Prods., 139 U.S.P .Q. 344 (Tm. Bd. 1963).
89. § 7(b), 60 Stat. 430 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1057(b) (1964). Note that registration is not made evidence of the validity of the claim of trademark
rights. See Leeds, "The Circular Trend in Trademarks," 47 A.B.A.J.

81.
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creates a presumption that a mark is dissimilar to other marks
registered for similar goods,90 that a mark has secondary meaning
if registered under section 2 (f), 91 and that the registrant has acquired rights in the mark,92 and consequently has the exclusive
right to use the mark in connection with the goods specified 93 in
the certificate.94 Though not conclusive,95 the presumption shifts
both the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden
of proof. 96
(Footnote continued)
256, 257 (1961). The courts, however, still tend to read in this presumption. E.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co.,
247 F .2d 730 (3d Cir. 1957).
90. But see In re Knapp-Monarch Co., 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 779, 296
F.2d 230 (1961).
91. If the mark was not registered under § 2(f), this presumption naturally
does not exist. Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F.
Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 312 F .2d 125 (2d
Cir. 1963).
92. This amounts to prima facie evidence of use as of the filing date of
the application for registration. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American
Screen Prods. Co., 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1230, 305 F.2d 479 (1962);
accord, American Throwing Co. v. Famous Bathrobe Co., 45 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 737, 250 F .2d 377 (1957). Registration may also be treated
as prima facie evidence of continuing use of a mark. Drexel Enterprises, Inc. v. Richardson 312 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1962); accord,
Friedman v. Sealy, Inc., 274 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1959); Gillette Co. v.
Kempel, 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 920, 254 F.2d 402 (1958); Sapphire
Corp. v. Robert Hosiery Mills, Inc., 136 U.S.P.Q. 308 (Tm. Bd. 1962).
But see In re Continental Distilling Corp., 45 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 863,
254 F .2d 139 (1958); Leeds, note 89 supr:i., at 256.
93. The presumption may be extended to the same class of goods as those
named, In re Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1367,
305 F.2d 492 (1962); but see American Liberty Ins. Co. v. American
Liberty Life Ins. Co., 136 U .S.P .Q. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), but not to
merely related goods. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F.
Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), cert. den.,
364 U .s. 909 (1960).
-94. Iowa Farmers Union v. Farmers' Educ. & Co-op Union, 247 F .2d 809,
817 (8th Cir. 1957); accord, Curtis-Stephens-Embry Co. v. Pro-TekToe Skate Stop Co., 199 F .2d 407, 413 (8th Cir. 1952).
95. See, e.g., Camloc Fastener Corp. v. OPW Corp., 164 F. Supp. 15
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 271 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1959).
96. Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-AU Window Corp., 259 F .2d 314
(2d Cir. 1958); accord, Dymo Indus., Inc. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 326
F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1964); Tigrett Indus. Inc. v. Top Value Enterprises,
Inc., 217 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Tenn. 1963); R.C.W., Supervisor, Inc. v.
Cuban Tobacco Co., 220 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N. Y. 1963); Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 154 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.J.
1957), rev'd on other grounds, 257 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1958). The presumption has been said to be easily overcome when a mark is composed of descriptive words. Shaw-Barton, Inc. v. John Baumgarth
Co., 313 F.2d 167 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 374 U.S. 831 (1963); see Dell
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Notwithstanding the evidentiary advantages afforded by section 7(b) a registrant will not be able to enjoin a concurrent user
unless likelihood of confusion exists, 97 and a difference in trade
territories has been held to negate the possibility of confusion. 98
Thus, section 7(b) is of little consequence as a curb on concurrent
territorial use until a registrant expands his markets so as to
come into contact with a junior user.
2. Constructive Notice
Section 22 makes registration constructive notice of a registrant's claim of trademark rights. Constructive notice commencei
on the date of registration on the Principal Register or, with regard to 1881 and 1905 registrations, the effective date of the Lanham Act, July 5, 1947 .99 Previous federal registration statutes
has no analogous provisions,100 although publication of applications
for registration in the Official Gazette of the Patent Office did afford occasion for actual notice of asserted trademark rights.10 1
The following excerpt from the 1939 Congressional hearings on the
Lanham Bill evinces the purpose of section 22:
Mr. Frazer. As a matter of information, is not section 22
suplusage, except as to the supplemental register, in view
of section 7(b) on page 5? That section provides:
The certificates of registration of a trademark
upon the principal register provided by this Act
shall be presumptive evidence of the validity of
the trade-mark and of the registrant's exclusive
right thereto.
Mr. Rogers. May I suggest in that connection, that the Supreme Court in the case of Rectans v. United Drug Co. [ sic.]
-quite unnecessarily, but they said that registration in the
Patent Office is not notice; that the actual notice had to be
shown.
(Footnote continued)
Pub. Co, v. Stanley Publications, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 126, 172 N,E,2d 656,
211 N.Y.S,2d 393 (1961) criticized in Derenberg, "The Fourteenth
Year," 51 Trademark Rep, 777, 838-40 (1961).
97. § 32(1), 60 stat. 437 (1946), as amended, 15 U .s.c. § 1114(1) (1964).
98. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.
1959); see Curtis-Stephens-Embry Co. v. Pro-Tek-Toe Skate Stop Co.,
199 F .2d 407 (8th Cir. 1952).
99. § 22, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15 U.S,C. § 1072 (1964).
100. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., note 36 supra; Griesedieck
Western Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 149 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir,
1945) (Act of 1905).
101. Theodore Rectanus Co. v. United Drug Co., note 35 supra; see 2 Nim,
Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 731 (4th ed. 1947).
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Now the purpose of all registration and recording acts
is notice and, frankly, this paragraph was put in to make it
notice, as it ought to be.
Mr. Lanham.
Mr. Rogers.

In the light of that decision?
In the light of that decision.

Mr. Thomson. That would mean there could not be any
honest concurrent user; after the registration has issued to
one party, no other party could claim any honest concurrent
user, or use beginning after that date, if it is notice to him.
Mr. Rogers.

I think that we all agree that is as it should be.102

It is not surprising that section 22 has been referred to as
the most important section in the Lanham Act.103 Those making
statements during the legislative hearings and numerous commentators104 have taken the position that the notice of registered markE
imputed by section 22 precludes junior users from acquiring territorial rights vis-vis a registrant if the junior users initiate use
after constructive notice commences.105 If section 22 is considere,
discretely, this would not seem an ineluctable result for a junior
user's knowledge of prior rights was not necessarily sufficient
"bad faith" to bar acquisition of concurrent territorial rights under
the Hanover and Rectanus doctrine. An improper motive was also
requisite unless the senior user's mark was known in the junior
user's territory or that territory was within the senior user's zone
of imminent expansion.106 In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,
for instance, the Supreme Court declared:

102.

1939 House Hearings at 125. For similar comments during other
hearings see Halliday, "Constructive Notice and Concurrent Registration,'' 38 Trademark Rep. 111, 117-20 (1948).
103. 1 Seidel, Dubroff, & Gonda, Trademark Law and Practice 694 (1963).
104. E.g., 4 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 2071-72 (2d
ed. 1950); Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 129-30 (1947); Browne
"Territorial Scope and Effect of Federal Trademark Registrations,"
44 Trademark Rep. 1357, 1360-61 (1954); Diggins, "The Lanham
Trademark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 305, 316-17 (1947). But see
Bonynge, "The Effect of Registration in Trademark Litigation," 50
Trademark Rep. 902, 912-13 (1960).
105. One case held that the Act of 1905 gave similar nationwide rights to
a registered mark, Standard Brewery Co. v. Interboro Brewing Co.,
229 Fed. 543 (2d Cir. 1916), petition for cert. dismisseci, 246 U .s.
677 (1918), but it was not followed. E.g., United States Printing &
Lithograph Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279 U.S. 156 (1929) (Holmes,
J.); accord, Griesedieck Western Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing
Co., note 100 supra.
106. See text in Chapter I accompanying notes 26-34.
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[ W] here two parties independently are employing the same
mark upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets
wholly remote the one from the other, the question of prior
appropriation is legally insignificant, unless at least it appear
that the second adopter has selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of the first user, such as to
take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to forestall
the extension of his trade, or the like.107
Nevertheless, the legislative history of section 22 plus those sections of the Lanham Act which declare that registration is evidence of the "exclusive right to use" a registered mark 108 indicate
that Congress intended that the imputation of constructive notice
of prior rights would be sufficient to bar subsequent acquisition
of concurrent territorial rights by junior users on competing
goods.109
This generalized statement of section 22's effect is misleading. Because the Lanham Act is based on the commerce
power, the constructive notice provision can only preclude acquisition of concurrent territorial rights if a junior use affects commerce. 11
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that only a
person who in good faith believes that he was the first user of a
mark is entitled to obtain unrestricted registration and the full
benefit of the constructive notice provision.111 If a nonregistrant

°

107. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916).
108. § 7(b), 60 Stat. 430 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1057(b) (1964); § 33(a) & (b),
60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (a) & (b) (1964).
109. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., note 98 supra, at 36263; see American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619
(5th Cir. 1963).
110. Compare Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473 (D. Utah
1962) with Peter Pan Restaurants, Inc. v. Peter Pan Diner, Inc.,
150 F. Supp. 534 (D.R.I. 1957). The argument has been made that
any intrastate use that commences after federal registration by a
senior user is necessarily inimical to the rights of the registrant
and consequently subject to regulation under the commerce clause.
See Browne, "Territorial Scope and Effect of Federal Trademark
Registrations," 44 Trademark Rep. 1357, 1360-63 (1954). See contra,
March, "Territorial Scope of the Trade-Mark Act of 1946," 38_ __
Trademark Rep. 955, 966-68 (1948). Browne's view was endorsed
in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., note 98 supra; see
Derenberg, "The Twelfth Year," 49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 1071-72
(1959). If,the constructive notice provision is found to be inapplicable because a junior use does not affect commerce, a registrant may
still qualify for territorial protection under the common-law rules,
e.g., if the junior user was in bad faith. See March, supra, at 967-68.
111. § l(a) (1), 6? ~tat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1051(a) (1)
(1964). A JUmor user with a distinct marketing area who adopted
his mark in good faith may be able to obtain concurrent registration
despite later knowledge of senior use. Ibid. See text at note 285
infra for discussion of concurrent registration.
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was actually the senior user with respect to the goods concerned,
a registration on the Principal Register, or an 1881 or 1905 registration, is initially subject to cancellation by the senior user in
Patent Officel.12 or judicial proceedings.113 If five years have
elapsed since registration on the Principal Register or republication, however, a prior user can bring a Patent Office cancellation
proceeding only if a registrant knew that he was a junior user
when he filed an application alleging exclusive rights.114 Marks
protected from Patent Office cancellation remain cancellable in
judicial proceedings until an incontestable right to use is obtained.
Thereafter, as in the Patent Office, a registrant must generally
be shown to have made a false claim of exclusive rights for judicial cancellation to be granted.115
Even assuming that a registrant is a senior user or that
registration can no longer be challenged on the ground of lack of
senior use, a registrant may not be able to enjoin a junior user
who started use after section 22 became applicable. Subsection
32(1) (a) of the Lanham Act provides that trademark infringement
does not exist unless concurrent use "is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 116 In the leading case of
112.

113.

114.

115.

116.

§ 14, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1064 (1964); e.g.,
Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Heidelberg Brewing Corp., 115 U.S.P.Q.
183 (Comm'r 1957). See Appendix for discussion of Patent Office
cancellation proceedings.
§ 37, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1964); e.g., Douglas Lab.
Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), modified on other grounds, 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 347 U.S.
968 (1954) (supplemental register registration).
§ 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964);
compare Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. F.T.C., 48 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 933, 289 F.2d 665 (1961) with Dunleavy v. Koeppel Metal
Furniture Corp., 122 U.S.P .Q. 395 (Tm. Bd. 1959). 1881 and 1905
registrations that are not republished remain cancellable at any time
for lack of prior use regardless of the registrant's good or bad
faith. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(d)
(1964), e.g., Henry A La Pensee, Inc. v. Societe A Responsabilite,
44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 892, 243 F .2d 181 (1957).
E.g., Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ala.
1964); John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F .2d 314,
316 (7th Cir. 1961) (dictum). See text accompanying note 170 infra
for discussion of the incontestable right to use.
§ 32(l)(a), 60 Stat. 437 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a)
(1964). § 32(1)(a) originally provided that infringement existed where
a use was "likely to cause confusion or mistake· or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin. • . Act of July 5, 1947, ch. 540,
§ 32(l)(a), 60 Stat. 437 (1946).
The 1962 amendments to the Lanham
Act deleted "purchasers" as an explicit referent of confusion, mistake, or deception in order to make clear that a probability of purchaser confusion, mistake, or deception was sufficient to constitute
infringement. 2 U.S. Code, Cong., & Ad. News 2847, 2850-51 (1962).
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Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc.117 the Second Circuit
accordingly held that a registrant can not capitalize on the effect
of the constructive notice provision until there is a probability that
purchasers will confuse the concurrent uses. This essentially
means that relief is not available despite the applicability of section 22 unless a junior user's area of use lies within a registrant's
zone of imminent expansion or a registrant's mark has become
known by reputation or through advertising in the junior user's
bailiwick.118 Dawn was followed by the Fifth Circuit in American
Foods, Inc. v.<3olden Flake, Inc.,119 where relief was limited to
the overlap between the registrant's and the junior user's selling
and advertising zones in spite of the fact that the junior user was
apparently employing the mark in other areas as well. Both the
Second and Fifth Circuit recognized, however, that section 22 entitles a registrant to territorial protection whenever likelihood of
purchaser confusion develops with respect to a use initiated after
constructive notice commenced. Thus in Dawn the denial of an
injunction was without prejudice to a later application by the registrant when he could establish an extension of his business operation, or presumptively his reputation or advertising, into the junior user's marketing area. 120
Dawn's melding of section 22 with subsection 32(1) (a) seems
readily defensible. Although Sterling Brewing, Inc. v. Cold Spring
Brewing Corp., 121 the first case to discuss section 22, declared
that the constructive notice provision entitled the owner of a republished 1905 registration who operated exclusively in the Midwest to enjoin a junior user in New England where the registered
mark was neither known nor advertised, Sterling did not even attempt to reconcile this interpretation of section 22 with subsection
117.
118.

119.
120.

121.

267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). See Fairway Foods, Inc. v. Fairway
Mkts., 227 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1955).
The Second Circuit summarized the pivotal findings of fact as follows:
"The district court found that in view of the plaintiff's inactivity for
about thirty years in exploiting its trademarks in defendant's trading
area at the retail level either by advertising directed at retail purchasers or by retail sales through authorized licensed users, there
was no reasonable expectation that plaintiff would extend its retail
operations into defendant's trading area." 267 F .2d at 364-65.
312 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1963); see Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago Pickle
Co., 171 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Youthform Co. v. R. H. Macy
& Co., 153 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ga. 1957).
See Elcon Mfg. Co. v. Elcon Mfg. Co., 132 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y.
1955), a pre-Dawn decision in which a federal judge granted a preliminary injunction to a registrant whose use had eventually expanded
into a junior user's trade territory.
i
100 F. Supp. 412 (D. Mass. 1951).
:

IMPACT OF LANHAM ACT

49

32(1) (a).12 2 There is an argument that "likelihood of confusion"
exists if similar marks are used on competing goods regardless
of market contact between the parties,123 but this interpretation
is undercut by the plain words of the statute. Subsection 32(1) (a)
states that infringement consists of using "in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark" where "such use is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive," 124 and section 45 defines a
"colorable imitation" as a look-alike-mark. 125 In short, an identical or confusingly similar mark is an element of infringement
but infringement also requires a probability that concurrent use
will cause purchaser confusion, 126 a requirement. not necessarily
supplied by the bare fact that the concurrent use involves competing goods. The Dawn interpretation means in at least one respect that the territorial relief available under the Lanham Act
may be more restricted than that available at common law. As
construed in Dawn, subsection 32(1) (a), like the common-law, would
permit relief where a registrant is about to expand into a junior
user's trade territory or the registrant's mark is advertised or
known by reputation in the junior user's market when the latter
initiates use, but subsection 32(1) (a) would not sanction relief
solely because a junior user had deliberately copied a senior
user's mark, whereas some common-law decisions do allow relief in these circumstances.127 Again, however, the limitations
of the Lanham Act test for trademark infringement derive from
the way that Congress deliberately wrote the statute and not from
the ingenuity of the Second Circuit in Dawn.128 Furthermore,
since trademark registration is not ordinarily considered to preclude reliance on common-law rights, registrants remain free to

122. See id. at 418. This may be because the court was "out to get" the
defendant who adopted his mark with full knowledge of the prior use
on competing goods in the Midwest but was immune from liability
under Massachusetts law.
123. E.g., 45 Minn. L. Rev. 1060, 1063-65 (1961).
124. § 32(1)(a), 60 Stat. 437 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (1)
(1964).
125. § 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964).
126. See 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1075, 1077-78 (1952).
127. E.g., Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. Wolfies Restaurant, Inc., 291 F.2d
302 (2d Cir.) (alternative holding) cert. den., 368 U.S. 889 (1961); cf.,
Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 913 (1965).
128. The Lanham Act similarly omits dilution from the definition of infringement. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 293,
299 (S.D,N.Y. 1959), aff1d on other grounds, 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.),
cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960).
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to rely on those common-law rights to the extent that they outstrip those available under the Lanham Act.129
The result of the Dawn case has been characterized as "impractical," 130 and in a sense it is. The defendant was put on notice that the plaintiff has a superior right to use the common mark,
but the defendant was not ordered to abandon use forthwith. Although this could be taken as an invitation to gamble that the plain-i
tiff would never be in a position to exercise his superior rights,
surely a prudent defendant would not do so. Even if the regis'
trant's chances of territorial expansion seemed remote, the everpresent possibility that the registered mark could be assigned to
a more dynamic firm or licensed to a local user in the defendant's
territory 131 should have persuaded the defendant to take advantage
of his period of grace to effect an orderly transition to a new
mark. When all is said and done, Dawn represents a reasonable
interpretation of the Lanham Act that was not unforseeable. 132
Moreover, Dawn laid to rest another possible accomodation betweer
the Lanham Act and the common-law doctrine of concurrent terri- !
torial rights that would have been far more objectionable in view
of the noncompetitive potentialities of that doctrine. Section 45 of
the Lanham Act states that nonuse of a mark for two years is a
prima facie abandonment of rights, 133 and the suggestion had been
made that the failure of a registrant to equate his market with the
territorial scope of the constructive notice provision within two
years might constitute abandonment of a claim to trademark rights
in the unexploited areas.134
Dawn, however, summarily rejected
this contention and held that continuous use of a registered mark
129. Cf. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F .2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963);
see "Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O 1 -the Wisp?" 77
Harv. L. Rev. 520, 524-25 (1964).
130. Derenberg, "The Sixteenth Year," 53 Trademark Rep. 785, 849 (1963).
The same author discussed the case more fully in "The Twelfth Year
49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 1070-72 (1959).
131. Dawn involved a relatively static licensor. 267 F .2d 358, 360 (2d
Cir. 1959).
132. Compare 1954 Summary of Proceedings, A.B.A. Section PTC Law at
21 with "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 859 (1955).
133. § 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964).
134. Bonynge, "The Effect of Registration in Trademark Litigation," 50
Trademark Rep. 902, 912-13 (1960); 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1075, 1079
(1952). Bonynge also noted a possible conflict between § 2(d), which
provides for concurrent registration, and the constructive notice prov1s1on. This suggestion ignores the legislative history of the Lanhan
Act which indicates that § 2(d)'s sole function is to permit the register to reflect common-law concurrent uses that develop before the
constructive notice provision becomes applicable. 1944 Senate Hearings 45-56 (comments of Henry J. Savage).
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anywhere in the nation was sufficient to retain the benefits of the
constructive notice provision in areas of nonuse.135
Another possible restrictive interpretation of section 22 would
limit imputation of notice to registered common-law trademarks.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian
Brewing Co., 136 affirming a decree that confined protection of a
registered secondary-meaning mark to the registrant's trade territory, has, for instance, been interpreted as indicating that the constructive notice provision does not confer nationwide rights to secondary-meaning marks.137 However, Anheuser-Busch is actually
consistent with Dawn for there was no evidence that the registrant
intended to expand his area of use or that his mark was known
outside his area of operations.138 Section 22 on its face applies
to all marks registered on the Principal Register and rightly so.
The user of a secondary-meaning mark has as great an interest
in developing new markets as the user of a common-law trademark.139

3. Incontestability
The Lanham Act makes it possible for the registration and
use of marks to become free from challenge on certain grounds.
This limited immunity or "incontestability" 140 is a function of
three different sections of the Lanham Act.
135. 267 F .2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1959). Nor should a registrant be chargeable with laches if he does not sue a concurrent user in a remote
trade territory. Under the Dawn theory he has no remedy until
there is a likelihood of confusion so that he should not be penalized
for deferring suit until that time.
136. 264 F .2d 88 (6th Cir. 1959) noted in 25 Mo. L. Rev. 100 (1960). See
also International Breweries, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 230 F.
Supp. 662 (M.D. Fla. 1964).
137. Bonynge, note 134 supra, at 909-10, 912.
138. "Bavarian" was found to describe a type of beer in most of the United
States. If "Bavarian'' was so descriptive as to amount to a generic
product name, the court erred in granting the registrant any relief.
Trademark rights cannot be acquired in a generic name; see Restatement (Second), Torts § 720, comment _s! (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963),
and an erroneously issued registration may be canceled at any time.
§ 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964);
see Derenberg, "The Twelfth Year," 49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 107374 (1959).
139. In Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473 (D. Utah 1962) the
American Oil Co. successfully invoked section 22 on behalf of the
"American" brand of gasoline.
140. The word was coined in the early days of the Lanham Bill before
the concept was whittled down as a result of congressional hearings.
Ooms & Frost, "Incontestability," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 220, 221
(1949). See generally Williamson, "Trade-Marks Registered Under
the Lanham Act Are Not 'Incontestable, 1 " 37 Trademark Rep. 404
(1947).
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to rely on those common-law rights to the extent that they outstrip those available under the Lanham Act.129
The result of the Dawn case has been characterized as "impractical," 130 and in a sense it is. The defendant was put on notice that the plaintiff has a superior right to use the common mark,
but the defendant was not ordered to abandon use forthwith. Although this could be taken as an invitation to gamble that the plaintiff would never be in a position to exercise his superior rights, '
surely a prudent defendant would not do so. Even if the registrant's chances of territorial expansion seemed remote, the everpresent possibility that the registered mark could be assigned to
a more dynamic firm or licensed to a local user in the defendant's
territory 131 should have persuaded the defendant to take advantage
of his period of grace to effect an orderly transition to a new
mark. When all is said and done, Dawn represents a reasonable
interpretation of the Lanham Act that was not unforseeable. 132
Moreover, Dawn laid to rest another possible accomodation betweenj'
the Lanham Act and the common-law doctrine of concurrent terri-.
torial rights that would have been far more objectionable in view 1
of the noncompetitive potentialities of that doctrine. Section 45 of 1
the Lanham Act states that nonuse of a mark for two years is a
prima facie abandonment of rights, 133 and the suggestion had been
made that the failure of a registrant to equate his market with the
territorial scope of the constructive notice provision within two
years might constitute abandonment of a claim to trademark rights
in the unexploited areas.134
Dawn, however, summarily rejected
this contention and held that continuous use of a registered mark
129. Cf. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F .2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963);
see "Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O'-the Wisp?" 77
Harv. L. Rev. 520, 524-25 (1964).
130. Derenberg, "The Sixteenth Year," 53 Trademark Rep. 785, 849 (1963).
The same author discussed the case more fully in "The Twelfth Year.
49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 1070-72 (1959).
131. Dawn involved a relatively static licensor. 267 F .2d 358, 360 (2d
Cir. 1959).
132. Compare 1954 Summary of Proceedings, A.B.A. Section PTC Law at
21 with "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 859 (1955).
133. § 45, 60 Stat. 444 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964).
134. Bonynge, "The Effect of Registration in Trademark Litigation," 50
Trademark Rep. 902, 912-13 (1960); 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1075, 1079
(1952). Bonynge also noted a possible conflict between § 2(d), which
provides for concurrent registration, and the constructive notice provision. This suggestion ignores the legislative history of the Lanham
Act which indicates that § 2(d)'s sole function is to permit the register to reflect common- law concurrent uses that develop before the
constructive notice provision becomes applicable. 1944 Senate Hearings 45-56 (comments of Henry J. Savage).
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anywhere in the nation was sufficient to retain the benefits of the
constructive notice provision in areas of nonuse.135
Another possible restrictive interpretation of section 22 would
limit imputation of notice to registered common-law trademarks.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian
Brewing Co., 13 6 affirming a decree that confined protection of a
registered secondary-meaning mark to the registrant's trade territory, has, for instance, been interpreted as indicating that the constructive notice provision does not confer nationwide rights to secondary-meaning marks.137 However, Anheuser-Busch is actually
consistent with Dawn for there was no evidence that the registrant
intended to expand his area of use or that his mark was known
outside his area of operations.138 Section 22 on its face applies
to all marks registered on the Principal Register and rightly so.
The user of a secondary-meaning mark has as great an interest
in developing new markets as the user of a common-law trademark.139

3. Incontestability
The Lanham Act makes it possible for the registration and
use of marks to become free from challenge on certain grounds.
This limited immunity or "incontestability" 140 is a function of
three different sections of the Lanham Act.
135. 267 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1959). Nor should a registrant be chargeable with laches if he does not sue a concurrent user in a remote
trade territory. Under the Dawn theory he has no remedy until
there is a likelihood of confusion so that he should not be penalized
for deferring suit until that time.
136. 264 F .2d 88 (6th Cir. 1959) noted in 25 Mo. L. Rev. 100 (1960). See
also International Breweries, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 230 F.
Supp. 662 (M.D. Fla. 1964).
137. Bonynge, note 134 supra, at 909-10, 912.
138. "Bavarian'' was found to describe a type of beer in most of the United
States. If "Bavarian" was so descriptive as to amount to a generic
product name, the court erred in granting the registrant any relief.
Trademark rights cannot be acquired in a generic name; see Restatement (Second), Torts § 720, comment _Q (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963),
and an erroneously issued registration may be canceled at any time.
§ 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964);
see Derenberg, "The Twelfth Year," 49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 107374 (1959).
139. In Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473 (D. Utah 1962) the
American OH Co. successfully invoked section 22 on behalf of the
"American" brand of gasoline.
140. The word was coined in the early days of the Lanham Bill before
the concept was whittled down as a result of congressional hearings.
Ooms & Frost, "Incontestability," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 220, 221
(1949). See generally Williamson, "Trade-Marks Registered Under
the Lanham Act Are Not 'Incontestable,"' 37 Trademark Rep. 404
(1947).
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a. Cancellation Restrictions
Under the Act of 1905 Patent Office cancellation proceedingsl41
could be brought at any time. In one case, for instance, cancellation took place more than twenty years after registration. 142 The
most frequent grounds of cancellation were that the mark was merely descriptive, geographical, or a personal name, or that the cancellation petitioner was the prior user with superior rights to the
mark.143 Section 14 of the Lanham Act imposes a statute of limitations upon these common grounds for cancellation in order to
give greater security to trademark rights. 144 If five years has
elapsed since registration on the Principal Register or republication of an 1881 or 1905 registration, 145 the right to register can
no longer be challenged on the ground that the mark is merely
descriptive, 146 geographical, or a surname or on the ground that
the petitioner was the prior user of the mark.147
On the other
hand, cancellation proceedings can still be brought at any time for
the following reasons: 1 48 (1) the mark has become the common
descriptive name of an article or substance; (2) the mark has been
abandoned; 149 (3) registration was fraudulently obtained; 150 (4)
141. See Appendix for a discussion of cancellation proceedings under the
Lanham Act.
142. White House Milk: Prods. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 27 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 1194, 111 F .2d 490 (1940).
143. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,"
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 829 (1955).
144. § 14, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1064 (1964). § 14
applies to Patent Office proceedings which result in restriction as
well as cancellation of registration. United States Steel Corp. v.
National Copper & Smelting Co., 131 U.S.P.Q. 397 (Tm. Bd. 1961).
145. If an inter partes Patent Office proceeding is commenced within the
five-year period and the party in the position of a plaintiff relies
on a Principal Register or republished registration, the statute of
limitations does not apply to a request for cancellation filed after
the expiration of the five-year period by the party in the position
of a defendant. Sunbeam Corp. v. Duro Metal Prods. Co., 106 U.S.
P.Q. 385 (Comm•r 1955). See Appendix for discussion of inter partes
Patent Office proceedings.
146. Seiler•s Inc. v. Hickory Valley Farm, Inc., 139 U,S.P.Q. 460 (Tm. Bd.1963
147. Dunleavy Co. v. Koeppel Metal Furniture Corp., 122 U.S.P .Q. 395
(Tm. Bd. 1959), See generally, Ooms & Frost, note 140 supra, at
225-26. 1881 and 1905 registrations that have not been republished
remain subject to cancellation proceedings at any time. § 14(c), 60
Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S.C. § 1064(d) (1964).
148. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964). /
149. Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1163, 303
F .2d 947 (1962). Modification of a mark may amount to an abandonment. Hewitt Soap Co. v. Lanolin Plus Cosmetics, Inc., 101 U.S.P .Q,
295 (Comm•r 1954).
150. Intentional fraud is requisite. Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v.
F. T .C., 48 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 933, 289 F .2d 665 (1961).
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registration was improper in view of certain absolute prohibitions
in section 2 of the Lanham Act; 151 or (5) the mark has been used
by or with the permission of the registrant to misrepresent the
source of goods.
A proviso to section 14 authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to bring cancellation proceedings against marks on the
Principal Register for any of the grounds to which the five-year
statute of limitations is inapplicable. 152 The terms of the authorization thus exclude registrations under prior acts whether or not
republished 153 and cancellation of Principal Register registrations
because of junior use or because the registered mark is merely
descriptive,154 geographical, or a surname.155 Although trademark
users have been apprehensive over the existence of any F.T.C.
ability to bring cancellation proceedings, 156 the proviso to section
14 is substantially a dead letter.157 To the extent that the F. T.C.
polices trademark abuses, the agency prefers to proceed under the
broad language of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.158

3D

es
163

31

;.I
I

151. Section 2 prohibits registration if a mark "(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living
or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them
into contempt, or disrepute. (b) Consists of or comprises the flag
or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any
State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation
thereof. (c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written
consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President
of the United States during the life of his widow, if any, except by
the written consent of the widow." § 2(a), (b), & (c), 60 Stat. 428
(1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1052(a), (b), & (c) (1964).
152. § 14, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1964).
153. F.T.C, v. Elder Mfg. Co., 84 U.S.P.Q. 429 (Comm 1r 1950).
154. A descriptive word is distinguishable from a common descriptive
name in that a descriptive word generally identifies characteristics
of goods whereas a common descriptive name identifies the generic
class within which particular goods fall. Ex parte L.R. Nelson Mfg.
Co., 94 U.S.P.Q. 119 (Comm'r 1952).
155. See Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. F.T.C., 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents)
933, 289 F .2d 665 (1961).
156. See, e.g., Derenberg, "The Status of Existing Trademark Registrations Under the New Trademark Act of 1946," 3 Food Drug Cosm.
L.Q. 267, 278 (1948).
157. See Stoughton, "Cancellation of Trademarks," 50 Trademark Rep. 890,
891-92 (1960).
158. § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.s.c. § 45(a)(l) (1964); e.g.,
Waltham Watch Co. v. F.T.C., 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 375
U.S. 944 (1963). In its petition for certiorari the Waltham Watch
Company contended that § 14 of the Lanham Act defined FTC jurisdiction over trademarks and precluded a cease and desist order under
§ 5.
ATRR 116:A-10,11 (10/1/63).
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Indeed, neither the F. T.C. nor the Justice Department opposed deletion of the proviso during 1954 hearings on Lanham Act amendments.159 The amendments failed to pass, however, and in 1961
the Commission obtained cancellation of a registration because the
registrant had fraudulently sworn that he had no knowledge that
anyone else had the right to use the word claimed as a mark in
commerce.160 The Commission apparently resorted to section 14
because the registrant had filed his registration with the Bureau
of Customs in order to block importation of Italian spun rayon
cloth bearing the generic Italian term "fiocco," 161 but it seems
doubtful that its "victory" restored the Commission's faith in section 14. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the
F. T.C. could not cancel a mark because of mere descriptiveness
and that an applicant for registration had no duty to ascertain
whether a word had a descriptive or generic meaning in a foreign
language. Cancellation was ordered simply because the particular
applicant knew that the word was used generically by Italian exporters when he swore that no one else had a right to use the
word in commerce.162
In appraising the significance of the statute of limitations in
section 14, it must be borne in mind that the section is solely concerned with the right to register,163 Although section 14 may bar
Patent Office cancellation of registration because of a mark's descriptiveness, the courts remain free despite section 14 to consider
the descriptive nature of a mark in determining the right to use.164
Furthermore, section 37 of the Lanham Act, which permits a court
to order cancellation of registration "in any action involving a registered mark," 165 affords the same remedy as a Patent Office
159.
160.
161.
162.

1954 Senate Hearings at 92-94.
Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. F. T ,C., note 155 supra.
Id. at 936, 289 F .2d 665, 668 (1961).
This aspect of the Schwartz case is discussed in Derenberg, "The
Fourteenth Year," 51 Trademark Rep. 777, 821-22 (1961).
163. Hammermill Paper Co. v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 52 C.C,P.A.
(Patents) 797, 337 F.2d 662 (1964).
164. Cf. John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F .2d 314 (7th
Cir. 1961) criticized in Derenberg, "The Fifteenth Year," 52 Trademark Rep. 877, 927-28 (1962).
165. § 37, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U,S.C. § 1119 (1964). "Actions involving
a registered mark" include an infringement suit brought by a registrant, Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F .2d 607 (2d Cir.),
cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960), a treble damage action under the antitrust laws in which a registered mark is interposed as a defense
Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 2 04 F .2d 331 (2d cir.),'
cert. den., 345 U.S. 994 (1953), and an action for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a registered mark, Simmonds Aerocessoriei
Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 257 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1958). See generally Stoughton, note 157 supra, at 892-93.
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proceeding 166 but section 14 applies only to the latter. Thus a
court may order cancellation of registration after the five-year
period on a ground not available to a cancellation petitioner. In
Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 167 for instance, a
court asserted the existence of the power to cancel registration
because the plaintiff was the prior user despite the expiration of
the five-year period. The Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has refused cancellation in a similar case. 168 Although
it may initially seem anomalous that courts should be able to cancel registrations under section 37 on grounds that are barred in
the Patent Office by section 14, this result is necessitated by the
fact that section 14 does not affect the right to use a mark. There
would be an unwarranted disparity between the right to use and the
right to register if a court which determined that a registrant had
no right to use a mark could not cancel registration. Indeed, the
principal difficulty concerning section 37 is that judges are reluctant to order the Commissioner to rectify the register. In Oakford
Co. v. Kroger Co.,169 for instance, the court applied the doctrine
enunciated in the Hanover and Rectanus cases to sanction concurrent territorial use but declined to direct the Commissioner to
conform the register to the decree.
b. Incontestable Right to Use
If a registered mark has been in continuous use in commerce
for five consecutive years after registration on the Principal Register or republication! 70 and within one year after expiration of a
five-year period the registrant files an affidavit with the Commissioner specifying that neither has there been a final Patent Office
or judicial decision adverse to the registrant's right to register
or to use his mark nor is any such proceeding pending, 171 section
166. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., note 165
supra; accord, Sylvania Elec. Prods. Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co.,
247 F .2d 730 (3d Cir. 1957); Nancy Ann Storybook Dolls, Inc. v.
Dollcraft Co., 197 F.2d 293 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 344 U,S. 877 (1952).
167. 210 F. Supp. 844, 854 (W.D,N.C, 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 323
F .2d 29 (4th Cir. 1963). See text accompanying note 193 infra, for
discussion of the Standard Crankshaft case.
168. Southern California Engineering Co. v. General Ionics Corp., 126
U,S,P,Q. 472 (Tm. Bd. 1960).
169. 157 F. Supp. 453 (S.D. Ill. 1957).
170. There is no magic in the five years immediately following registration or republication. Any consecutive five-year period will do. 37
C.F ,R. § 2,167(f) (1960).
171. 37 C,F.R. § 2.167 (1960). The affidavit also must specify the goods
referred to in the registration on which the mark has been in continuous use. Ibid.
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15 of the Lanham Act makes the right to use the mark "incontestable" in judicial proceedings ,172
This means that within the limitations of section 15 an incontestable right to use is a good defense 173 to a prayer for cancellation in an action involving a reg- ,
istered mar kl 74 and, except as modified by section 33(b), to an
infringement suit brought against a registrant.175 Section 15 is
subject to the same exceptions as section 14176 and, like section
14, imposes a statute of limitations on contentions that a registrant was not the initial user 177 or that a mark is unprotectable
because merely descriptive,17 8 geographical, or a surname. 179
In addition to incorporating the exceptions to section 14,
section 15 states that an incontestable right to use cannot be raised
as a defense where the other party obtained a valid right to use a
mark or trade name under state or territorial law prior to the
publication of a registrant's application for registration or prior
I
to republication of an 1881 or 1905 registration. 180 This exception was intended to ensure that an incontestable right to use would

I

I

172. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964).
173. Section 15 is defensive in effect. It insulates trademark rights from
certain challenges but does not enlarge them. Rand McNally & Co.
v. Christmas Club, 105 U.S.P.Q. 499 (Comm'r 1955), aff'd on other
grounds, 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 861, 242 F .2d 776 (1957); see Cambridge Rubber Co. v. Sun Valley Mfg. Co., 137 U.S.P.Q. 385 (Tm.
Bd. 1963).
174. See John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F .2d 314, 316
(7th Cir. 1916) (dictum) (discussing related section 33(b) ). But see
Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 210 F. Supp. 844
(W.D.N.C. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1963).
175. Herbert Prods., Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 71, 145
N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. N,Y. County 1955); see Borg-Warner Corp.
v. York-Shipley, Inc., 127 U.S.P,Q. 42 (N.D. Ill. 1960), modified on
other grounds, 293 F.2d 88 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
See note 209 infra and accompanying text for discussion of section
33(b).
-176. § 15 incorporates the principal exceptions to § 14 by reference, § 15,
60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1065 (1964), and unnecessarily repeats the exception with regard to terms that are common
descriptive names. § 15(4), 60 Stat. 434 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1065(4) (1964); see Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 138 (1947).
177. See Ooms & Frost, "Incontestability," note 140 supra, at 225-26 (1949),
178. Seiler's, Inc. v. Hickory Valley Farm, Inc., 139 u.s.P.Q. 460 (Tm.
Bd. 1963); accord, Eastern Metals Research Co. v. Hunter Spring Co.,
119 U,S,P,Q. 448 (Tm. Bd. 1958); see Pure Oil Co. v. Paragon Oil
Co., 117 U,S.P.Q. 321 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
179. See generally Derenberg, "The Status of Existing Trademark Registrations Under the New Trademark Act of 1946," 3 Food, Drug, cosm.
L.Q. 270, 278-81 (1948).
180. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964); Herbert Prods.,
Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 71, 145 N.Y.S,2d 168
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955).
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not enlarge a registrant's rights against other lawful users. 181
In substance, the state rights exception removes the statute of
limitations otherwise imposed by section 15 on a claim that a registrant was a junior user in those states in which territorial rights
were acquired by another before publication or republication. 182
Reference to the dates of publication and republication for this
purpose is mystifying. The legislative history suggests that these
dates were chosen because publication and republication put concurrent users on notice of a registrant's claim of adverse trademark rights. 18 3 This rationale, however, ignores the distinction
between publication and republication, which merely offer an opportunity for actual notice of asserted trademark rights, 184 and
section 22 of the Lanham Act, 185 which imputes constructive notice
of trademark registrations to persons without actual notice. Section 22 applies to Principal Register registrations on the date of
registration, not on the date of publication, 186 and to 1881 and
1905 registrations on July 5, 1947, not the date of republication.187
Thus, if a registrant on the Principal Register acquires an incontestable right to use his mark, the state rights exception does not
exclude from incontestability areas in which other persons acquired
state rights between the date of publication and the date of registration, although section 22 does not bar acquisition of concurrent
rights during this interval. An incontestable right to use would
consequently be a defense to an infringement suit brought by a
person who acquired state rights through initiation of good faith
use during the period between publication and registration of the
incontestable mark on the Principal Register if it were not for
another section of the Lanham Act. Subsection 33(b) (5) 188 removes
181.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

The exception first appeared in a version of the Lanham Bill prepared by a coordinating committee sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers. H.R. 5461, § 15, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941). A statement by the coordinating committee introduced into
the record of the congressional hearings offers what evidence there
is of intent. See 1941 House Hearings at 132.
Herbert Prods., Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., note 180 supra.
See 1941 House Hearlngs at 133-34.
Theodore Rectanus Co. v. United Drug Co., note 35 supra.
§ 22, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1964).
Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473 (D. utah 1962).
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., note 98 supra.
§ 33(b)(5), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b)(5)
(1964). The interplay between § 33(b)(5) and the states rights exception was commented on in Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp.
238 (N.D. Ala. 1964) (alternative holding). § 33(b)(5) did not correct
the discrepancy until the 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act. Formerly, § 33(b)(5) also referred to the date of publication as the time
at which a concurrent user's territorial rights were defined. § 33(b)
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an incontestable right to use as a defense to an infringement suit
r
in those areas in which a good faith concurrent user engaged in
s
continuous use prior to registration of the incontestable mark. The
c
state rights exception is also largely superfluous insofar as the
\I
1881 or 1905 registrants are concerned. Section 22 precludes acc
quisition of rights adverse to those of a registrant after July 5,
t
1947, regardless of republication or incontestability, 18 9 and section 49 190 saves all rights acquired in good faith prior to that
r
date. Finally, subsection 33(b} (6) 191 removes the incontestable
right to use as a defense to an infringement suit in those areas
in which a concurrent user who obtained registration prior to republication of the 1881 or 1905 registration engaged in continuous
use prior to republication.
Although devoid of major import the state rights exception
remains a source of potential mischief,192 In Allen v. Standard
Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 193 for instance, the exception was
utilized to justify judicial cancellation of an incontestable mark.
The case involved an infringement suit by the registrant of "arcplated" against the registrant of "arcwell." Both the plaintiff's
and defendant's marks were incontestable but the court determined
that the plaintiff was the initial user in North Carolina and declared
that the state rights exception to section 15 stripped the defendant's
mark of all incontestable rights and rendered his registration subject to judicial cancellation. 194 This construction of the state
(Footnote continued)
(5), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b)(5) (1958); see Statement
on Behalf of the National Trademark Coordinating Committee, 1954
Senate Hearings at 47.
189. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., note 98 supra; see Diggins, "The Lanham Trademark Act II," 37 Trademark Rep. 419, 43233 (1947).
190. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 49, 60 Stat. 446.
191. § 33(b)(6), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.s.c. § 1115(b)(6)
(1964). § 33(b)(6) is only literally applicable if the republished mark
has become incontestable, ibid., but the policy of the subsection seems
equally relevant before incontestability is achieved. Cf. Forstmann
Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
192. E.g., Letter from the Rochester Patent Group, 1941 House Hearings
at 237; see "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 830-31 (1955).
193. 210 F. Supp. 844 (W.D.N.C. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d
29 (4th Cir. 1963).
194. Although the district judge in the Allen case spoke of the plaintiff's
"right to have the defendant's mark cancelled," Allen v. Standard
Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 210 F. Supp. 844, 854 (W.D.N.C. 1962),
it appears that the decree enjoined the defendant from using his mark
without a formal direction to the Commissioner to cancel the defendant's registration. See Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic
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rights exception does not seem justified by the reciprocal relationship between section 14 and 15. These sections were intended to
create greater security for trademark rights by limiting the time
within which prior and concurrent users could assert conflicting
claims in both the Patent Office and the courts.195 Section 16 of
the Lanham Act, for instance, states that a later applicant for registration cannot assert superior rights in Patent Office interference
proceedings if a registrant has acquired an incontestable right to
use his mark in judicial proceedings.196 After the attainment of
an incontestable right to use, the parallel function of sections 14
and 15 suggests that judicial as well as Patent Office cancellation
of registration should generally be restricted to cases falling within the exceptions common to both sections.197 Ordinarily, the state
rights exception to section 15 should merely authorize the courts
to order territorial restriction of registration in order to retlect

(Footnote continued)
Co., 323 F .2d 29, 35-36 (4th Cir. 1963). Since court-ordered aband
donment of a trademark is a more severe sanction than cancellation
red
of registration, the terms of the decree do not palliate the court's
construction of the state rights exception.
it's
195. E.g., Time, Inc. v. T.I.M.E., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 446, 453 (S.D. Cal.
1954) (dictum) (§ 15); Dunleavy Co. v. Koeppel Metal Furniture Corp.,
122 U.S.P.Q. 395 (Tm. Bd. 1959) (§ 14); see Ooms & Frost, note 177
supra, at 225-26, 232-33.
196. § 16, 60 Stat. 434 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1066 (1964). An
interference proceeding is an inter partes Patent Office proceeding
to determine which of two rival claimants, at least one of whom is
an applicant for registration, is entitled to a Principal Register registration. See Appendix. As a practical matter, marks that have
been registered or republished for over five years have a similar
immunity from interference proceedings. When an interference is
declared between an application and a registration, the applicant will
not be permitted to register his mark unless he can obtain cancellation of the registered mark, 37 C.F.R. § 2.96 (Supp. 1964), and a
IS
registration will not generally be cancelled in an interference proceeding unless it could be cancelled in a cancellation proceeding.
See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Redbanks Orchard Co., 102 U.S.P.Q.
409 (Comm'r 1954); Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure
298-99 (1959). Therefore, the grounds, on which registrations which
have been registered or republished for more than five years are
subject to interference, are the same grounds on which incontestable
registrations are subject to cancellation, i.e., the exceptions to § 14.
197. The total cancellation in Allen, for instance, was justified by the fact
that the defendant made a claim of exclusive rights in his application
which he knew to be false-a ground of cancellation common to both
sections 14 and 15. See Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & HydrauUc
Co., note 194 supra.
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the extent to which the state rights exception is applicable, 198
The state rights exception should only justify cancellation of a
registration if the registrant and a person claiming superior state
rights base their claim of trademark rights on use in the same
state, and the registrant has never acquired territorial rights in
other states,199
c. The Conclusive Evidence Rule
Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act 200 complements section 15
by providing that registration furnishes conclusive evidence of a
registrant's exclusive right to use a mark in commerce once an
incontestable right to use is achieved. Section 33(b) could have
been interpreted as referring to the use of incontestability as a
sword rather than as a shield. In that event an incontestable right
to use would have entitled a registrant to enjoin any concurrent
use which produced likelihood of purchaser confusion except as expressly provided in section 33(b) itse1f.20l Instead, the section
has been construed to be a restatement in evidentiary terms of
the statute of limitations imposed by section 15202 so that other
considerations continue to determine whether a registrant is entitled to affirmative trademark protection. In Cambridge Rubber
Co. v. Sun Valley Manufacturing Co., 203 for instance, the Patent
Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that a registrant
who had an incontestable right to use a mark could not oppose 204
the registration of the same mark by a prior user, although the
registrant was protected from cancellation. The defensive construction
198. The Patent Office has no equivalent authority because of the absence
of a state rights exception to § 14. Cf. United States Steel Corp. v.
National Copper & Smelting Co., 131 U,S,P,Q. 397 (Tm. Bd. 1961).
199. It is difficult to tell from the opinion but this may have been the
situation in Allen. See 210 F. Supp. 844 (W.D.N.C. 1962).
200. § 33(b), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (1964).
The conclusive evidence rule is limited to the goods specified in the
affidavit required to obtain an incontestable right to use. Ibid.
201. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,"
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 829-30 (1955). See Williamson, "Trade-Marks
Registered Under the Lanham Act Are Not 'Incontestable, 1 " 37 Trademark Rep. 404, 408-10 (1947) concerning the exceptions to § 33(b).
202. E.g., John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F .2d 314 (7th
Cir. 1961); Rand McNally & Co. v. Christmas Club, 105 U.S.P.Q. 499
(Comm'r 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 861,
242 F .2d 776 (1957). The evidentiary effect of incontestability is of
major importance to small business. See Taggart, "Trade-Marks
and the Lanham Act," 38 Trademark Rep. 125, 142 (1948).
203. 137 u.s.P.Q. 385 (Tm. Bd. 1963).
204. An opposition proceeding is an inter partes Patent Office proceeding
initiated by a person objecting to the issuance of a Principal Register
registration. See Appendix.
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of section 33(b) is of particular moment in infringement suits. Incontestability may be a good defense if a registrant is the defendant, 205 but, where a registrant is the plaintiff, the courts determine his right to relief with slight regard for incontestability. 2 06
Section 33(b) contains several exceptions which necessitate
careful consideration of the relationship between section 33 (b) and
section 15. The former baldly states that a registration that has
become incontestable is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive
right to use where any of the following circumstances exist: (1)
registration or the incontestable right to use was fraudulently obtained; (2) the mark has been abandoned; (3) the mark has been
used by or with the permission of the registrant to misrepresent
the source of goods; (4) the alleged infringing use is a good faith
nontrademark use; (5) the infringing use was commenced without
knowledge of the registrant's use prior to registration or republication by the registrant; (6) the infringing mark was used and registered prior to registration or republication of the incontestable
mark; and (7) the incontestable mark has been or is being utilized
to violate the antitrust laws. 207 There has been dispute as to the
significance of these exceptions 208 but any consequence beyond removing an incontestable right to use as a defense to an infringement suit usually depends on other sections of the Lanham Act
than section 33(b).209 Even so, not all the exceptions have the
same effect on the conclusive evidence rule.
205. Herbert Prod., Inc. v. Oxy-Dry Sprayer Corp., note 180 supra; see
Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 127 U.S.P.Q, 42 (N.D. Ill.
1960), modified on other grounds, 293 F.2d 88 (7th Cir.), cert. den.,
368 U.S. 939 (1961).
206. See Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 312 F .2d 125 (2d
Cir. 1963); John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d
314 (7th Cir. 1961); Peterson Bros., Inc. v. Murphy, 205 F. Supp.
432 (S,D, Fla. 1961); Richard Hudnut v. Du Barry, Inc. 127 U.S.P.Q.
486 (S,D. Cal. 1960), aif'd, 323 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1963). This was
prophesied in Handler, "Trade-Marks and Anti-Trust Laws," 38
Trademark Rep. 387, 392 (1948).
207. § 33(b) 1-7, 60 Stat. 438-39 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S,C. § 1115(b)
(1)-(7) (1964).
208. Compare Stoughton, "Incontestability Under the Lanham Act, 11 34
Women Law. J. 8, 9, 47 (No. 3 1948) with Robert, The New TradeMark Manual 139-48 (1947).
209. Section 33 deals with the significance of registration in infringement
suits so that the exceptions to section 33(b) necessarily remove an
incontestable right to use as a defense to an infringement suit _2!E
tanto modifying section 15. The Senate and House conferees explicitly stated, however, that the exceptions to section 33 (b) did not
"modify the substantive law of trademarks. . .as set out in other
sections of the act" aside from the implicit effect on section 15.
92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946) (remarks of Congressman Lanham); 92
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Subsections 33(b) (1), (2), and (3) dispense with the conclusive
evidence rule whenever registration was fraudulently obtained, the
mark has been abandoned, or the mark was used by or with the
permission of the registrant to misrepresent the source of goods. 210
These circumstances also constitute grounds for cancellation of
registration211 and exceptions to an incontestable right to use 212
so that whenever they exist registration has no evidentiary value.213
This should also be true if a registered mark is shown to have
become the common descriptive name of an article or registered
contrary to the absolute prohibitions of section 2 of the Lanham
Act, although section 33(b) does not reiterate these grounds for
cancellation and exceptions to incontestability. 214
Subsection 33(b) (4) 215 excepts from the conclusive evidence
rule use of a person's name in his own business other than as a
trade or service mark 216 as well as good faith use of descriptive
descriptive or geographical terms or devices in a geographical
(Footnote continued)
Cong. Rec. 7636 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes). This should
mean, for example, that the exceptions to section 33(b) do not ordinarily remove the incontestable right to use as a shield against
judicial restriction or cancellation of registration as this is principally governed by sections 14 and 15. But see text accompanying
notes 228-34 infra.
210. § 33(b) (1), (2), (3), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 U.s.c. § 1115
(b) (1), (2), (3) (1964). Subsection 33(b) (1) also makes reference to
fraudulent acquisition of an incontestable right to use a mark.
211. § 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964).
212. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964).
213. This is not true where only an incontestable right to use was fraudulently obtained. Submission of a false affidavit under § 15 should not
affect the status of registration as "prima facie" evidence, § 7(b), 60
Stat. 430 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1057 (b) (1964), or even subsequent acquisition of an incontestable right to use on a proper affidavit. See
Robert, note 208 supra, at 141.
214. It was unnecessary to repeat any of the exceptions to an incontestable right to use in § 33(b) since the latter only applies to the extent
that an incontestable right to use exists. § 33(b), 60 Stat. 438 (1946),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1964); see "Developments in the
Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 60 Harv. L. Rev. 814,
829-30 (1955).
215. § 33(b) (4), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (1964).
216. A service mark is a mark used in the sale or advertising of services
to identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the
services of another. § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S,C,
§ 1127 (1964).
Service marks are registrable on the Principal Register. § 3, 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1053 (1964). See generally Isler, "Service Mark Registration Requirements," 37 J. Pat. Off.
Soc'y 243 (1955).
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or descriptive sense.217 This "fair use" concept was initially advanced as a reasonable limitation on offensive employment of incontestable secondary-meaning marks. 218 The subsection was
nevertheless subjected to severe criticism throughout the congressional hearings by those who believed that the exemption was too
narrow 219 and should include use of generic terms. 220 As enacted,
subsection 33(b) (4) is appreciably broader than the original proposal, 221 and, while the subsection contains no reference to generic
terms, barring an incontestable right to use in common descriptive
names accomplishes the same result. 22 2
If a mark was adopted without knowledge of the registrant's
use and used continually prior to registration on the Principal Register or republication of the mark that has become incontestable,
subsection 33(b) (5) removes the area of continuous antecedent use
from the application of the conclusive evidence rule. 223 Subsection 33(b) (6) similarly states that registration is not conclusive
evidence in the area in which another person used a registered
mark previous to registration on the Principal Register or republication of the mark that has become incontestable.224 Subsection
33(b) (6) was regarded as a necessary concomitant of the requirement
217. Use as a trademark is not a fair use. See Pure Foods, Inc. v.
Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.), cert. den •. 348 U.S. 888
(1954); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.),
cert. den., 346 U.S. 867 (1953). But see Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963).
218. 1941 House Hearings at 63-65 (remarks of Robert W. Byerly).
219. E.g., 1941 House Hearings at 63-74, 103-16.
220. Statement of Milton Handler, 1941 House Hearings at 224-25; 1944
Senate Hearings at 102-03 (remarks of Milton Handler).
221. Compare H.R. 102, § 32(2), 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) with§ 33(b)
(4), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (1964).
222. § 15(4), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4) (1964).
But see Handler, note 206 supra, at 391-92 (1948). In Nissen Trampoline Co. v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa
1961) a court ordered cancellation of Lanham Act registration because of the genericness of the registered term, although neither incontestability nor the conclusive evidence rule appear to have been
involved.
223. § 33(b) (5), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (5)
(1964); compare Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp.
777 (M.D.N.C. 1962) with Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland Grocery Corp., 301 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.), cert. den., 371 U.S. 817 (1962).
Modern day advertising may make the area of prior use extremely
large. See Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 293,
299-300 (S.D.N. Y. 1959) (dictum), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F .2d
607 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960).
224. § 33(b) (6), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (6)
(1964).
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in subsection 33(b) (5) that the privileged rights must be acquired
in good faith. Otherwise, if there were several registrants of similar marks, each of whom may have known of the others' use, the
first to obtain an incontestable right to use might gain disproportionate rights with respect to the others simply because the Patent
Office processed his papers first. 225 Subsection 33(b) (6) was accordingly conceived as removing the protection ordinarily afforded
by the conclusive evidence rule with respect to concurrent users
who obtained registration prior to registration on the Principal
Register or republication of the mark that has become incontestable regardless of the concurrent users' knowledge of the mark
that has become incontestable when they adopted their marks. This
means that the constructive notice provided by section 22 should
not preclude the availability of the subsection 33(b) (6) exception,226
although section 22 probably does bar resort to the subsection
33(b) (5) exception because of the latter's "without knowledge" requirement. 227
The relationship of subsections 33(b) (5) and 33(b) (6) to section 15 has been subject to dispute. It has been assumed by at
least one major commentator-Daphne Robert (Mrs. Leeds)-that
subsection 33(b) (5) does not, and that subsection 33(b) (6) does,
remove the incontestable right to use as a defense to a prayer
for judicial restriction of registration on the theory that subsection 33(b) (5) dovetails with the state rights exception to section
15, whereas subsection 33(b) (6) creates a new exception to both
sections 15 and 33(b). 228 At first blush, it appears as though both
of these assumptions are incorrect. This construction, for instance, overlooks the language in section 33(b) restricting application of the conclusive evidence rule to situations where "the
right to use the registered mark has become incontestable." 229
Since the state rights exception limits incontestability, neither
section 33(b) nor subsection 33(b) (5) have relevance to the extent

225. 1941 House Hearings at 168-70, 192.
226. If the junior use was initiated in actual as well as constructive bad
faith, however, attainment of registration would not protect the junior
user because registration would be subject to cancellation at any
time. § 14-15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1064-65

(1964).
227. Cf. Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ala. 1964)
(alternative holding). See contra Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and
Procedure 55 (1959).
--228. Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 140-43 (1947); see also Diggins,
"The Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 419, 432 (1947).
229. § 33(b), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1964).
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that the state rights exception comes into play. 230 Instead, subsection 33(b) (5) eliminates the conclusive evidence rule in areas
in which bona fide concurrent use commences during the interval
between publication of the senior user's application for registration on the Principal Register and issuance of registration despite
the failure of the state rights exception to preserve these rights.23l
Moreover, contrary to Mrs. Leeds' position, there are indications
in the legislative history that neither subsection 33(b) (5) nor subsection 33(b) (6) was intended to have any impact on section 15 beyond the removal of the incontestable right to use as an absolute
defense to an infringement suit. Both the Senate and House conferees told their respective colleagues:
It is clear from the language of the act and from the
congressional history of the act as it is found in the hearings
and reports that the seven "defenses or defects" listed under
paragraph (b) of section 33 are intended to relate to and to
affect the weight of evidence to be given to the certificate of
registration where the owner claims the benefit of the incontestable rule and where the opposite party can, by the weight
of the evidence, establish any one of the things listed in the
seven paragraphs in paragraph (b); but these seven paragraphs
are not intended to enlarge, restrict, amend, or modify the
substantive law of trademarks either as set out in other sections of the act or as heretofore applied by the courts under
prior laws. [ Emphasis supplied.] 232
On the other hand, despite the sweeping language of this statement,
its specific purpose was to explain to Congress the effect of subsection 33(b) (7), not subsections 33(b) (5) and (6), and it is difficult
to believe that the statement is correct insofar as these subsections
are concerned. Subsections 33(b) (5) and (6) are only literally applicable if a registered or republished mark has become incontestable but the policy of the subsections must be equally relevant prior
to the attainment of incontestability. Otherwise, incontestability,
which was meant to enhance trademark rights, would lessen a registrant's rights with respect to the concurrent users protected by
the subsections .233
The applicability of the policy of subsections
33(b) (5) and (6) to registered marks that are not incontestable
230. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,"
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 829-31 (1955). But see Travelodge Corp. v.
Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. A_la. 1964).
231. See notes 182-88 supra and accompanying text.
232. 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946) (remarks of Congressman Lanham); 92
Cong. Rec. 7636 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes).
233. Cf. Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D. 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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means that the subsections must, in effect, constitute exceptions
to the prima facie evidence rule of section 7(b) as well as to the
conclusive evidence rule of section 33(b) and, for this reason,
should also be considered exceptions to the immunity from judicial
restriction of registration accorded by section 15 as Mrs. Leeds
suggested. If these exceptions affected the conclusive evidence
rule and the prima facie evidence rule but not section 15, persons
falling within the exceptions could enjoin use of the incontestable
mark within their enclaves but could not obtain a restriction of
the registration of the incontestable mark to reflect the registrant's
actual right to use. It is more consistent with the Lanham Act's
purpose of reconciling the right to register with the right to use
to consider that subsections 33(b) (5) and 33(b) (6) permit those who
can bring themselves within the exceptions to both enjoin the registrant of an incontestable mark and to obtain territorial restriction of the incontestable mark's registration. Z34
Subsection 33(b) (7) originated as a Senate amendment to the
final House version of the Lanham Bill.235 The original Senate
language created an exception to the conclusive evidence rule if
"the mark has been or is being used in violation of the antitrust
laws of the United States." 23 6 The enacted provision includes a
conference committee revision limiting the exception to a mark
that "has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of
the United States." 237 This antitrust exception is tangible evidence of the Justice Department's hostility to the theory of incontestability 238 and has been enbroiled in controversy from the
234. Cf. Conley v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 125 U.S.P.Q. 2 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
235. s." Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1946).
236. Ibid. (emphasis supplied).
237. § 33(b) (7), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (7) (1964) (emphasis supplied).
238. E.g., Statement of the Department of Justice, 1944 Senate Hearings
at 59-62. Justice Department fears that the Lanham Bill could be
construed to license antitrust violations also led to a declaration in
section 46 (a) of the Lanham Act that "nothing contained in this Act
shall be construed as limiting, restricting, modifying, or repealing
any statute in force on the effective date of this Act which does not
relate to trade-marks, or as restricting or increasing the authority
of any Federal department or regulatory agency except as may be
specifically provided in this Act." Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540,
§ 46(a), 60 Stat. 445 (1946).
The Justice Department characterized
a prototype of this clause as "indefinite," "general," and an inadequate "safeguard against future interpretations of the bill . . . as permitting restraints of trade and the creation of monopolies." 1944
Senate Hearings at 65. This judgment seems to have been borne
out by subsequent events. The subsection has received no relevant
interpretation and is not even reported in the text of the 1964 edition
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moment of conception. 239 The principal issues are: (1) When is
a mark used "to violate" the antitrust laws? (2) Was the antitrust
exception intended to affect the capacity to sue for trademark infringement? 240
In submitting the conference report to the House, Congressman Lanham answered the first question as follows:
If a trade-mark should be used the legal, causal, and efficient instrumentality to effect a contract, agreement, or arrangement which violates the antitrust laws [ sic.] then the
actual use of the mark to carry out such a scheme would
constitute a use in violation of the antitrust laws; but if the
mark is in no sense an essential legal element of the unlawful conduct, then the fact that the registrant may have violated the antitrust laws would not bring paragraph (7) of
paragraph (b) of section 33 into operation.241

The Senate conferees later told the Senate that this statement
meant that use of a trademark "must have been a part of the
process of violating the antitrust laws" for section 33(b) (7) to
apply. 242 These indications of Congressional intention make it
difficult to agree with commentators who have minimized the applicability of section 33(b) (7). 243 A trademark would seem to be
"part of the process of violating the antitrust laws" in numerous
situations including those involving (1) patently unwarranted claims
to trademark rights in commercially necessary language coupled
with threats of infringement suits against competitors, 244 (2) agreements by competitors to allocate markets and to require joint use

(Footnote continued)
of the United States Code. See notes accompanying 15 U.S.C. § 1051
(1964). See also "Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing," 53 Trademark Rep. 113 0, 1164-68 (1963).
239. E.g., Rogers, "The Lanham Act and the Social Function of TradeMarks," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 173, 183-84 (1949).
240. Prior to the enactment of § 33(b) (7) a plaintiff's antitrust record had
no effect on his ability to sue for trademark infringement. E.g., O.
& W. Thum Co. v. Dickinson. 245 Fed. 609 (6th Cir. 1917), cert. den.,
246 U.S. 664 (1918); see Nicoson, "Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in
Infringement Suits," 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 76, 96 (1962). But see Folmer
Graflex Corp. v. Graphic Photo Service, 41 F. Supp. 319 (D. Mass.
1941), new trial granted on other grounds, 45 F. Supp. 749 (D. Mass.
1942).
241. 92 Cong. Rec. 7524-25 (1946).
242. 92 Cong. Rec. 7873-74 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes).
243. E.g., Diggins, "The Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 37 Trademark Rep.
419, 440 (194 7); Handler, note 206 supra, at 395 (1948).
244. If several persons are involved in this conduct, it may constitute a
conspiracy in restraint of trade violative of § 1 of the Sherman Act.

t
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of a common mark so that remedies for trademark infringement
can be utilized to police the division of territories,245 (3) a dominant corporation's receipt of a trademark assignment from a
competitor along with a transfer of the good will associated with
the mark where the transaction results in a probable substantial
lessening of competition,246 (4) exploitation of a trademark's commercial value through tying clauses in trademark licenses which
are unrelated to the licensor's duty to control the nature and quality of the goods sold by the licensee, 247 and (5) possibly even
discriminatory grant of trademark licenses.248
The number of instances in which trademarks may figure in
antitrust violations makes the effect of subsection 33(b) (7) on tainted
marks of considerable moment. The House conference committee
report249 and Congressman Lanham 's presentation of the report to
the House 250 maintain that the antitrust defense has exactly the
effect that section 33(b) indicates; i.e., if a mark is used to violate '
the antitrust laws, the conclusive evidence rule does not apply in
(Footnote continued)
§ 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), see Tirnberg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition,"
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 331 (1949). If a single individual is
involved there could be an attempt to monopolize violative of section
2 of the Sherman Act, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 u.s.c.
§ 2 (1964), Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 71 F .2d 662 (2d Cir.
1934), or an "unfair method of competition" under § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, § 5: 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964); Christmas Club, 25 F.T.C. 1116 (1937); Albany Chem. Co., 3 F.T.C. 369 (1921).
245. See Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 307 F .2d 207
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. den., 372 U.S. 929 (1963).
246. See Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F,T.C. 26 (1956). A trademark can not
be validly assigned without the good will associated with the mark.
§ 10, 60 Stat. 431 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1964).
247. A tying arrangement exists where a vendor will sell one product
only if a purchaser will agree to buy another independent product as
well. The existence of a trademark license was summarily dismissed
as a justification for otherwise illegal tying clauses in Switzer Bros.,
Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F .2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. den., 369 U.S. 851
(1962) where the tying clauses were not necessary to maintain the
quality of the products on which the licensed mark was used. On the
other hand, in Susser v. Carvel Corp. 332 F .2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. dismissed, 33 U.S,L, Week 3355 (1965), a divided Second Circuit held that a trademark licensor's duty of quality control removed
tying clauses related to the integrity of the trademark product from
the category of an antitrust violation. For discussion of a trademark
licensor's duty of quality control see Chapter Ill infra.
248. See K,S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 203 Supp. 230 S,D.N.Y. 1962);
K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310 (S,D.N. Y. 1961).
249, H.R. Rep. No 2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1946).
250. 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946).
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judicial proceedings. The Senate conferees, however, used the following language in explaining the conference committee's handiwork
to the Senate:
This exception means, and should mean, that a trade-mark
owner who sues another user for infringement must come
into court with clean hands, and if he is using the mark to
violate the antitrust law he is subject to be contested and to
have his violation used as a defense. [ Emphasis supplied.) 251
[ T] he Senate inserted [ sic] this amendment to make it a
defense to an infringement suit as well as to make it a ground
of contestability if it should be shown that the registrant was
using the mark itself to violate the antitrust law. [ Emphasis
supplied. J 252
Although it is possible to read the comments of the Senate conferees as merely emphasizing that a defendant in an infringement
suit can utilize subsection 33(b) (7) to preclude the plaintiff's assertion of the conclusive evidence rule,253 it seems that the Senators meant something more. 254 In an effort to fathom the Senate
conferees' oracular pronouncements several writers have noted
that the other exceptions to the conclusive evidence rule are defenses to an infringement suit so that subsection 33(b) (7) must
also constitute a defense.255 However, many of these writers
have not given equivalent emphasis to the fact that the other exceptions to the conclusive evidence rule are not uniformly available to every defendant in every infringement suit. Although fraudulent registration, abandonment, or deceptive use of a mark can
be raised by any defendant, "fair use," good faith concurrent use
prior to registration of an incontestable mark, and use of a registered mark prior to registration or republication of an incontestable mark manifestly cannot be. This distinction may provide a
solvent for fears that subsection 33(b) (7) would bar every suit for
infringement of a mark subject to an antitrust defense if it is conceded that the subsection affords a defense.256
251. 92 Cong. Rec. 7636 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes) (emphasis
supplied).
252. 92 Cong. Rec. 7873 (1946) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney) (emphasis
supplied.)
253. See Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 210 (1947).
254. See Lockhart, "Violation of the Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil
Actions," 31 Minn. L. Rev. 507, 566-67 (1947); Tirnberg, note 244
supra, at 359.
255. See Handler, note 206 supra, at 395; Lockhart, note 254 supra, at
567-68; Timberg, note 244 supra, at 359.
256. See Nicoson, note 240 supra, at 97 & n. 141; Note, "The Antitrust
Defense in Trademark Infringement Actions," 45 Va. L. Rev. 94,
102-03, 106 (1959).
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Section 33(a) states that registration is prima facie evidence
of a registrant's exclusive right to use the mark on the goods
specified in the certificate "but shall not preclude an opposing
party from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect which
might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered." 257
On the other hand, section 33(b) declares that on attainment of an
incontestable right to use registration is conclusive evidence of
the exclusive right to use except with regard to seven enumerated
defenses or defects, including use of a mark to violate the antitrust laws. 258 A possible inference from the wording of sections
33(a) and (b) is that equitable defenses available against an ordinary registration cannot be raised after attainment of an incontestable right to use unless enumerated in section 33(b). 259 Though
there is dictum to this effect,260 it seems reasonably clear today
that equitable defenses not specified in section 33(b) can be asserted to bar reliance on the conclusive evidence rule. 261 This
construction was not, however, assured when the Lanham Bill was
under legislative consideration. Therefore, if subsection 33(b) (7)
was meant to do more than waive the conclusive evidence rule,
the language of the Senate conferees and the juxtaposition of sections 33(a) and (b) suggest that the subsection was merely intended
to preserve the possibility of raising an antitrust defense to infringement suits where the maxim of clean hands would dictate the
withholding of relief. Since at the time of the enactment of the
Lanham Act there was no reported trademark infringement suit in
which a defense of unclean hands had been sustained on the basis
of a plaintiff's antitrust violations,262 subsection 33(b) (7) must have
been predicated on the contemporary assumption that the burgeoning "patent misuse" doctrine, which bars enforcement of patent
rights during periods of misuse, would soon spill over into the
257. § 33(a), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(a) (1964).
258. § 33(b), 60 Stat, 438 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (1964).
259. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,"
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 830 (1955).
260. Apple Grower Ass'n v. Pelletti Fruit Co., 153 F. Supp. 948, 951
(N.D. Cal. 1957) (dictum); Richard Hudnut v. DuBarry, Inc., 127 U.S.
P.Q. 486, 489 (S,D. Cal. 1960) (dictum), aff'd on other grounds, 323
F .2d 986 (9th Cir. 1963).
261. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350
(E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 368 U.S.
820 (1961), accord, Lance, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 210 F. Supp. 272 (E.D.
Pa. 1962); Gillette Co. v. Ed Pinaud, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y,
1959).
262. The applicability of the maxim was, however, suggested on a motion
to strike the defense in Folmer Graflex Corp. v. Graphic Photo Service, 41 F. Supp. 319 (D. Mass. 1941), new trial granted on other
grounds, 45 F. Supp. 749 (D. Mass. 1942).
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trademark field. 263
Because a defense of "trademark misuse"
would apply to all registered and unregistered marks, 264 subsection 33(b) (7)'s humble office was to ensure that an incontestable
right to use would not destroy the defense. Viewed in this light,
the subsection's reference to past as well as to present antitrust
violations is not a command to deny perpetually relief to marks
involved in antitrust violations but a simple declaration that unpurged antitrust violations commenced prior to the effective date
of the Lanham Act, as well as those initiated after July 5, 1947,
can be raised as defenses when the registrant of an incontestable
mark sues for infringement.
If subsection 33(b) (7) has been read correctly, it is one of
the ironies of legal history that a statutory provision intended to
preserve the availability of an anticipated defense appears to be
the principal reason for the potential existence of that defense.
A full-fledged trademark misuse doctrine did not develop shortly
after 1946 and has not developed to this day,265 but there are indications that the very existence of subsection 33(b) (7) could result in evolution of the doctrine. In Forstmann Woolen Co. v.
Murray Sices Corp., 266 for instance, Judge Medina theorized:
Plaintiff urges that its violation of the anti-trust laws
is no defense in an action for infringement of its trade-mark,
citing numerous cases. Defendant relies on 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115.
That Section, enacted as part of the Lanham Act of 1946, provides, in substance, that a mark which has become incontestable under the provisions of the Lanham Act may not be enforced where "the mark has been or is being used to violate
the anti-trust laws of the United States." Plaintiff's marks are
registered under the Act of 1905, and no incontestability attaches thereto. Nevertheless, if a trade-mark owner's use of
his incontestable mark is subject to the defense specified in
§ 1115 a fortiori, the plaintiff's mark, which lacks the status
of incontestability, must be subject to the same defense.267
Judge Medina granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the antitrust
defense from the answer, however, because the antitrust violation
pleaded did not involve the plaintiff's trademark. Several subsequent
263.

See Handler, note 206 supra, at 395-97; Ooms & Frost, note 139
supra, at 228-30 (1949); Note, "The Besmirched Plaintiff and the
Confused Public: Unclean Hands in Trademark Infringement," 65
Colum. L. Rev. 109, 113-14 (1965).
264. See Handler, note 206 supra, at 395-96.
265. See Handler, "Trademarks-Assets or Liabilities," 48 Trademark
Rep. 661, 674-76 (1958); ATRR 204:A-5 (6/8/65).
266. 10 F .R.D. 367 (S.D.N. Y. 1950).
267. 10 F.R.D. 367, 370.
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cases which cite subsection 33(b) (7) or the Forstmann case for the
propostition that an antitrust violation may bar an infringement suit
are also on pleading or procedural points.268 An antitrust defense
has yet to be sustained on the merits in an infringement suit. 269
As soon as subsection 33(b) (7) was perceived to be the root
of a trademark misuse doctrine, efforts were made to expunge the
provision from the Lanham Act because of "the psychologically and
legally undesirable effect of seemingly offering a weapon to unscrupulous competitors and infringers to avoid a judicial condemnation of their own conduct. • • •"270 Opinions expressed concerning the proposed amendment reflected continuing controversy over
the effect of subsection 33(b) (7). Proponents of amendment assumed that the subsection either waived the conclusive evidence
rule or legislated a defense to an infringement suit that would be
unavailable after repeal. 271 The Justice Department concurred in
the latter interpretation and opposed deletion of "an important weapon in enforcing the antitrust laws." 272 On the other hand, the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee endorsing deletion stressed
that subsection 33(b) (7) was surplusage because violation of the antitrust laws could always be raised via a defense of unclean hands.273
Since subsection 33(b) (7) survived the 1962 amendments to
the Lanham Act 274 it would be well to hazard a guess as to the
future. The current view that the conclusive evidence rule can
only be raised as a defense to an infringement suit275 postdates
268. Sanitized, Inc. v. S,C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 23 F .R.D. 230 (S.D.N. Y.
1959); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Marshall-Wells Co., 1959 Trade Cas.
,r 69343 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (mem.); Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Alexander's
Dept. Stores, 11 F .R.D. 405 (S.D.N. Y. 1951). See also Aerojet-General Corp. v. Aero-Jet Prods. Corp., 33 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Ohio, 1963).
269. See Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962); American
Auto Ass'n v. Spiegel, 205 F.2d 771 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 346 U.S.
887 (1953); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Institutional Drug Distribs., Inc.,
151 F. Supp. 715 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
270. Derenberg, "The Fourth Year," 41 Trademark Rep. 893, 919 (1951).
Cf. National Dynamics Corp. v. John Surrey, Ltd., 144 U.S,P .Q. 184
(S.D.N. Y. 1964) for an example of abuse of an antitrust defense.
271. See Statement on Behalf of National Trademark Coordinating Committee, 1954 Senate Hearings at 47-48. Compare Att'y Gen. Nat'l
Comm. Antitrust Rep. 260 (1955).
272. 1954 Senate Hearings at 94.
273. Sen. Rep. 2266, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. at 9 (1954); see Derenberg, note
270 supra, at 919. Compare Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep.
260 (1955).
274. See 4 Callmann, Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, Supp., 1963,
at 111-13 (2d ed. 1950).
275. E.g., John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d 314 (7th
Cir. 1961); Rand McNally & Co. v. Christmas Club, 105 U,S,P.Q. 499
(Comm'r 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 861,
242 F.2d 776 (1957).
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much of the discussion concerning subsection 33(b) (7). Statements
on the floor of Congress and most writers have assumed that the
conclusive evidence rule could be utilized by a plaintiff and that
the antitrust defense limited the ability to do so. 276 The defensive
interpretation of section 33(b) requires a compensating shift in analysis.
The defensive interpretation of section 33(b) should lead to
the conclusion that 33(b) (7) is unrelated to a registrant's ability
to obtain affirmative relief for trademark infringement. When a
registrant is sued for trademark infringement, the antitrust defense simply reduces his registration to prima facie evidence of
the exclusive right to use without constituting an independent ground
for cancellation of registration or lifting the statute of limitations
imposed by section 15 on certain grounds of judicial cancellation. 27 7
The duration of subsection 33(b) {7)'s suspension of the conclusive
evidence rule turns on interpretation of the function of the subsection. If the previously suggested interpretation is accepted,
and the subsection is considered to merely leave the door open
for a trademark misuse doctrine, the conclusive evidence rule
would only be waived while an antitrust violation continued-in the
event that a trademark misuse doctrine crystallized.278 The contrary view that subsection 33(b) (7) constitutes a mandatory statutory exception to the conclusive evidence rule would probably result in permanent suspension of section 33(b) once a mark had
been used to violate the antitrust laws because the subsection's
explicit reference to past as well as to present antitrust violations
would permit plaintiffs to raise perpetually the same antitrust offense to ward off the conclusive evidence rule.279 This mechanistic interpretation of the antitrust defense would be objectionable
in that it offers no reward for repentance by an antitrust violator
but would not inflict an intolerable penalty for his illegal conduct.
Waiver of the conclusive evidence rule as a defense to an infringement suit is a pinprick at best. Since subsection 33{b) {7) has no
effect on the prima facie evidence rule or the constructive notice
276. E.g., 92 Cong. Rec. 7636 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes); 92
Cong. Rec. 7873 (1946) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney); Loc_khart,
"Violation of the Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions,"
31 Minn. L. Rev. 507, 566-68 (1947).
277. Cott Beverage Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 146 F. Supp.
300 (S.D.N. Y. 1956), appeal dismissed 243 F .2d 795 (2d Cir. 1957)
(per curiam); see Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 144-47 (1947).
278. See text accompanying notes 255-64 supra. Compare Robert, note
277 supra, at 144.
279. Cf., Nicoson, note 240 supra, at 97 & n.141 (1962); "Antitrust Defense In Trademark Infringement Actions," 45 Va. L. Rev. 94, 10203, 106 (1959).
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prov1s1on, concurrent users should only be able to rebut defensive
use of the prima facie evidence rule if they commenced good faith
use prior to the commencement of constructive notice 280 or if a
registered secondary-meaning mark lacked secondary meaning in
a particular area.281 Moreover, in the latter instance the constructive notice provision would permit the registrant to expand
the area in which his mark has secondary meaning insofar as
persons who commenced use after constructive notice began are
concerned.2 82 Interpretation of subsection 33(b) (7) as legislating
an inflexible antitrust defense is only indefensible if this is considered to be a mandatory defense to infringement suits by a registrant. Viewed in this light, the explicit reference to past as
well as to present antitrust violations would lead to total loss of
trademark protection whenever a mark had been used to violate
the antitrust laws because defendants could repeatedly raise the
same antitrust offense as a defense to infringement suits.283
In
stark contrast, the patent misuse doctrine, which provided the inspiration for subsection 33(b) (7), merely deprives a patentee of
legal protection for the duration of patent misuse.284 Taken as
a rigid statutory defense to trademark infringement, subsection
33(b) (7) is an inexorable penalty offering no reward for repentance
and no solace to a consuming public confused by unchecked appropriation of a condemned mark.
D. Concurrent Registration
The Act of 1905 neither authorized the Patent Office to consider the equitable principles applied by the courts285 nor altered
the equitable doctrine permitting concurrent territorial rights if a
junior user adopted a mark in good faith;286 yet registration for
280. The common-law rule that concurrent territorial rights must be acquired in good faith would control unless a concurrent user who obtained registration prior to registration or republication of the incontestable mark is entitled to greater territorial rights under § 33(b)
(6) regardless of good faith. § 33{b) (6), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (6) (1964).
281. Cf. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co. 264 F .2d 88 (6th
Cir. 1959).
282. Cf. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d
Cir. 1959).
283. See Nicoson, note 240 supra, at 97 & n.141; "Antitrust Defense In
Trademark Infringement Actions," 45 Va. L. Rev. 94, 102-03, 106
(1959).
284. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457
(1957).
285. See Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 55-56 (1947).
286. E.g., Griesdieck Western Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 149
F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1945).
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goods of the "same descriptive properties" was denied to all except the first user.287 Section 2(d), 288 which authorizes concurrent registration, was one of several sections of the Lanham Act
intended to remedy the glaring discrepancy between the right to
use and the right to register which discredited the registry maintained under the Act of 1905. 289 Although section 2(d) is not a
substantive provision of the Lanham Act because it has no direct
effect on common-law concurrent territorial rights, section 2(d}
interlocks with the substantive provisions and thus warrants discussion at this point.
Section 2 (d} permits the Commissioner to issue concurrent
registrations if he determines that confusion is unlikely because
of distinctions "as to the mode or place of use of the marks or
the goods in connection with which such marks are used," 290 but
Patent Office practice has been to refuse concurrent registration
unless there is a territorial distinction in the use of marks. 291
If there is no likelihood of purchaser confusion because of differ ences in goods or in modes of use of a mark, the Patent Office
maintains that an unrestricted registration is available and that
287. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 725-26; e.g., Pennsylvania
Petroleum Co. v. Pennzoil Co., 23 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 706, 80 F .2d 67
(1933): California Packing Corp. v. Tillman & Bendel, Inc., 17 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 1048, 40 F.2d 108 (1930).
288. § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964).
289. See 1944 Senate Hearings at 45-46; 1939 House Hearings at 118-19
for § 2(d)'s meager legislative history. Other noteworthy provisions
are § 19, which permits the Patent Office tribunals to apply principles of laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, § 19, 60 Stat; 434 (1946),
15 U.S.C. § 1069 (1964), and § 37, which empowers courts to direct
the Commissioner of Patents to conform the register to their decisions, § 37, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1964). Despite
substantial improvement in the situation the Lanham Act has been
said to make the right to register "nearly but not completely coincident" with the right to use. Callmann, "Trademarks-the Right to
Use vs. the Right to Register," 51 Trademark Rep. 1209 (1961). See
also Lunsford, "The Right to Use and the Right to Register-the
Trademark Anomaly," 43 Trademark Rep. 1 (1953).
290. § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964).
291. See Baxter Laboratories, Inc. v. Don Baxter, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q. 122
(Comm'r 1950), juris. retained, 38 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 786, 186 F .2d
511 (1951); Ford Motor Co. v. Lincoln Radio & Television Corp., 99
U .s.P .Q. 60 (Comm' r 1953). These cases were dee ided under the
original wording of this portion of § 2(d) which permitted concurrent
registration if the Commissioner found confusion unlikely because of
distinctions "as to the mode or place of use or the goods in connection with which such registrations may be granted . . . ." § 2(d), 60
Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1958). During 1954 hearings
the Patent Office objected to amending this to read "or the goods in
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concurrent registration is not required.292 Section 37 of the Lanham Act permits a court to order issue of concurrent registration
in these instances,293 but, as viewed by the Patent Office itself, a
concurrent use proceeding is an inter partes proceeding 294 to determine an applicant's right to a registration embracing part of
the United States where another person is using the same or a
similar mark on related goods in another part of the country.
Section 2(d) prescribes the determinations that must be made by
the Office in a concurrent use proceeding that is not based upon
a judicial resolution of the right to use: confusion of purchasers
must not be apt to result from concurrent use, and an applicant
must have been found to have engaged in both lawful use in commerce and use prior to certain dates if applications to register
confusingly similar uses have been filed by others.295
(Footnote continued)

292.

293.
294.
295.

connection with which the marks are used" on the basis of its theory,
see text accompanying note 292 infra, that a sufficient difference between goods to forestall likelihoodof confusion would render concurrent
use proceedings unnecessary and permit separate unrestricted registration. 1954 Senate Hearings at 19-20. Quaere: Should congressional enactment of the language opposed by the Patent Office affect
its theory? See Derenberg, "The Thirteenth Year," 50 Trademark
Rep. 773, 875 (1960). For pro and con on the merits of the Patent
Office approach, compare "Trade-Marks, Unfair Competition, and
the Courts: Some Unsettled Aspects of the Lanham Act," 43 Trademark Rep. 906, 914 (1953), with Derenberg, "The Seventh Year,"
44 Trademark Rep. 991, 1008-10 (1954).
Rohn & Haas Co. v. C. P. Hall Co., 91 U.S.P.Q. 69 (Comm'r 1951);
accord, Nebraska Consolidated Mills Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 118
U.S.P.Q. 454 (Comm'r 1958). In the latter case the Assistant Commissioner specifically found that an unrestricted registration was
possible.
E.g., Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.),
cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960).
See Appendix for the distinction between ex parte and inter partes
Patent Office proceedings.
A concurrent use proceeding will be instituted only if an application
seeking concurrent territorial registration is pending in the Patent
Office and the mark is registrable except for questions of concurrent
registration. 37 C.F.R. § 2,99(a) (1960); e.g., Ex parte M. Wile &
Co., 109 U.S.P.Q. 114 (Comm'r 1956). However, a Patent Office
trademark examiner has discretion to allow amendment of a regular
application in order to transform it into an application for concurrent
registration, 37 C.F.R. § 2.73 (1960), and other Patent Office proceedings can be converted into concurrent use proceedings. Fair v.
Twin City Wholesale Grocer Co., 98 U.S.P.Q. 16 (Comm'r 1953). As
an alternative the Commissioner may restrict the territorial scope
of an existing registration on the basis of evidence presented in
another inter partes proceeding. Prince Dog & Cat Food Co. v.
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Concurrent registrations are granted where marks would produce a likelihood of purchaser confusion if used in the same market but this probability is obviated by a difference in trade territories. Section 2(d) requires a specific finding by the Patent Office that confusion between concurrent uses is unlikely; 29 6 a stipulation by the interested persons to that effect is not controlling.297
In close cases a probability of confusion is more apt to be found
to exist if the marks have been in use a relatively short time,298
especially if the concurrent users have adjacent markets. 299 On
the other hand, experience in concurrent use of marks may preclude an inference of likelihood of purchaser confusion that might
otherwise have been made.300
A person who has no legal right to use a mark obviously has
no right to registration.301 In the context of concurrent territorial use, the "lawful use" requirement means that a junior user who
adopts his mark in constructive bad faith by virtue of section 22
of the Lanham Act, as well as a junior user in actual bad faith,

(Footnote continued)
Central Nebr-aska Packing Co., 128 U.S.P.Q. 405 (Tm. Bd. 1961),
rev' d on other grounds, 49 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 1328, 305 F .2d 904
(1962).
296. Ex parte Chadbourne Hosiery Mills, Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q. 12 (Comm'r
1955).
297. Ford Motor Co. v. Lincoln Radio & Television Corp., 99 U.S.P.Q.60
(Comm'r 1953).
298. See Flintkote Co. v. Merriam & Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Comm'r 1951).
See Derenberg, "The Fourth Year," 41 Trademark Rep. 893, 900-01
(1951); Hancock, "Notes from the Patent Office," 46 Trademark Rep.
53, 54 (1956).
299. Flintkote Co. v. Merriam & Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Comm'r 1951); see
Old Monastery Wine Co. v. St. Julian Wine Co., 110 U.S.P .Q. 241
(Comm'r 1956). The Flintkote case has been said to be too doctrinaire on this point. See 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 246 (1951). The
recent case of Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q.
208 (Comm'r 1963) seems to evidence a more flexible approach; but
§ 2(d) itself has been construed as requiring the Patent Office to apply the likelihood of confusion test more strictly than the courts.
Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), cert.
den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960); accord, Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp. V:Billy Boy Co., 133 U.S.P.Q. 218 .(Tm. Bd. 1962).
300. Nebraska Consolidated Mills Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 118 U.S.P.Q.
454 (Comm'r 1958).
301. E.g., Ex parte Crown Beverage Corp., 102 U.S.P.Q. 312 (Comm'r
1954); see Carmo Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Markoulis, 121 u.s.P.Q. 46 (Tm.
Bd. 1959). The converse is not necessarily true even under the
Lanham Act. E.g., Salem Commodities, Inc. v. Miami Margarine
Co., 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 932, 244 F.2d 729 (1957); see note 289
supra.
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is not entitled to concurrent registration.302 The Patent Office
also takes the position that an extension of trade territory by a
junior user after notice of senior use will not ordinarily be considered in determining the territory for which a junior user will
be granted concurrent registration. In Coastal Chemical Co. v.
Dust-A-Way, Inc., 303 the Commissioner declared:
The first user in commerce which can lawfully be regulated
by Congress is entitled to registration for the entire country
less the area in which the other user can establish actual use
prior to notice of adverse use.304
The principal exception to this proposition occurs where a jWlior
user obtains an unrestricted registration an appreciable period of
time before the senior user applies for registration. In these circumstances, the Patent Office maintains that it increases the incentives to register if the junior user is allowed concurrent registration for the entire country with the exception of those states
in which the senior user engaged in use prior to notice of the
junior use,305 These rules-of-thumb are not inflexible, however,
and the Patent Office may "balance the equities" in apportioning
territorial rights. 306
In the absence of a judicial determination of the right to use,
concurrent registration can only be issued to a person who used
his mark prior to the filing date of the earliest application by
another to register a confusingly similar use on the Principal Register,307 or prior to July 5, 1947, if a concurrent user has an unexpired 1881 or 1905 registration.308 In the early days of the
Lanham Act the Patent Office tended to restrict the scope of concurrent registration to the area of use at the time that the earliest relevant application was filed.309 This approach was supported
302. See Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., note 299 supra. A use
that violates regulatory legislation is also not a "lawful use." Cf.,
Coahoma Chem. Co. v. Smith, 113 U.S.P.Q. 413 (Comm'r 1957),aff'd
on other grounds, 46 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 801, 264 F.2d 916 (1959~
accord, In re Taylor, 133 U.S.P.Q. 490 (Tm. Bd. 1962).
303. 139 u.s.P.Q. 208 (Comm'r 1963).
304. 139 u.s.P.Q. 208, 210.
305. Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., note 299 supra.
306. Haas Bros. v. Charles Jacquin et Cie., 143 U.S.P.Q. 37 (Comm'r
1964).
3 07. This includes applications which have matured into registrations. See
Frontier Ref. Co. v. Frontier Oil Ref. Corp., 118 U.S.P.Q. 176
(Comm'r 1958).
308. An expired registration is not considered in concurrent use proceedings. Fair v. Twin City Wholesale Grocer Co., 98 U.S.P.Q. 16
(Comm'r 1953).
309. E.g., Ex parte Chadbourn Hosiery Mills, Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q. 12 (Comlll1
1955); Flintkote Co. v. Merriam & Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Comm'r 1951)
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by a few commentators who made a deduction that section 2{d) was
intended to regulate the acquisition of concurrent territorial rights
from the language barring concurrent registration to a person
whose use commenced after the filing of an application for registration by a senior user .310 If the filing of an application did not
also preclude the acquisition of subsequent concurrent territorial
rights, they apparently reasoned, a variance between the right to
use and the right to register would continue to exist despite the
avowed purpose of section 2{d). With all due respect to this approach, reading section 2 (d) as governing concurrent territorial
rights is even more incongruous. This substantive interpretation
reduces the constructive notice provision to surplusage because
section 22 makes registration constructive notice and filing of an
application to which section 2{d) refers necessarily precedes registration.311
Furthermore, under a substantive interpretation section 2{d) as originally written312 would have barred acquisition of
concurrent rights after the filing of an application under the act
of 1881 in 1890, or under the Act of 1905 in 1910, in irreconcilable conflict with the clear intent of Congress that the Lanham
Act should not impair rights acquired in good faith prior to July
5, 1947 .313
The flaws in a substantive interpretation of section 2(d) require acknowledgment of the fact that the section was poorly drafted. 3l 4 Although valid at common law, all good faith concurrent
uses which were initiated after the filing of an application but before the operability of the constructive notice provision were inexplicably denied registrability.315 The most signal aspect of the
variance between the right to use and the right to register perpetuated by section 2 {d) was, however, removed by the 1962
310. E.g., Diggins, "The Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 37 Trademark Rep.
305, 317 (1947).
311. There are clear statements in the legislative history that § 22 was
intended to reduce concurrent territorial use, e.g., 1939 House Hearings at 125. This is not true with respect to § 2(d). See 1944 Senate
Hearings at 45-46; 1939 House Hearings at 118-19.
312. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428; Ex parte Stauffer
Chem. Co., SO U.S.P.Q. 180 (Comm'r), reconsideration den., 81 U.S.P.Q.
170 (Comm'r 1949).
313. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 49, 60 Stat. 446. The effect of the
constructive notice provision on concurrent territorial rights is consonant with this intent. Section 22 applies to 1881 and 1905 registrations only as of July 5, 1947. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores,
Inc., 267 F .2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
314. See Halliday, "Constructive Notice and Concurrent Registration," 38
Trademark Rep. 111, 121 (1948).
315. See Vandenburgh, "Concurrent Registration of Trademarks," 29 J.
Pat. Off. Soc'y 720, 726-27 (1947).
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amendments to the Lanham Act. The amendments conformed section 2(d) and the constructive notice provision by making concurrent registration available to junior uses initiated in good faith
prior to July 5, 1947, regardless of the filing of an earlier application under the Acts of 1881 or 1905.316 A discrepancy between
the right to use and the right to register continues to exist with
respect to good faith concurrent uses begun during the interval
between the filing of an application for registration on the Principal Register and issue of a registration to the applicant but other
aspects of the Lanham Act can be utilized to correct the situation,
Section 2(d} itself gives the Patent Office discretion to issue concurrent registration if a court "has finally determined that more
than one person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in
commerce. n317 At least subsequent to the 1962 amendments to
the Lanham Act, this language permits the Patent Office to compensate for the lack of coalescence between section 2(d) and section 22 whenever a court has sanctioned concurrent use that commenced after the filing of an application for registration,318
Furthermore, if a court order concurrent registration in addition to
recognizing lawful concurrent use, section 37 compels the Patent
Office to comply. 319

E. Evaluation of the Impact of the Lanham Act on Territorial
Trademark Rights
The most important section of the Lanham Act from the
standpoint of concurrent territorial use is clearly the constructive
notice provision. By imputing knowledge of a registered mark to
subsequent users, section 22 enhances a registrant's ability to
316.

§ 2{d), 60 Stat. 428 {1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964);
see Hoge, "The Lanham Act's Housekeeping Amendments," 52 Trademark Rep. 1245, 1251 (1962).
317. § 2{d), 60 Stat. 428, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964).
318. Prior to the 1962 amendments this clause began with the words "and
concurrent registrations may be similarly granted by the Commissioner. . . .11 § 2{d), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1958).
Derenberg argued that the term "similarly" made the restrictions on
concurrent registration in § 2{d) applicable to registration based on
a court decree. See Derenberg & Merchant, "Problems in Registration Procedure," 37 Trademark Rep. 799, 801 (1947). While the Patent Office seemed to take a contrary position even prior to the 1962
amendments, see Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Dunhill Tailored Clothes, Inc.,
49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 730, 741 n. 8, 293 F.2d 685, 693 n. 7, cert. den.,
369 U.S. 864 (1961); Ex parte Crown Beverage Corp., 102 U,S.P.Q.
312 (Comm'r 1954), the deletion of "similarly'' by those amendments
should remove whatever doubt previously existed.
319. § 37, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 119 (1964); Ex parte Westgate
Sea Prods. Co., 84 U.S.P.Q. 368, 371-72 (Comm'r 1950) (dictum).
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expand the geographical scope of his business operations under his
existing trademarks. Restriction of the grounds of cancellation and
acquisition of an incontestable right to use generally supplement
section 22 by making registration, on which the constructive notice
provision hinges, more secure. It is accordingly highly significant
that during the hearings on the Lanham Bill the Justice Department
never leveled a specific attack at section 22. 320 Indeed, through
criticism of the recognition of the principle of concurrent territorial rights in the concurrent registration provisions, 321 the Antitrust Division might be said to have inferentially supported the
constriction of concurrent territorial rights that section 22 was
meant to bring about. This is not to say that some of the claims
concerning the effect of section 22 were not extravagant or that
the Justice Department was justified in its attack on section 2(d).
Both during the legislative hearings and in published articles
certain individuals have steadfastly maintained that section 22 both
precludes acquisition of any rights by junior users who inaugurate
use after constructive notice begins and prevents persons who began use prior to registration by another from expanding their territorial rights.3 22 The first proposition was sustained by the Second Circuit in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc.,323 the
second is questionable, although supported by the Patent Office interpretation of the concurrent registration provisions in Coastal
Chemical Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc.3 24 In Coastal, the Commissioner announced that a senior user was ordinarily entitled to concurrent registration "for the entire country less the area in which
the other user can establish actual use prior to notice of adverse
use . . . . , "325 but, because a junior user had sought and obtained
an unrestricted registration 38 months before the senior user filed
an application, the junior user was granted concurrent registration
for every state except those in which the senior user established
adverse rights prior to notice of the junior use.

320. But see 1944 Senate Hearings at 41-42 (remarks of Elliott H. Moyer).
The Antitrust Division's general opposition to the need for revision
of the trademark laws, of course, encompassed § 22. E.g., Statement
of the Department of Justice, id. at 58-71.
321. Id. at 38-39 (remarks of Bartholemew Diggins); Statement of the Department of Justice, id. at 63-64.
322. E.g., 1943 House Hearings at 49-50 (remarks of Wallace J. Martin);
1941 House Hearings at 169 {remarks of Wallace J. Martin); Martin,
"Incentives to Register Given by the New Trade-Mark Act," 36 Trademark Rep. 213, 216 (1946).
323. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
324. 139 U.S.P.Q. 208 (Comm'r 1963).
325. Id. at 210.
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The Coastal theory concerning the effect of notice on concurrent territorial rights is unworkable and illustrates the implausibility of the contention that section 22 forecloses acquisition of
fresh territorial rights by concurrent users who obtained initial
rights before registration by another. If mere notice of conflicting
rights precluded either a senior or a junior user from gaining new
territorial rights, their legal positions would be frozen on the date
notice was received and there could theoretically be blocks ofterritory in which neither party could acquire rights. It will not do
to say that notice will generally be provided solely by section 22
so that only a nonregistrant will lose the ability to increase his
rights. The dispatch of letters advising concurrent users of their
lack of rights is a commonplace of trademark practice 32 6 which
would undoubtedly become even more popular if the Coastal theory
represented the law; and, assuming that both a senior and junior
user are aware of each other's existence, Coastal produces an ab- '
surd result in territory untapped by either party prior to notice
of the other's existence. Commercial life is not static and one or
the other will eventually expand his area of use. Once this dynamic user presses into an unoccupied area in which he is allegedly
deprived of rights because of his notice of another use on competing goods, how will the courts react to the fact of expansion?
Should another concurrent user who also has no rights in the area
be able to enjoin the expansion? Logic says no and Dawn supports
this by denying relief to even a person with superior rights if concurrent use does not produce likelihood of purchaser confusion.
But if no one can sue to stop this expansion what is the point in
saying that a person with knowledge of conflicting use can not obtain further rights? Furthermore, once expansion has taken place
and the public has become familiar with the mark, it would impair
the identification function of trademarks to deny the expander relief against other concurrent users in his new territory, and, if he
obtains relief as he should, he will in substance have obtained
additional rights through expansion regardless of the Coastal theory,
The unreality of the Patent Office position is further underscored by its radical deviation from sensible common-law principles. At common law a senior user's knowledge of junior use had
no affect on his potential territorial rights unless it resulted in lachei
or acquiescence in a junior user's expansion into an area in which
the senior user had originally had rights.327 Moreover, the Hanove
and Rectanus concept of a good faith junior user determined whether

-

326. E.g., Tillman & Bendel Inc. v. California Packing Corp., 63 F.2d
498 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 290 U.S. 638 (1933).
327. E.g., Jacobs v. Iodent Chem. Co., 41 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1930).
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concurrent territorial rights could be acquired at all, but, once
this threshold question was answered affirmatively, the extent of
those rights depended primarily on precedence in the penetration
of a market. Thus, in J. A. Dougherty's Sons v. Kasko Distillers
Products Corp.328 the court limited a senior user to the following
relief against a good faith junior user:
The plaintiff [ the senior user] is entitled to a decree enioming the defendant [ the junior user] from using the trade-mark
"Country Gentleman" in those areas outside of Pennsylvania
where the plaintiff is using the same or may do so in the
normal course of sales expansion. . . . 329

The language of the United States Supreme Court in American
Trading Co. v. H. E. Heacock Co.330 is also instructive. The
plaintiff in American Trading was associated with the International Silver Co., one of two concurrent users of "Rogers" for silverware in the United States. Plaintiff distributed the International
Silver Co. 's products in the Philippines and obtained registration
of the "Rogers" mark there. When a competitor sought to import
silverware manufactured by Wm. A. Rogers, Ltd., the other user
in the United States, plaintiff obtained relief under Philippine law
which was sustained by the Supreme Court in the following terms:
[I] t is unnecessary to consider the respective rights of the
International Silver Company and Wm. A. Rogers, Limited,
in relation to the use of their marks in the States of the
Union. These rights have been the subject of numerous judicial decisions. It is sufficient to say that when petitioners
entered the trade within the Philippine Islands in 1925, they
found a field already occupied and were bounded to respect
the rights there established. Nor do we find any ground for
holding that the respondent is estopped from seeking relief
by reason of its relation to the International Silver Company.
Respondent manifestly had acquired an interest in the local
trade which was entitled to protection, and it has sought and
obtained that protection in accordance with the law governing
that trade.331

It is easy to comprehend why mere notice of another use
should not bar further expansion of territorial markets by a person
who has already acquired concurrent territorial rights. The doctrine of concurrent territorial rights is noncompetitive because the
rights acquired by each concurrent user raise legal barriers to

328. 35 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
329. Id. at 565.
330. 285 U.S. 247 (1932).
331.

Id. at 260-61 (sustaining the validity of a Philippine trademark registration statute relied on by the plaintiff}.
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the expansion of markets under the same mark by the others.
This may be justified at common law by the desirability of protecting the identification function of trademarks if there is actual
market conflict between concurrent users and by the desirability
of avoiding forfeiture of a junior user's good will if he did not
have fair notice of the senior use when he adopted his mark; but
there are no concomitant justifications for precluding a good faith
junior user, or a senior user, from extending his concurrent territorial rights where this does not involve a clash with a concurrent user. It would merely restrain trade without countervailing
benefit to permit one concurrent user to enjoin another in an area
where the plaintiff's mark is not used, advertised, or known, and
it would result in unwarranted forfeiture of a defendant's good will
to allow a concurrent user who was the last to reach such a market to summarily oust his predecessor. The judges were right in
considering that later-acquired knowledge of concurrent use did not
petrify a senior user's or a good faith junior user's ability to acquire additional rights at common law once the applicability of the
noncompetitive doctrine of concurrent territorial rights was established.
The common-law concept that notice of concurrent use does
not inhibit extension of previously-gained territorial rights is easily
engrafted on section 22, and properly so in the light of its proponents' statements that section 22 was intended to operate within
the interstices of the Hanover and Rectanus doctrine.332 Indeed,
this interpretation may already have been adopted by the Second
Circuit. In Avon Shoe Co., Inc. v. David Crystal, Inc.333 Judge
Hincks commented:
It is true that the Lanham Act indeed prevents a junior user
from claiming good faith when his use begins subsequent to
a prior user's registration under the Act. But that provision
is inapplicable here. For the defendant's use commenced more
than two years prior to the effective date of that Act.334
The principal difficulty with respect to this interpretation of section 22 arises with respect to incontestability and the conclusive
evidence rule. Subsection 33(b) (5)335 excepts from the conclusive
evidence rule, and by implication from section 15, only the area
in which a good faith junior user used his mark prior to registration or republication by another of the mark that has become
332.
333.
334.
335.

See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960).
Id. at 611.
60 Stat. 439 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (5) (1964).
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incontestable. If an incontestable right to use were a defense to
an infringement suit and to a prayer for a cancellation in the area
in which a good faith junior user broadens his use following registration or republication by another of a mark that has become
incontestable, it would be difficult to maintain that the junior user
could obtain rights in this territory. The impact of subsection
33(b) (5) is, however, negated where any of the exceptions to section 15 can be established because section 33(b) is only applicable
"if the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable
able . • . . 11336 One of the exceptions to section 15 is that a registered mark "has been abandoned." 337 The relevance of this
exception is demonstrated by the following excerpt from Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf:338
Allowing to the Allen & Wheeler firm and corporation [the
senior user] the utmost that the proofs disclose in their
favor, they have confined their use of the "Tea Rose trademark to a limited territory, leaving the south-eastern States
untouched. . . . If, during the long period that has elapsed
since the last specified sale of Allen & Wheeler "Tea Rose"this was "in the later 70 1 s" -that flour has been sold in other
parts of the United States, excluding the south-eastern States,
no clearer evidence of abandonment by non-user of trade-mark
rights in the latter field could reasonably be asked for. [Emphasis supplied.] 339
Hanover suggests that subsection 33(b) (5) should be inapplicable
because of abandonment of a registrant's rights derived from registration in those areas in which a good faith junior user engages
in unobstructed and substantial expansion of his use following registration or republication by another of a mark that has become
incontestable. 340
A similar analysis should be employed with respect to a
senior user who neglects to obtain registration before it is obtained
by a good faith concurrent user.
Because nonregistrant senior
users are thereby penalized for exploiting open markets, it is a
336. § 33(b), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (1964).
337. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964).
338. 240 u.s. 403 (1916).
339. Id. at 419.
340. This interpretation is consistent with Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food
Stores, Inc., 367 F .2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). Dawn held that use by a
registrant anywhere in the nation retained the benefit of the constructive notice provision in areas of nonuse. The above discussion is
based on the assumption that section 22 does not bar extension of
concurrent territorial rights by a person who obtained these rights
before constructive notice began. The abandonment referred to is of
the territorial rights that might otherwise be derived from § 33(b) (5).
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euphemism for a restraint of trade to characterize a rule foreclosing further aggrandizement of territorial rights by the nonregistrant senior user as "an incentive to register." Small penalties
might be appropriate for a failure to register but an arbitrary delimitation of territorial rights throughout the length and breadth of
the United States is not. Indeed, nonregistrant senior users are
treated even more harshly by section 15 and 33(b) than good faith
junior users. Their rights are protected solely by the state rights
exception to section 15 which cuts off rights as of the date of publication or republication of the registrant's mark that has become
incontestable.341 This unnecessarily harsh and noncompetitive result should be compensated for by considering that a registrant's
territorial rights derived from registration are abandoned in those
areas in which a nonregistrant senior user engages in unobstructed
and substantial expansion of his use following publication or republication by another of a mark that has become incontestable.
The Justice Department's attack on the concurrent registration
provisions was as out of focus as some of the claims concerning
the import of section 22. During the hearings on the Lanham Bill
the Antitrust Division maintained that the concurrent registration
provisions could be "utilized to establish and police divisions of
territory. • •by registrations in the Patent Office." 342 This was
anomalous for the concurrent registration provisions reflected the
common-law doctrine of concurrent territorial rights343 and a major theme of the Justice Department's opposition to the proposed
legislation was the adequacy of the common law to protect "legitimate rights" of trademark users.344 Insofar as the Justice Department objected to the principle of concurrent territorial rights,
its quarrel was with the common law, not the Lanham Bill, but
the Antitrust Division was probably primarily concerned with the
practice of concurrent territorial use. The effect that issue of
concurrent registrations can have on the incidence of concurrent
use is necessarily conditioned by the fact that territorial restrictions in a registration curtail only the advantages derived from
registration and not the capacity to use a mark.345 Since several
341. § 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964).
342. 1944 Senate Hearings at 64.
343. See Derenberg & Merchant, "Problems in Registration Procedure,"
37 Trademark Rep. 799, 802 (1947); Legislative Note, "Possible Monopoly Implications in the Trade-Mark Bill," 32 Geo. L.J. 171, 174, 181
(1944).

344. E.g., 1944 Senate Hearings at 59.
345. In re National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 49 C.C,P.A, (Patents) 854,
863, 297 F .2d 941, 948 (1962) (concurring opinion); Alfred Dunhill,
Inc. v. Dunhill Tailored Clothes, 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 730, 738 N.5,
293 F.2d 685, 691 n.4, cert. den., 369 U.S. 864 (1961).
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of these substantive advan'i:ages, like the constructive notice provision and incontestability, penalize junior users by inhibiting subsequent acquisition and enforcement of concurrent territorial rights,
concurrent registration may weaken registration as a deterrent to
concurrent territorial use by limiting the territorial scope of the
substantive provisions of the Lanham Act; but this would not necessarily encourage concurrent territorial use over and above that
probable at common law. The Justice Department's forebodings
could only have been realized if the Patent Office had interpreted
section 2(d} as permitting concurrent registration in circumstances
in which concurrent territorial rights would not have been recognized at common law.
Whatever might have occurred, the Patent Office has taken
its cue from the legislative hearings and administered the statute
so as to avoid the consequences forseen by the Justice Department.346 Section 2(d) requires a formal Patent Office proceeding
before concurrent registration can be issued regardless of any
understanding among the persons affected,347 and the Patent Office
has stubbornly adhered to the spirit of the requirement. From the
first, concurrent registration has been treated as an "extraordinary remedy for extraordinary circumstances" that is not routinely
granted.348 A person must have engaged in substantial use of his
mark and must have acquired common-law rights for concurrent
registration to be available.349 Moreover, even though a right to
concurrent registration may be unquestionable, the Patent Office
has disregarded private agreements concerning the appropriate
territorial scope of concurrent registration to what some believe
is an extreme degree. 350 Although the 1962 decision of the Court
346. See Hancock, "Notes from the Patent Office," 45 Trademark Rep.
272, 273 (1955); Timberg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint
of Competition," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 352-53 (1949).
347. E.g., Ex parte Chadbourn Hosiery Mills, Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q. 12 (Comm'r
1955). The original conception of concurrent registration was exactly
the opposite. In 1925 it was proposed that "plural registrations" should
be permitted only if the interested parties filed written consents in the
Patent Office. See Derenberg, "The First Year," 38 Trademark Rep.
831. 849-50 (1948).
348. See Leeds, "Trademarks from the Government Point of View," 44
Calif. L. Rev. 489, 494-96 (1956); Hancock, "Notes from the Patent
Office," 46 Trademark Rep. 53 (1956), 45 Trademark Rep. 272 (1955).
349. Compare B-1 Beverage Co. v. Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co., 110 U.S.
P .Q. 381 (Comm 'r 1956) with Old Monastery Wine Co. v. St. Julian
Wine Co., note 299 supra, see Hancock, "Notes from the Patent Office," 46 Trademark Rep. 53-54 (1956); Leeds, "Trademarks from
the Government Viewpoint," 44 Calif. L. Rev. 489, 494-96 (1956).
350. E.g., Ex parte Chadbourn Hosiery Mills, Inc., note 347 supra; see
Derenberg, "The Ninth Year," 46 Trademark Rep. 1017, 1073-75
(1956).
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of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Nat'l Distillers & Chem.
Corp. 351 indicated that agreements among interested persons should
be given greater weight in ordinary registration proceedings, the
transfer value may not be great insofar as concurrent registration
proceedings are concerned. Section 2(d} itself bars consent as a
basis for concurrent registration and the Commissioner continues
to look askance at stipulations concerning the territorial scope of
concurrent registration. 352
Another possible basis for the Justice Department's aversion
to section 2(d) may have been a largely unarticulated concern that
issue of concurrent registration on the basis of a private agreement for concurrent use would impair the Justice Department's
ability to attack the underlying agreement. Since the Patent Office
can only authorize concurrent registration if marks are in "concurrent lawful use, 11 353 it can plausibly be contended that issue of
concurrent registration on the basis of an agreement for concurrent territorial use would constitute an administrative determination that the agreement did not violate the antitrust laws.354 However it is doubtful that this determination would have any impact
on antitrust liability. Congressional approval of a pervasive scheme
of regulation may preclude antitrust proceedings with regard to
matters entrusted to an administrative agency, but Patent Office
regulation of territorial allocations by competitors is hardly pervasive.355 This is made explicit by section 46(a} of the Lanham
Act which provides that:

[ NJ othing contained in this Act shall be construed . . . as restricting or increasing the authority of any Federal department or regulatory agency except as may be specifically provided by this act.356
351. 49 C .C .P.A. (Patents) 854, 297 F .2d 941 (1962).
352. Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., note 299 supra. In Haas
Bros. v. Charles Jacquin et Cie, 143 U.S.P.Q. 37 (Comm'r 1964) the
Commissioner adopted the terms of a stipulation concerning the scope
of concurrent registration but only after an affirmation of his power
to disregard the agreement and a careful review of the facts.
358. § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964).
354. Though the requirement of "lawful use" was not one of the last minute
Senate amendments intended to harmonize the Lanham Bill with the
antitrust laws, concurrent use pursuant to an agreement violative of
the antitrust laws would certainly not be "lawful." See "Developments
in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev.
814, 899-900 (1955).
355. Compare Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 296 (1963) (preclusion) with California v. Federal Power Comm'n,
369 U.S. 482 (1962) (nonpreclusion).
356. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 445.
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Voluntary judicial deference to a Patent Office determination of
"lawful concurrent use" also seems improbable in view of the
Patent Office's lack of sophistication in antitrust matters.:357
The Justice Department's disapproval of the concurrent registration provisions can not in fairness be taken as a strong indorsement of the right to territorial expansion accorded a registrant by section 22 with respect to persons who adopted their
marks after constructive notice began. It should be acknowledged
that the objections raised to incontestable rights,358 particularly
with respect to generic and descriptive terms,359 would also be
relevant to the broad territorial rights derived from section 22.
The Justice Department essentially contended that facilitating the
acquisition of greater exclusivity in trademark rights through federal legislation would be detrimental to small business. :3GO Although "small business" is a difficult concept to define, 3Gl the
context makes reasonably clear what the Justice Department had
in mind. The Lanham Bill was strongly supported by the National
Association of Manufacturers362 and the United States Trademark
Association. 363 Since both of these organizations have a sizable
number of large manufacturers among their membership, the Justice Department would appear to have championed the cause of
manufacturers who produce goods for regional or local markets
as well as the myriad of local businesses that retail goods and
services. :3G4
The plea on behalf of local business was more substantial. A
company that has developed a regional or multistate marketing
system3 65 should possess sufficient financial resources to be able
to afford trademark advice and protection.366 A multistate or regional business should also possess sufficient commercial sophistication
357. See Diggins, "The Lanham Trademark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 305,
322 (1947).
358. See, e.g., 1944 Senate Hearings at 40 (remarks of Elliott H. !\Toyer).
359. Sec, e.g., Statement of the Department of Justice, id. at S9-G2, id.
at 1:36 (remarks of Elliott H. Moyer).
360. Statement of the Department of Justice, id. at 59.
361. See Adelman, "Small Business-A Matter of Definition," lG A.D.A.
Antitrust Section 18 (1960).
362. See 1941 House Hearings at 129-32.
363. See id. at 124-26.
364. See Carretta, "Some Competitive Practices with which Small Business
Must Contend," 24 Law & Contemp. Prob. 169 (1959); e.g., 1944 Senate
Hearings at 39, 41-42 (remarks of Elliott H. Moyer).
365. Local firms located on or near state lines excepted. See 1941 House
Hearings at 184.
366. Cf. Harnish, "The New Trade-Mark Law," 32 Mass. L.Q. 27, :l2
(1947). A fair amount of general information can be obtained at
nominal cost from the government either by writing one's clcctecl
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to be chargeable with the legal consequences of failure to search
for conflicting registrations in the Patent Office before adopting
a mark and the legal consequences of failure to register that mark.
A thriving but modest interstate business has actually far more to
gain than to lose from the substantive provisions of the Lanham
Act. Under the common law a smaller business with a "magic"
trademark was not only subject to depredations by minor league
buccaneers who commenced simulated bona fide uses in separate
territories in order to cash in on the potentialities of the mark,
but was also subject to virtual encirclement by commercial giants
with the same disguised purpose and greater resources. The common law stacked the cards in favor of big business. Because the
extent of territorial rights turned on the extent of use, only the
largest firms were able to establish broad territorial rights quickly enough to head off most potential concurrent users.367 Small
firms, which could least afford it, were more likely to be ambushed by good faith concurrent users as they slowly expanded
their markets. By their inroads on the common law, the substan- I
tive provisions of the Lanham Act placed small business on a more
equal plane with big business. For the price of registration a
small company can obtain the same legal opportunity to expand its
markets under a mark that a big company can. Furthermore, registration serves as a protective shield with which to ward off sorties by commercial giants.368 On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the nationwide rights derived from registration place local
business on a procrustean bed. Even today how many of the local
drug stores, grocery stores, or haberdasheries that place their
labels on a few items can realistically be expected to check the
federal registry first, and then obtain registration? Moreover,
registration is not available without use in commerce, and local
firms are unlikely to be acquainted with the subtleties of token
use.369
(Footnote continued)
representatives, e.g., 1941 House Hearings at 185 (remarks of Congressman Lanham), or the Government Printing Office. E.g., Watson,
Small Business and Trade-Marks (Economic-Small Business-Series
No. 68 G.P,O. 1949).
367. See Hopkins, Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Competition 25
(4th ed. 1924).
368. See A. Smith Bowman Distillery, Inc. v. Schenley Distillers, Inc.,
198 F. Supp. 822 (D. Del. 1961); Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley,
Inc., 127 U.S.P.Q. 42 (N,D. Ill. 1960), modified, 293 F.2d 88 (7thCir.),
cert. den., 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Conley v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 125
u.s.P.Q. 2 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
369. See, e.g., 1941 House Hearings at 73-74, 181-87 (remarks of Louis
Robertson).
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An obvious rejoinder to the Justice Department's concern
over the effect of the Lanham Act on local business is that this
effect is de minimus when compared with the benefit accruing to
multistate enterprise. Certainly the advertising expenditures invested in trademarks in multistate use would ordinarily be greater
than those in local use. By the same token, forcing a multistate
firm to adopt a new mark should impose a greater financial burden
than requiring a local firm to do so.370
Furthermore, the Lanham
Act is not devoid of features which cushion its impact on local business. The constructive notice pro-vision's lack of effect of concurrent uses initiated before constructive notice commenced aids
established local businesses.371 The act's limitation to interstate
commerce, albeit "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated
by Congress," 372 has some, 373 if not a great deal, of cushioning
effect;374 and the "fair use" exception to the conclusive evidence
rule is also of moment: a registered trademark can infringe a
local trade name, and the "fair use" exception removes the conclusive evidence rule as a defense with respect to some of the
most common local trade names; namely, trade names composed
of the names of those engaged in the business or their privies.375
370. Disparity in size between interstate and local firms may mean that
the relative burden on the local firm is greater than a dollars-andcents comparison would indicate. Nevertheless, economic waste is
minimized by placing the burden on the smaller firm.
371. See text accompanying notes 332-41 infra.
372. § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (1964). See
generally Dunner, "The Effect of the Lanham Act of Intrastate Activities," 40 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 379 (1958).
373. Compare Peter Pan Restaurants, Inc. v. Peter Pan Diner, Inc., 150
F. Supp. 534 (D.R.I. 1957) with John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway,
141 U.S.P .Q. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
374. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d
Cir. 1959) (bakery marketing goods within a 45 mile radius of Rochester, N.Y., subject to the constructive notice provision); Nielsen v.
American Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 473 (D. Utah 1962) (gasoline station
selling to interstate travelers in commerce); Drop Dead Co. v. s. C.
Johnson & Sons, Inc, 326 F.2d 87, 94 (9th Cir. 1963) (alternative holding), cert. den., 377 U.S. 907 (1964) ($700P in sales affects commerce);
cf. In re Gastown, Inc., 51 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 876, 326 F .2d 780
(1964).
375. § 33(b) (4), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1115(b) (4) (1964); see
John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 141 U.S.P.Q. 355 (N.D. Tex.
1964). The fair use exception does not apply to trademark use. See
Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.),
cert. den., 348 U.S. 888 (1954); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson,
206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.), cert. den., 346 U.S. 867 (1953). But see
Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir.
1963).
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With all due regard for the foregoing, it is the Lanham Act
definition of trademark infringement that seems to offer the greatest safeguard for local interests. 376 As this definition was construed in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hartis Food Stores, Inc., 377 a federal registrant, although entitled to superior rights with respect
to all persons who started use after constructive notice began,
cannot enjoin such local concurrent users unless the registered
mark is known in the locality or the local use lies within the registrant's zone of imminent expansion. The Dawn interpretation
tempers the literal significance of the substantive provisions of
the Lanham Act with the commercial reality that not every registrant will be able to capitalize on his nationwide trademark
rights and ensures that local interests will only be sacrificed to
those of a dynamic federal registrant. Stagnant registrants will
have a right without a remedy. Admittedly, Dawn may lead to
some unfortunate consequences. Some local firms will doubtless
increase advertising investments in their trademarks and trade
names in blissful ignorance that continued use of these trade identifiers is due to the temporary license extended by the Dawn interpretation. When the federal registrant subsequently invades the
hitherto peaceful local preserve, the courts will be faced with the
bitter fruit of compromise. It is to be hoped that judicial statesmanship will avoid undue hardship, not by denying the registrant
his opportunity to expand, but by permitting the local user to adjust his infringing use in a way,378 or over a period of time,379
that will minimize his losses.380
The foregoing discussion has particular relevance to registered secondary-meaning marks. 381 Secondary-meaning marks
are potent advertising devices since they consist of familiar,
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

381.

32(1) (a), 60 Stat. 437 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (a)
(1964).
267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
See Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 777 (M.D.N.C.
1962).
Elcon Mfg. Co. v. Elcon Mfg. Co., 132 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1955);
see Victory Chain, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 10 Misc. 2d 382, 174 N.Y.S.
2d 46 (Sup. Ct. Chenango County 1958).
The Lanham Act states: "The several courts vested with jurisdiction
of civil actions arising under this chapter shall have power to grant
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms
as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any
right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent Office."
(Emphasis supplied.) § 34, 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1964),
See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,"
68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 831 (1955).
§
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easy-to-remember terms.382 For this reason the acquisition of
a secondary-meaning mark can seriously affect competitors' advertising programs. Because of the Pure Oil Company's "Pure"
mark, for instance, none of their competitors can sell "Pure"
products. 383 Despite the importance of secondary-meaning marks,
the Patent Office can permit registration upon a mere averment
without requiring proof of secondary meaning384 and other users
who do not religiously scan the Official Gazette of the Patent Office may not be aware of a registrant's claim of exclusive rights
until incontestable rights have been obtained. 385 The upshot will
probably be a more rigorous application of the Dawn rationale to
registered secondary-meaning marks. Although an incontestable
right to use may make registration a good defense to a prayer for
cancellation, attempts by the registrant to utilize registration as
the basis for an infringement suit wil_l require cogent proof of the
geographical extent of secondary meaning in order to establish
likelihood of purchaser confusion. 386

382. This is not to say that secondary meaning marks are the best trademarks from the standpoint of legal protection. See "Selection and
Adoption of Trademarks," 53 Trademark Rep. 687, 706-08 (1963).
383. See Pure Oil Co. v. Paragon Oil Co., 117 U.S.P.Q. 321 (N.D. Ohio
1958).
384. 37 C.F .R. § 2.41(b) (1960).
385. See 1941 House Hearings at 66-67 (remarks of Wallace H. Martin);
id. at 73-74 (remarks of Louis Robertson).
386. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 264 F .2d 88 (6th
Cir. 1959). Anheuser is discussed in Bonynge, "The Effect of Registration in Trademark Litigation," 50 Trademark Rep. 902, 909-10
(1960).

III. ASSIGNMENT AND LICENSING OF TRADEMARKS
An assignment transfers the assignor's exclusive right to the
use of a mark, whereas a license permits a privileged use of a
mark by another subject to the licensor's quality control. 1 Both
are inconsistent with the original legal conception of a trademark
as an identification of the source of goods. If a mark is considered to denote a particular person, it is patently deceptive to allow
another to sell goods under its aegis.2 Notions concerning assignment and license are consequently permised upon a view that a
trademark primarily identifies not the source of goods, but like
goods, from, or controlled by, a single anonymous source.3
The Lanham Act put the assignment and licensing of trademarks upon a new footing. The governing legal principles were
simplified and clarified so that employment of those methods of
transferring trademark rights was greatly facilitated. The Department of Justice bridled at this endeavor because of fears that
consensual allocation of territorial trademark rights might gain a
resultant immunity from antitrust liability. 4 Evaluation of the Antitrust Division's position requires an appreciation of the general
treatment of territorial allocations under the antitrust laws and
the nature and background of the Lanham Act provisions dealing
with the assignment and licensing of trademarks.
A. General Treatment of Territorial Allocations Under the Antitrust Laws
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is the principal antitrust yardstick by which territorial allocations are measured. Section 1
states that
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . .5
§ 756A, comment ~ (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1963).
Cf. Messer v. The Fadettes, 168 Mass. 140, 46 N.E. 407 (1897); see
Taggart, "Statutory New Concepts of Trade-Mark Ownership," 38 Trademark Rep. 125 (1948).
See Brown, "Advertising and the Public Interest," 57 Yale L.J. 1165,
1185-87 (1948).
See 1944 Senate Hearings at 63-64.
§ 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).

1. See Restatement (Second), Torts

2.
3.
4.
5.
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Although the Supreme Court may have initially flirted with the idea
that every contract, combination, or conspiracy that restrained
trade was ineluctably condemned by this uncompromising phraseology, the Court concluded early in the history of the Sherman Act
that only unreasonable restraints of trade fell within the statute's
ambit.6 As an antidote to the sweeping inquiry prerequisite to a
wholly factual determination of reasonableness,7 the Court has
also held that
[T] here are certain agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not only
makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire
history of the industry involved, as well as related industries,
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable • . . ,8

The validity of restraints outside the per se category continues to
be tested by a broad factual evaluation, often referred to as a rule
of reason inquiry, which seeks to ascertain whether conceded inter
partes restraints strengthen or inhibit the competitive process,
limit the supply of goods or services or produce socially useful
economic efficiency gains. Restraints which have overall deleterious effects are not condoned.9 The crux of the essentially tentative dichotomy between restraints that are per se illegal and those
that are tested by the rule of reason lies in the evidence that must
be considered by a court.10 Per se illegality may be announced
on the basis of evidence concerning the nature and the factual
6. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). For contrasting
views as to the initial interpretation of the statute compare Handler,
Antitrust in Perspective 4-12 (1957) with Bork, "The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept," 74 Yale L,J. 775, 785-96 (1965).
7. Cf. Dirlam & Kahn, Fair Competition 268-75 (1954).
8. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
9. See Handler, note 6 supra, at 26-28; Loevinger, "The Rule of Reason
in Antitrust Law," 50 Va. L. Rev. 23, 33-34 (1964). There is currently a lively debate over the extent to which a per se rule or a
rule of reason inquiry should be based on economic considerations
alone. See Symposium, "The Goals of Antitrust," 65 Colum. L. Rev.

363 (1965).
10. Loevinger, note 9 supra, at 32-34.
Monopoly 88-91 (1963).

But see Massel, Competition and
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setting of a defendant's conduct. 11 On the other hand, if this evidence does not warrant a conclusion that there is a pernicious effect on competition without redeeming virtue, evidence concerning
probable competitive effects must also be weighed.12 In procedural terms this means that whenever a defendant's conduct falls
within a per se category, the defendant has the burden of going
forward with evidence to negative the implication of unmitigated
anticompetitive effect; where a non-per se offense is involved, the
burden of going forward with evidence with respect to both the
nature of the defendant's conduct and its competitive effect rests
upon the plaintiff, 13
Whatever the test applied, if a territorial allocation violates
section 1 of the Sherman Act, it will also offend the broad proscription of "unfair methods of competition" in section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,14 Section 5, which embraces
both incipient and consummated Sherman Act offenses,15 paradoxically resulted in part from a movement to supplement the general
language of the Sherman Act with more specific antitrust standards.16 Far from performing this original purpose, section 5 instead vests additional general antitrust authority in the Federal
Trade Commission, an administrative agency whose orders are
subject to judicial review. Insofar as this administrative blank
check embraces territorial allocations, the Commission has a general predisposition to follow the distinctions between application
of the rule of reason and a per se approach charted under section
1 of the Sherman Act.17
"The general objective of the antitrust law is promotion of
competition in open markets, "18 and this objective is implemented
in no small part through the prohibition of agreements which unduly
11. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see Att'y
Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 11 (1955); Loevinger, note 9 supr11.,
at 33; Oppenheim, "Antitrust Booms and Boomerangs," 59 Nw. L. Rev.
33, 35-37 (1964).
12. E.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); see Att'y
Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep, 11 (1955); Loevinger, note 9 supra,
at 33-34.
13. See Packer, Book Review, 67 Yale L,J, 1141, 1142-43 (1958).
14. § 5, 38 Stat, 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U,S.C, § 45(a) (1) (1964).
15. See F .T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
16. See Handler, note 6 supra, at 29-31.
17. See Sandura Co., Dkt. 7042, 1961-63 F.T,C, Complaints, Orders, Stipulations ,r 15945 (1962), rev 1d, 339 F .2d 847 (6th Cir, 1964); Snap-On
Tools Corp., 59 F. T .C. 1035 (1961), rev'd, 321 F .2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
See generally Oppenheim, "Harmonization of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts," 17 A.B.A.
Antitrust Section 231, 236-37 (1960),
18. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep, 1 (1955).
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impair rivalry among sellers.19 Intentionally anticompetitive conduct is condemned out of hand yet in many cases conduct is equivocal, or at least evidence of subjective intent is lacking. In these
situations the economic relationship between the parties to restrictive agreements is a material factor in determining whether the
agreements have an anticompetitive effect. Agreements among competing sellers, called horizontal agreements because they involve
persons on the same level of manufacture or distribution, may
strike at the heart of competition and are often invalidated by the
antitrust laws. The validity of agreements between buyers and
sellers, so-called vertical agreements, also depends on the effect
of the agreements on competing sellers-with judicial approbation
being more likely because this effect is indirect. Finally, agreements between persons who have no discernible economic relationship may be placed in a catchall conglomerate category 20 that is
usually treated most tolerantly under the antitrust laws.
Although the pertinent Supreme Court cases have concerned
competitors with substantial market power and involve more than
bare allocation of markets, there is little doubt that horizontal division of markets is ordinarily a per se offense.21 The unique circumstances which have led two district judges to apply the rule of
reason to horizontal territorial allocations merely emphasize their
customary per se illegality. United States v. National Football
League,22 which upheld National Football League bylaws forbidding
telecasts of outside games when the home team was playing at
home, turned on the sui generis nature of professional football,
including the need to protect the gate receipts of the weaker teams.
When the same federal district court later held that the terms of
the earlier decree forbade the League to sell the pooled television
19. Bork, "The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept," 74 Yale L.J. 775
(1965).
20. Cf. Bock, Mergers and Markets 30 (2d ed. 1962).
21. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir.
1961); see Kayson & Turner, Antitrust Policy 144 (1959); Massel, note
10 supra, at 89; Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 26 (1955). The
leading Supreme Court opinions are Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) and Addystone Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U .s. 211 (1899). In White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), a case involving vertical territorial restraints, the court included horizontal territorial allocations in a roll
call of per se violations disregarding an amicus curiae brief that
urged the avoidance of dicta on horizontal arrangements. Id. at 259;
see 51 Calif. L. Rev. 608, 619 n. 89 (1963).
22. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). See Bork, "Ancillary Restraints
and the Sherman Act," 15 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 211, 231-34 (1959)
for a critical analysis of the theory of National Football League.
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network,23 Congress in turn stressed the singularity of the context
by legislating a specific exemption from the antitrust laws. 24 United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc,,25 concerned
equally exceptional situation. In 1929 PanAmerican and W.R. Grace
& Co. established Panagra, a jointly controlled airline, in order to
obtain United States mail contracts for western South America.
The joint venture included an understanding between Pan American
and Grace that Panagra and Pan American would not duplicate or
parallel each other's South American routes. Disregarding a government charge that the agreement was per se invalid, the district
judge concluded that the rule of reason was applicable and that the
territorial allocation did not unreasonably restrain competition. He
stressed as mitigating the restraint the large amount of capital
necessary to finance an airline, the fierce competition from foreign
carriers, and a Post Office and State Department policy of zoning
operations of American international carriers. The Pan American
and National Football League cases give no indication that an allocation of domestic markets by competing businesses would be
other than a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 26
Analysis of vertical territorial restraints customarily distinguishes between restraints on the seller and restraints on the
buyer.27 The former typically involves a manufacturer's promise
that a particular dealer will be the manufacturer's exclusive sales
outlet for a defined territory.28 Although an exclusive sales outlet agreement negates intrabrand competition from within a dealer's
territory by removing the possibility that additional dealers will be
appointed and that the manufacturer will engage in direct sales,
these agreements have been uniformly sustained unless enmeshed

an

23. United States v. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa.
1961).
24. Blaich v. National Football League, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
25, 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D,N,Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296
(1963).
26. With respect to § 5 see, e.g., W, B. Saunders Co., 35 F.T.C. 382 (1942);
Hardwood Charcoal Co., 31 F.T.C. 706 (1940).
27. But see Jordan, "Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws," 9 U, C,L,A.L. Rev. 111, 142-43 (1962).
28. An exclusive sales outlet arrangement may or may not be based upon
an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor. If the arrangement is a de facto result of a manufacturer's unilateral decision
to lirn it the number of his distributors, an antitrust violation is improbable, See Turner, "The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 703-04 (1962). But see id. at 705.
The textual discussion is accordingly focused on exclusive sales outlet
agreements,
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in an anticompetitive scheme or monopoly power existed at either
the buyer or seller level.29 In other words, exclusive sales outlet agreements have been tested by the rule of reason under both
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 30 The furor over vertical territorial allocations
sparked by White Motor Co. v. United States31 has, however, recently led to a critical reappraisal. It has been suggested that
exclusive sales outlet agreements should be presumptively illegal32
and that their business purpose must justify both their existence
and the material terms of the contract before a rule of reason
inquiry is justified. 33 The assumptions of the critics of exclusive
sales outlet agreements have been questioned,34 but Mr. Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in White Motor contained the following footnote:
The District Court suggested, 194 F. Supp., at 585-86,
and the Government seems to concede, that certain types of
exclusive franchises would not violate the Sherman Act, although a determination of the legality of such arrangements
would seem also to require an examination of their operation
and effect.35

Quaere: What does this observation portend?

It should at least inspire more careful consideration of the reasonableness of the contractual provisions in exclusive sales outlet agreements. 36
29. E.g., New York Automatic Canteen Corp. v. Automatic Canteen Corp.,
1963 Trade Cas. ,r 70625 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); see 51 Calif. L. Rev. 608,
617 & nn.74-75 (1963).
30. See Day, "Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws," 40 N.C.L. Rev. 223, 229-35, 248 (1962); Jordan, note 27 supra,
at 134-42, 152 (1962); Robinson, "Restraints on Trade and the Orderly
Marketing of Goods," 45 Cornell L.Q. 254, 255-61 (1960). With respect to § 5 see Sandura Co., 0kt. 7042, 1961-63 F. T.C. Complaints,
Orders, Stipulations ,r 15945, ,r 16095 (1962), rev'd on other grounds,
339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp., 59 F.T.C. 1035
(1961), rev'd on other grounds, 321 F .2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963),
31. 372 u.s. 253 (1963).
32. Turner, note 28 sue~11, at 704-05; Note, "Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the S erman Act," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 824-27 (1962).
33. Note, "Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act,"
note 32 supra, at 823-27; 51 Calif. L. Rev. 608, 617-19 (1963).
34. Cf. Handler, "Recent Antitrust Developments," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159,
166-68 (1963).
35. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 n. 11 (1963). See
also Jordan, note 27 suprl.!, at 142-43.
36. See Stewart, "Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of
Distributors," 22 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 33, 44 (1963); 51 Calif. L.
Rev. 608, 618 (1963) (speculating on increased Justice Department interest). Compare New York Automatic Canteen Corp. v. Automatic
Canteen Corp., 1963 Trade C as. ,r 70625 (S.D.N. Y. 1962) which sustained a thirty-two year contract under the current permissive standards.
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Vertical territorial restraints on buyers range from requiring a dealer to perform minimum marketing functions in a defined
area before soliciting sales elsewhere, through for bidding a dealer
to solicit sales outside his designated territory, to a ban on sales
to persons residing outside the territory. These restrictions will
be respectively referred to as designation of areas-of-primaryresponsibility, closed territories, and geographical customer allocation. The customary sanctions for disregard of territorial restrictions are some form of profit "pass-over" from the raiding
dealer to a dealer whose territorial rights he has infringed or the
refusal of a manufacturer to continue doing business with an offending dealer. 37
Closed territories and geographical customer allocation are
in relatively common use38 and sustained by a substantial body of
older precedent.39 Nevertheless, since 1949 the Antitrust Division
has asserted their per se invalidity and garnered a surprising number of consent decrees abjuring the restraints.40 White Motor Co.,
however, refused to accede to Justice Department importunities and
issue was joined. The district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment holding White's system of geographical customer allocation illegal per se,41 but the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case for a trial noting that
This is the first case involving a territorial restriction
in a vertical arrangement; and we know too little of the actual
impact of . . . that restriction . . . to reach a conclusion on
the bare bones of the documentary evidence before us.42
Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Goldberg joined Mr. Justice Douglas
in the majority opinion in which Mr. Justice Brennan concurred.
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black joined Mr. Justice Clark
in voting for affirmance, and castigating the majority for prolonging
37. See Note, "Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act,"
note 32 supra, at 814-17.
38. But see Robinson, note 30 supra, at 254. The area-of-primary-responsibility concept emerged from the provisions of consent decrees terminating alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. E.g., United
States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. IT 69065 (D,N.J,
1958) (consent decree); United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. I
IT 68409 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (consent decree).
39. E.g., Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903),
cert. den,, 192 U.S. 606 (1903); see generally Robinson, note 30 supra,
at 261-65 and accompanying notes.
40. E.g., United States v. Studebaker Corp., 1965 Trade C as. IT 71410 (D.
Neb. 1965) (consent decree); see generally Handler, "Annual Review of
Antitrust Developments," 15 Recore! of N.Y.C.B.A. 362, 374,-75 (1960).
41. United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D, Ohio 1961).
42. White Motor Co. v. United States, note 35 supra, at 261.
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White's "enjoyment of the fruits of its illegal action." 43 White
Motor Co. itself was not as impressed by the Court's largess.
White accepted a consent decree in which it renounced all present
and future vertical territorial restraints. 44
Although another Supreme Court opinion will be necessary to
ascertain the touchstone of legitimacy,45 the basic issue is the
extent to which solicitude for intrabrand competition will lead the
Court to require justifications for vertical territorial restraints on
buyers that do not substantially impair market competition,46 A
full dress rule-of-reason inquiry would disregard abridgment of
intrabrand competition for a valid business purpose, absent an overriding anticompetitive design or concomitant undue impairment of
market competition at either buyer or seller levels; 47 but it is
optimistic to assume that the Court will dismiss intrabrand competition lightly. The three dissenters in White Motor would have
struck down the avowed restriction of intrabrand competition out
of hand, and the opinion of the Court couched reversal of the district court as follows:
We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff
out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain. They
may be too dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable
protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business . . . and within the "rule of reason" . . . .
There is an analogy from the merger field that leads us to
conclude that a trial should be had. A merger that would
otherwise offend the antitrust laws because of a substantial
lessening of competition has been given immunity where the
acquired company was a failing one,48
While admittedly inconclusive, this language seems to coincide with
the views of commentators requiring convincing justifications for
43. Id. at 283.
44. United States v. White Motor Co., 1964 Trade Cas. ,r 71195 (N,D. Ohio
1964) (consent decree).
45. See ATRR 122:B-3 (11/12/63). For views suggesting a per se approach
see Kessler & Stern, "Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration,"
69 Yale L.J. 1, 113 (1959); Rifkind, "Divisions of Territory Under the
Antitrust Laws," 1953 CCH Antitrust Symp. 173, 180-81; Turner, note
28 supr~ at 698-99. Proponents of the rule of reason include Day,
note 30 supra, at 248-51; Jordan, note 27 supr~ at 152-55 (1962);
Robinson, note 30 supra, at 267-68 (1960); Note, "Restricted Channels
of Distribution Under the Sherman Act," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 823-24
(1962).
46, See Handler, note 34 supra, at 161-70 (1963).
47. See Jordan, note 27 supra, at 155.
48. White Motor Co. v. United States, note 35 supra, at 263-64,
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restraints on intrabrand competition 49 and appears consistent with
evolution of the per se rule which denies established firms with
large market shares the privilege of using tying clauses. 50 Mr.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion is equally suggestive. He
adverted to the claim that territorial restrictions were necessary
to effective competition by independent truck manufacturers and to
the situation of a manufacturer starting out in business or marketing a new and risky product as merely indicating possible justifications for vertical territorial restraints. 51 These reflections
were, moreover, qualified by a footnote suggesting that justification might only be open to companies with small market shares,
and by a caveat that even a justifiable restriction might be un1.awful if its terms were too severe or "excessively anticompetitive. "52
The lower federal courts may interpret White Motor as a mandate
to apply the rule of reason to vertical territorial restraints until
the Supreme Court writes a definitive opinion,53 but prudent counsel view White Motor as a thunderhead on the horizon that is slowly moving toward their clients.54
The application of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to vertical territorial restraints on buyers has paralleled
section 1 experience. At first charges of invalidity were dismissed55 or found wanting, 56 then the administrative attitude changed
radically. 57 In Snap-On Tools Corp.58 a sizable manufacturer of
hand tools was ordered to abandon a program of vertical geographical customer allocation but allowed to designate areas-of-primary responsibility. In Sandura Co.59 a small manufacturer of
49. Stone, "Closed Territorial Distribution," 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 286, 314-17
(1963); Turner, note 28 supra, at 698-99. Note, "Restricted Channels
of Distribution Under the Sherman Act," note 45 supra, at 823-29, 83234.
50. See Oppenheim, "Antitrust Booms and Boomerangs," 59 Nw. L. Rev. 33,
38-40 (1964). But see Snap-On Tools Corp. v. F. T .c ., 321 F .2d 825
(7th Cir. 1963).
51. White Motor Co. v. United States 372 U.S. 253, 268-70 (1963).
52. Id. at 269 n. 8, 270-72.
53. E.g., Bandura Co. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On
Tools Corp. v. F.T.C., note 50 supra; see ATRR 122:B-3 (11/12/63).
But see United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D.
Ill. 1965) (outlawing geographical customer allocation with respect to
stock purchased by a distributor).
54. E.g., United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., note 53 supra; see Stewart, "Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of Distributors,'' 22 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 33, 37, 47 (1963).
55. General Cigar Co., 16 F.T.C. 537 (1932).
56. Columbus Coated Fabrics, 55 F. T.C. 1500 (1959).
57. International Staple & Mach. Co., 59 F.T.C. 1080 (1961).
58. 59 F.T.C. 1035 (1961).
59. Dkt. 7042, 1961-63 F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations ,r 15945,
I! 16095 (1962).

ASSIGNMENT AND LICENSING

103

plastic floor and wall covering was handed a virtually identical
order. Both Snap-On and Sandura were decided prior to the Supreme Court's disposition of White Motor, in fact, the F. T.C.
hearing examiner in Sandura relied on the trial court opinion in
White Motor. 60 When the cases were reviewed by the Seventh
and Sixth Circuits respectively, White Motor had been reversed
and remanded by the Supreme Court. The courts of appeals interpreted the Supreme Court's action as indicating that the rule
of reason was presently applicable to vertical territorial restraints,
found Snap-On's and Sandura's vertical restrictions justified by a
need to combat fierce interbrand competition, and set aside the
Commission's cease and desist orders.61
Except where there is an obvious intent to stifle future competition62 the rule of reason is necessarily the Sherman Act and
Federal Trade Commission Act test for conglomerate territorial
restrictions on buyers. 63 The absence of an economic relationship
between the parties makes it requisite to probe the factual matrix
of a restriction before a judgment of invalidity can be rendered,
if, indeed, these restrictions are ever invalid. As a practical
matter, however, pure conglomerate territorial restrictions are
rare and the subsequent development of competition will mature
them into horizontal or vertical restraints subject to the antitrust
principles governing those types of restraints. For example, assume that a nonmanufacturing trademark licensor64 has developed
a marketing system for hand tools involving complete lines of approved products carried in minitrucks. If the licensor enters into
representation arrangements with retailer-servicemen in Salt Lake
City and Boston and restricts each retailer's sales territory to
within 50 miles of the metropolitan area in order to obtain intensive cultivation of the urban market, the restraint is conglomerate.
Yet, as more and more retailers enter into similar representation
arrangements, a situation will inevitably occur where one or more
60. Id. at 20766.
61. Sandura Co. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools
Corp. v. F.T.C., note 50 supra.
62. A territorial allocation intended to prevent future competition is void
per se. United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
63. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963)
rev'd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 158 (1964); cf. United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 218-20 (D. Del. 1953),
aff' d on other grounds, 351 U.s. 377 (1956); Foundary Services v. Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 206
F .2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953). See also George Hantscho Co. v. MiehleGoss-Dexter, Inc., 33 F.R.D. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
64. See text accompanying note 207 infra for discussion of trademark licensing by nonmanufacturing "sponsors."
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retailers could have competed for hand tool sales except for the
territorial restrictions. In this event the territorial restrictions
will become analogous to vertical restraints with regard to the
retailers who are precluded from competing and should be tested
by the antitrust standards applicable to vertical restraints on
buyers.
Territorial allocations accompanying joint ventures may fall
into any of the categories previously discussed. A joint venture
is an association of two or more persons to carry out a single
undertaking for profit 65 and the participants may range from competitors to firms with no other economic relationship than that
represented by the joint venture. If territorial allocations between
parties to a joint venture attend, but are collateral to, the joint
venture, the territorial allocations will neither gain nor lose antitrust status because of the existence of the joint venture. 66 For
example, a joint venture between two competing manufacturers in
building a plant of sufficient size to efficiently process a common
by-product should not affect, and should not be affected by, the
validity of an allocation of territorial markets by the same manufacturers with respect to their primary product.6 7 On the other
hand, in situations in which territorial allocations between the parties to a joint venture are integral to the existence of the joint
venture, the validity under the antitrust laws of the joint venture
itse1f68 should influence appraisal of the territorial restrictions.
A lawful joint venture supplies sufficient business purpose and
justification so that ancillary territorial restrictions should ordinarily be tested by the rule of reason;69 conversely, territorial
allocations ancillary to an illegal joint venture fall with it. 70
65. See 2 Williston, Contracts § 318A (3d ed. 1959); Tractenberg, "Joint
Ventures on the Domestic Front," 8 Antitrust Bull. 797, 798 (1963).
66. See Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust Policy 137 (1959); Bork, "Ancillary
Restraints and the Sherman Act," 15 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 211, 229
(1959).
67. See Bork, note 66 supra.
68. The validity of joint ventures is a current cause celebre in antitrust
law. See Handler, "Emerging Antitrust Issues-Diversification, Reciprocity, and Joint Ventures," 49 Va. L. Rev. 433 (1963); Panel Discussion, "Joint Ventures and the Sherman Act," A.B.A. Antitrust Section
Transcript at 27 (1963); ATRR 35:X-4 (3/13/62) (remarks of Paul Rand
Dixon). The Supreme Court has recently decided that § 7 of the Clayton Act, the Celler-Kefauver AntFMerger Act, applies to joint ventures.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
69. See United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp.
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); United
States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953);
see Bork, note 66 supra, at 224-34.
70. E.g., United States v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947
(D. Mass. 1950).
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It is clear that there is no single test for ascertaining the
validity of all territorial allocations under the antitrust laws.
Horizontal restrictions are generally invalid per se whereas vertical restraints on sellers have been said to be virtually legal per
se. 71 The status of vertical restraints on buyers is presently unclear though it is entirely possible that geographical customer allocation may be placed in a per se category 72 while closed territories 73 and areas-of-primary-responsibility74 will continue to be
evaluated by the rule of reason. To the extent that valid business
purposes can be attributed to conglomerate restraints, they are
probably valid simply because the antitrust issue is not ripe for
decision. As soon as competition develops between the parties,
conglomerate restraints assume either a vertical or a horizontal
posture and become subject to the principles governing those classifications. Finally, a joint venture will materially affect the validity of ancillary territorial restrictions.
B. The Assignment and Licensing Provisions of the Lanham Act
The assignment and licensing provisions of the Lanham Act
do not remove consensual territorial allocations involving trademarks from the sweep of the antitrust laws. Congress allayed
the Justice Department's concern in this regard through section
46(a) of the Lanham Act which provides:
[NJ othing contained in this Act shall be construed as limit-

ing, restricting, modifying, or repealing any statute in force
on the effective date of this Act which does not relate to
trade-marks, or as restricting or increasing the authority
of any Federal department or regulatory agency except as
may be specifically provided in this Act. 75
This section is not, however, fully dispositive of the Antitrust Division's contention. Conduct otherwise per se violative of the antitrust laws can become subject to the rule of reason if required
or sanctioned by another federal statute. 76 Because of the per
71. Oppenheim, "Antitrust Booms and Boomerangs," 59 Nw. L. Rev. 33,
36 n,15 (1964).
72. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (1965) (outlawing geographical customer allocation with respect to stock purchased
by a distributor). But see Sandura Co. v. F.T.C,, 339 F.2d 847 (6th
Cir. 1964) (small manufacturer in a concentrated industry).
73. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. F,T,C., note 50 supra.
74. E.g., United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
~ 69065 (D.N.J. 1958) (consent decree).
75. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 445.
76. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.s. 341 (1963); see Loevinger, "The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law," 50 Va. L. Rev. 23, 31-32
(1964).
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se-rule of reason dichotomy is essentially a judge-made rule of
evidence and not an express statutory provision, the Lanham Act
could conceivably require a rule of reason test for all consensual
allocations of territorial trademark rights that it authorizes despite section 46(a). A sketch of the manner in which the Lanham
Act condified the divergent common law decisions concerning assignment and licensing will further the assessment of this possibility.
The common-law shibboleth was that a trademark could only
be validly assigned in conjunction with the good will that it represented. 77 "Good will" was an amorphous concept which was once
defined as "that which makes tomorrow's business more than an
accident. It is the reasonable expectation of future patronage based
on past satisfactory dealings. 11 78 Despite abstruseness, the rule
was easily enough applied if there was obviously no good will, for
example, where the assignor had previously abandoned the assigned
mark,79 or had never used the mark in connection with the goods
or the area for which an assignment was made.SO Nor did assignments of merchants' or selectors' marks cause the courts a great
deal of trouble because the good will involved was generally related to the quality of the goods sold.81 But the common-law precept left the courts adrift without rudder and compass whenever
good will did exist which was arguably derivative from productive
facilities. Virtually the only judge-proof assignment by a manufacturer at common law was one accompanied by all of the physical assets used to produce the goods identified by an assigned
mark.82 Assignments coupled with less tangible evidence of the
transfer of good will were subject to greater or lesser degrees
of risk with judicial condemnation being most likely if a manufacturer-assignor continued to sell the identical product under a different trademark.83
77. See 1 Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 85-95 (4th ed. 1947).
78. Rogers, Goodwill, Trade-Marks, and Unfair Trading 13 (1919).
79. E.g., Dietz v. Horton, Mfg. Co., 170 Fed. 865 (6th Cir. 1909) (alternative holding).
80. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756, comment _2 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1963).
81. E.g., Schneider Brewing Co. v. Century Distilling Co., 107 F.2d 699
(10th Cir. 1939); accord, Witthaus v. Mattfeldt & Co., 44 Md. 303 (1876).
82. E.g., Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617 (1879); accord, Emerson Elec. Mfg.
Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 105 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.);
cert. den., 308 U.S. 616 (1939).
83. Eiseman v. Schiffer, 157 Fed. 473 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907); accord, California Packing Corp. v. Sun-Maid Raisin Growers, 81 F .2d 674 (9th Cir.),·
cert. den., 298 U.S. 668 (1936); Independent Baking Powder Co. v.
Boorman, 175 Fed. 448 (C .C.D.N.J. 1910) (alternative holding). See
also Gehl v. Hebe Co., 276 Fed. 271 (7th Cir. 1921).
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A related limitation on assignability was that no material
public deception should result from an assignee's use of a mark.84
This meant that the original connotation of a mark to the public
had to remain substantially unaltered after a transfer unless the
public was adequately informed of material changes. For example,
a mark that identified a particular source was nonetheless assignable, unless it also denoted uniquely personal attributes of that
source, 85 as long as an assignee gave notice of successorship in
conjunction with his use of the mark. 86 There was some authority
requiring transfer of the entire physical plant used to produce the
goods on which a mark had been used if an assignor was a manufacturer; 87 but the sounder and more prevalent view was that only
assets necessary to preserve the connotation of a mark had to accompany an assignment in order to avoid a probability of public
deception.88 Typical examples were patents89 and secret formulas. 90 In general, an assignee had the same privilege to vary the
composition of trademarked goods as an assignor;91 both were
merely expected to disclose material alterations.92
84. See Grismore, "The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names,"
30 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 493-96 (1932); Isaacs, "Traffic in Trade Symbols," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1220-21 (1931).
85. E.g., Lowell Lamb & Co. v. Herskovits, 204 App. Div. 407, 198 N.Y.
Supp. 55 (1st Dep't 1923), appeal dismissed per curiam, 238 N.Y. 572,
144 N.E. 897 (1924); see Restatement (Second), Torts § 756, comment
g (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
86. E.g., Symonds v. Jones, 82 Me. 302, 19 Atl. 820 (1890). Failure to
give notice constituted unclean hands although not necessarily invalidating the assignment. E.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Alaska Imp.
Co., 60 Fed. 103 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1894).
87. E.g., Mayer Fertilizer & Junk Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co.,
35 App. D.C. 425 (1910); see 1939 House Hearings at 90-92 (especially
remarks of Stewart L. Whitman).
88. See Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 189 (1959); Grismore,
note 84 supra, at 498-500.
89. E.g., Lewis v. Trinklein, 304 Mich. 542. 8 N. W.2d 631 (1943); see
Dewees v. Schneider, 333 Pa. 401, 5 A.2d 174 (1939).
90. E.g., Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd Muelhens, Inc., 43 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir.), cert. den., 282 U.S. 881 (1930).
91. See Isaacs, note 84 supra, at 1215-16; Restatement (Second), Torts
§ 756, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
In marketing parlance
this is referred to as "trading-up" or "trading-down" as the case may
be. See Phelps, Sales Management 44-45 (1951).
92. Trademark rights may conceivably be forfeited by undisclosed changes
in ingredients, e.g., Independent Baking Co. v. Boorman, 175 Fed. 448
(C.C.D.N.J. 1910) (alternative holding) but denial of trademark protection because of unclean hands would be more likely. E.g., Renaud
Sales Co. v. Davis, 22 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass 1938), mod. on other
grounds, 104 F .2d 683 (1st Cir. 1939). The trademark user would
also be subject to a Federal Trade Commission proceeding. E.g.,
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. F.T.C., 281 Fed. 744 (2d Cir. 1922).
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An invalid assignment, called a "naked assignment" or an
"assignment in gross," led to loss of an assignor's ability to prevent use of his mark by third parties 93 and transferred no rights
against third parties to an assignee,94 Nevertheless, an assignor
was estopped to assert the invalidity of an assignment against an
assignee 95 and the latter could acquire rights in the mark through
use subsequent to the invalid assignment,96
In marked contrast to the Act of 1905, which reiterated the
common-law rule that a ma.i·k was assignable in connection with
the good will of the business,97 the original version of the Lanham
Bill declared that a registered mark was assignable "either with
or without the goodwill of the business. 11 98 Proponents of free assignability explained that this language was intended to make clear
that marks were assignable without the plant or premises where
the goods identified by a mark had been produced.99 They argued
that the common-law rule confused good will related to a business
with good will related to a mark and that the transfer of a mark
necessarily conveyed the latter type of good will because "the goodwill is appurtenant to the trade-mark, not the trade-mark to the
goodwill." 100 More traditional views had equally eloquent spokesmen, however,101 and the language finally accepted by Congress
represented a dilution of both the common-law rule and the theory
of free assignability. Section 10 of the Lanham Act provides:
A registered mark or a mark for which application to
register has been filed shall be assignable with the goodwill
of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part

93, E.g., Eiseman v. Schiffer, 157 Fed. 473 (C,C.S,D.N.Y. 1907), This is
because the assignment is evidence of the assignor's intent to abandon
the mark. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756, comment £ (Tent.
Draft No. 8, 1963).
94. E.g., Avon Shoe Co, v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 293, 300-01
(S,D,N,Y, 1959) (alternative holding), aff'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d
607 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 364 U.S. 909 (1960). The assignee could not,
for instance, rely on the assignor's period of use in order to establish
senior rights. See W. H. Childs & Son v. G. Sidenberg & Co., 11 F.2d
463 (D,C, Cir. 1926),
95, Holly Hill Citrus Grower's Ass'n v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 75
F ,2d 13 (5th Cir. 1935); cf. Huber Baking Co. v. stroehmann Bros. Co.,
252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir,), cert, den. 358 U.S. 829 (1958).
96. See, American Beauti Pleat, Inc. v. Judkins Co., 133 U.S.P,Q, 405
(Tm. Bd. 1962).
97. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 10, 33 Stat. 727.
98. H.R. 9041, § 10, 75th Cong., 3d Sess, (1938).
99. 1939 House Hearings at 80-81, 86 (remarks of Edward S. Rogers).
100. 1939 House Hearings at 81 (remarks of Edward S. Rogers).
101. 1939 House Hearings at 88-89 (remarks of Stewart L, Whitman).
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of the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and
symbolized by the mark, and in any such assignment it shall
not be necessary to include the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by any other mark
used in the business or bY. the name or style under which
the business is conducted. 102
Although the initial portion of section 10 is a verbatim reenactment of the Act of 1905, the phrase permitting partial assignment of good will borders on the concept of free assignability outlined at the 1939 hearings. The new phrase, for instance, sanctions assignment of one registered mark by a manufacturer who
uses several marks for the same type of goods 103 and dissipates
the compulsion that existed under the Act of 1905 to convey symbolic tangible tokens, like labels and advertising mockups, in order
to establish a "transfer of the business." 104 On the other hand,
a manufacturer who uses a single mark for a distinctive product
probably still cannot validly assign the mark and immediately
adopt a new mark for the identical product,105 and assets necessary to preserve a mark's connotation, like secret formulas and
patents, shOuld still accompany transfer of the mark.106 In this
connection it should be noted that the price enacted for liberalization of section 10 was statutory acknowledgment of the policy
against recognition of assignments that foster material deception.
Registration is subject to cancellation in Patent Office proceedings
whenever a mark is used by or with the permission of the registrant to misrepresent source,107 and a mark that is so used is
102.

103.

104.
105.
106.
107.

§ 10, 60 Stat. 431 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1060 (1964); see
generally Halliday, "Assignments Under the Lanham Act," 38 Trademark Rep. 970 (1948), If the assignor's trade name is similar to the
transferred mark, the name should also be transferred or discontinued or the validity of the assignment may be jeopardized. See Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 27-28 (1947).
See Gentry Canning Co. v. Blue Ribbon Growers, Inc., 138 U.S.P.Q.
536 (Tm. Bd. 1963); 1944 Senate Hearings at 22-23 (remarks of Daphne
Robert). However, if two marks are used on the same product, one
cannot be assigned without the other. See Robert, note 102 supra, at
28.
See J. C. Hall Co. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 52 C.C.P.A, (Patents)
340 F.2d 960 (1965); Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osbourne, 49 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 1163, 303 F .2d 947 (1962).
See Halliday, note 102 ~ at 976.
See ibid; Restatement (Second), Torts § 756, comment !_ (Tent. Draft
No. 8, 1963).
§ 14(c), 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S,C, § 1064(c) (1964).
Registrant is defined to include both assignors and assignees. § 45,
60 Stat. 443 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (1964). Prior to
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excepted from both the incontestable right to use and the conclusive
evidence rule. 108 These Lanham Act provisions generally make it
the greater part of wisdom for an assignee to display notice of
successorship in conjunction with an assigned mark.109
A license is an arrangement whereby a trademark user permits another to use his mark but does not give up the exclusive
right to its use. Although a trademark license is only legally
necessary if a licensee's use would otherwise constitute trademark
infringement, 110 one of the many fantasies concerning licensing is
the practice of granting licenses that are unnecessary. 111
The
resale of trademarked goods in their original containers does not,
for instance, constitute infringement because the marks continue
to identify exactly the same goods that were produced by the manufacturers who affixed the marks; 112 nevertheless, wholesalers and
retailers are often granted superfluous licenses.113
An unnecessary license naturally has no effect whatsoever. On the other hand,
where a mark is used to identify goods that are not produced by
the possessor of rights to the mark, a valid license bars the licensor
(Footnote continued)

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

113.

the 1962 Lanham Act amendments the cancellation provisions were
reiterated in the section dealing with assignments. § 10, 60 Stat.
432 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1958); H. H. Scott, Inc. v. Annapolis
Electoacoustic Corp., 195 F. Supp. 208 (D. Md. 1961). Both of the
original cancellation provisions referred solely to misrepresentation
by, or with the permission of, assignees. The 1962 amendments
broadened the ambit of the cancellation provision in § 14(c) to include
misrepresentation of source by any "registrant" and deleted the duplicative language in § 10. See Hoge, "The Lanham Act's Housekeeping
Amendments," 52 Trademark Rep. 1245, 1249-50 (1962). See Appendix for a sketch of cancellation proceedings.
§ 15, 60 Stat. 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1964); § 33(b)
(3), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(3) (1964).
See Halliday, note 102 supra, at 976-79.
See Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 176 (1959).
See Statement of Daphne Leeds, 1961 Senate Hearings at 7-8; see
generally Shniderman, "Trade-Mark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy
and Fact," 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 248 (1949).
See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947); Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). Exclusive distributors for
the continental United States with long-term trademark licenses have
a "special ownership" that entitles them to register the licensed
marks, e.g., Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber Works,
Inc., 257 Fed. 937 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 250 U.S. 644 (1919); but this
does not signify that the long-term license is necessary. Registration is allowed primarily to protect the exclusive distribution rights.
See Amag Optik und Mechanik, A.G. v. Weinstein, 85 F. Supp. 631
(S.D.N. Y. 1949).
See Corral, Wodiska y Ca. v. Anderson, Thorson & Co., 95 F .2d 11
(7th Cir.), cert. den., 305 U.S. 613 (1938).
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from asserting that the licensee's use is an infringement114 and
precludes the licensee from acquiring rights in the mark through
his use.115 In contrast, an invalid license, called a "naked" or
"bare" license,116 results in forfeiture of the licensor's trademark
rights. He is denied relief for trademark infringement 11 7 and an
erstwhile "licensee" can ordinarily acquire adverse rights.118
Licensing was not permissible under the early common law119
and the federal trademark acts of 1881 and 1905 did not allude to
it. Arrangements akin to modern licensing eventually gained judicial approval in situations where it was probable that the persons
permitted to use a mark would vend substantially identical products
under the common mark.120 Arrangements that did not satisfy this
criterion were condemned as naked licenses.121 A transfer of
property from the licensor to the licensee was usually present in
the transactions which the courts sustained, but ascription of the
validity of a license to this transfer, would lose sight of the instances in which resale of a trademarked product does not require
a license122 and emphasize form over substance. As in the case
of assignments, it was the relation of the property transferred to
the connotation of the mark that was crucial.

114. See Martha Washington Creamery Buttered Flour Co. v. Martien, 44
Fed. 473 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1890).
115. E.g., Smith v. Dental Prods. Co., 140 F .2d 140 (7th Cir.) cert. den.,
322 U.S. 743 (1944); Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. F. N, Johnson Maple
Syrup Co., 272 Fed. 478 (D. Vt. 1921).
116. See Vandenburgh, note 110 supra. An invalid license has also been
called a "license in gross" in order to emphasize that the law of
licensing derived from the law of trademark assignments. See Taggart, "Trade-Marks and Related Companies," 14 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 234, 241 (1949).
117. Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, 3 F.2d 7 (8th Cir.
1924); accord, Midwest Fur Producers Ass'n v. Mutation Mink Breeders
Ass'n, 127 F. Supp. 217 (W .D. Wis. 1955) (alternative holding); Broeg
v. Duchaine, 319 Mass. 711, 67 N.E.2d 466 (1946).
118. E. F. Pritchard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F .2d 512 (6th
Cir. 1943), cert. den., 321 U.S. 763 (1944); accord, Morse-Starrett
Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1949), appeal dismissed, 191 F .2d 197 (9th Cir. 1951); Ex parte Teca Corp., 117 U.s.
P.Q. 367 (Comm'r 1958). Estoppel may, however, preclude a particular licensee from challenging the licensor's rights. E. F. Pritchard
Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., supra.
119. See Rogers, Good Will, Trade-Marks, and Unfair Trading 106 (1914).
120. See Shniderman, note 111 supr:1., at 253.
121. See id. at 257-58.
122. Compare "Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing," 53 Trademark Rep. 1130, 1145-46 (1963) with notes 111 and
112 supra and accompanying text.
-
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A mark which identified goods produced according to a patent
or a secret process could be licensed in conjunction with license
of the patentl23 or disclosure of the secret process;124 but it was
sufficient if a licensor furnished components of a licensee's product and there were adequate safeguards concerning the quality of
the licensee's manufacture. The Coca-Cola casesl25 sustained the
license of wholesaler-bottlers by the manufacturer of a soft-drink
base where the manufacturer supplied the syrup which was the
principal ingredient of the bottled drink and supervised the bottling
process. Similarly, Crown Fabrics Corp. v. American Viscose
Corp.126 upheld the licensing by a yarn manufacturer of fabric
manufacturers who utilized the licensor's yarn to weave fabrics
that were tested by an independent testing agency, and B. B. & R.
Knight, Inc. v. W. L. Milner & Co. 127 allowed a cotton piece goods
manufacturer to permit carefully selected clothing manufacturers
to use the licensor's mark on garments made from his piece goods
where the clothing manufacturers and the licensor jointly undertook
to refund the purchase price to purchasers dissatisfied with the
garments.128
The other major instance in which licensing was
sustained involved companies subject to common control. Keebler
Weyl Baking Co. v. J. S. Invins' Son129 upheld the licensing of
manufacturing subsidiaries of a common parent by a co-subsidiary
123. E.g., Smith v. Dental Prods, Co., 140 F.2d 140 (7th Cir.), cert. den.,
322 U.S. 743 (1944); Adam v. Folger, 120 Fed. 260 (7th Cir. 1903);
Hoffman v. B. Kuppenheimer & Co., 183 Fed. 597 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1910).
124. See Barcardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940). In both the
patent and secret formula situations there was a high probability that
the licensor would lose his rights in the mark to the licensee if the
license was exclusive and the licensor failed to adequately supervise
the licensee. E.g., Replogle v. Air-Way Co., 287 Fed. 765 (D.C. Cir.
1923) (patent); President Suspender Co. v. Macwilliam, 238 Fed. 159
(2d Cir. 1916), cert. den., 243 U.s. 636 (1917) (patent); Montgomery
v. Kalak Water Co., 196 F. Supp. 173 (S.D.N. Y. 1961) (secret formula).
125. Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 Fed. 513 (8th Cir. 1916); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920); CocaCola Co. v. J. G. Butler & Sons, 229 Fed. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916);
Coca-Cola Co. v. State, 225 S.W. 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
126. 32 C ,C.P .A. (Patents) 701, 145 F .2d 246 (1944).
127. 283 Fed. 816 (N.D. Ohio 1922).
128. The Knight case is one instance in which the literal implications of
the "guarantee" function of trademarks cannot be disputed. See Brown.
"Advertising and the Public Interest," 57 Yale L. J. 1165, 1186-87
(1948).
129. 7 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1934); accord, United States Ozone Co. v.
United States Ozone Co., 62 F .2d 881 (7th Cir. 1932); see Vermont
Maple Syrup Co. v. F. N. Johnson Maple Syrup Co., 272 Fed. 478 (D.
Vt. 1921).
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which furnished instructions concerning the production of the goods
identified by the licensed mark.
The Lanham Act does not in terms advert to trademark licensing. Section 5 provides:
Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be
registered is or may be used legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to the benefit of the registrant
or applicant for registration, and such use shall not affect
the validity of such mark or of its registration, provided
that such mark is not used in such manner as to deceive
the public.130
Section 45 defines a "related company" as follows:
The term "related company" means any person who
legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant or
applicant for registration in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the
mark is used.131
These provisions were primarily intended to codify prior law concerning trademark licensing,132 Avowed exceptions were several
Patent Office decisions under the Act of 1905 denying a holding
company the right to register a mark used by its operating subsidiaries.133 In overturning these decisions through a declaration
that use by a related company inures to the benefit of an applicant
for registration, section 5 necessarily created an exception to the
common-law fundamental that trademark rights derive solely from
use.134 Moreover, the exception was apparently as broad as the
definition of related company in section 45, which was intentionally
inclusive of more than the parent-subsidiary relationship. 135 The
Patent Office, however, has relied on the legislative history of
section 5 to restrict derogation of the common law to the parent130.
131.
132.

133.

134.
135.

5, 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U,S,C. § 1055 (1964).
45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S,C, § 1127 (1964).
See Taggart, "Trade-Marks and Related Companies," 14 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 234 (1949); "Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing," 53 Trademark Rep. 1130, 1141-42 & n. 66 (1963)
(citing legislative history).
1938 House Hearings at 134-36. The decisions were Ex parte United
States Steel Corp., 23 U.S.P,Q. 145 (Comm'r 1934) and Buergerliches
Braeuhaus Pilsen v. Allied Brewing & Distilling Co., 31 U.S.P,Q. 26
(Comm'r 1936).
See Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 98 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1938); 1944
Senate Hearings at 94 (remarks of Henry J. Savage).
1944 Senate Hearings 1947-51; see Diamond, "Requirements of a Trademark Licensing Program," 17 Bus. Law 295, 300-02 (1962).
§
§
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subsidiary relationship 136 and closely analogous situations. 137
Other licensors who introduce marks on particular goods through
licensee use are required to have had pre-existing good will in
the mark in order to obtain registration, 138 and persons who have
merely conceived an idea for a trademark have been held to be
incapable of acquiring registrable rights through a licensee's use,139
In light of the Patent Office position even an established business
would be well-advised to engage in use of a mark prior to licensing.140
Despite the technical question of the extent to which the Lanham Act introduced the concept of acquisition of basic trademark
rights through controlled use by another, the overriding significance
of section 5 and 45 derives from the manner in which they codified
prior law. 141 The salient features of this codification are the prescript that the licensor must control the licensee with respect to
the nature and quality of the goods in connection with which the
licensed mark is used, and the double requirement that there be
"legitimately" related companies and a "legitimate" use.
The guidelines to the interpretation of licensor control were
laid down in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp.,142
136. In re C. B. Donald Co., 122 U.S.P .Q. 401, reconsideration denied, 122
U.S.P.Q. 535 (Tm. Bd. 1959); see Zephyr American Corp. v. Esterbrook Pen Co., 135 U.S.PoQ. 84 (Tm. Bd. 1962).
137. See Clark v. Sanderson Films, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 130 (Tm. Bd. 1963)
(licensor and wife sole stockholders of licensee).
138. In re C. B. Donald Co., 122 U.S.P .Q. 401, reconsideration denied, 122
U.S.P.Q. 535 (Tm. Bd. 1959); see In re Joseph Bancroft & Sons, 129
U.S.P.Q. 329 (Tm. Bd. 1961); see Diamond, note 135 supra, at 300-02.
139. In re C. B. Donald Co., 122 U.S.P .Q. 401, reconsideration denied, 122
U.S.P.Q. 535 (Tm. Bd. 1959); accord, Coahoma Chem. Co. v. Smith,
113 u.S.P.Q. 413 (Comm'r 1957), aff'd, 46 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 801, 264
F .2d 916 (1959); A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 118 U.S.P.Q. 312
(Comm'r 1958); Ex parte Alexander, 114 U.S.P.Q. 547 (Comm'r 1957).
Denial of registration in these cases may also have been justified by
the inadequacy of the licensors' quality control. See Krayer, "Domestic Trademark Licensing," 43 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 574, 579-80 (1961).
140. See In re Joseph Bancroft & Sons, 129 U.S.P.Q. 329 (Tm. Bd. 1961):
Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure, 179-80 (1959). A possible alternative would be for the contemplated licensee to introduce
the mark, obtain common-law rights, and assign the mark to the licensor in exchange for a license. See Geo. A. Hormel & Co. v. Here·
ford Heaven Brands, Inc., 52 C.C.P.A. (Patents), 341 F.2d 158 (1965):
Vandenburgh, supra.
141. See Reynolds, "Contemporary Problems in Trademark Licensing," 49
Trademark Rep. 1141, 1144-45 (1959).
142. 35 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1061, 167 F .2d 484 (1948). Celanese was technically decided under the Act of 1905 because the case was initiated
before the effective date of the Lanham Act.

ASSIGNMENT AND LICENSING

115

a Patent Office cancellation proceeding,1 43 in which du Pont alleged that a faulty licensing arrangement had invalidated the Celanese Corporation's registration of "Celanese." The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed dismissal of the petition for
cancellation on two narrow grounds: (1) there was no allegation
of breach of the license provisions specifying the nature and quality of the goods to be manufactured by the licensee, and (2) the
alleged breach of the license provision requiring the licensee to
include notice of the license in advertisements of the licensed
mark was immaterial because of failure to allege resultant public
deception. Judge O'Connell's dissent stressed that invalidation of
a license could result from the failure of the licensor to police
the licensee's manufacture and that there was no showing of actual
quality control despite the detailed license provisions.144 Since
the Celanese case it has become generally accepted that the burden
of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence are on
the person attacking the validity of a license whether the claim of
invalidity is raised by a plaintiff 145 or a defendant.146 As Celanese further indicated, section 45 requires actual control by a licensor over both the nature and quality of the goods sold by a
licensee. 147 Neither impeccable license provisions 148 nor control
143. See Appendix for discussion of cancellation proceedings.
144. 35 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 1061, 1069, 167 F .2d 484, 490 (1948).
145. R. C. W., Supervisor, Inc. v. Cuban Tobacco Co., 220 F. Supp. 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
146. American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F .2d 619 (5th Cir.
1963); accord, Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d
358 (2d Cir. 1959); see Friedman v. Sealy, Inc., 274 F.2d 255 (10th
Cir. 1959). Contrarywise, if a licensor asserts rights derived from
a licensee's use, the licensor must establish that there are sufficient
controls to validate the license. Ex parte Pure Oil Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.
19 (Comm'r 1953); see Krayer, note 139 supra, at 578-79. The licensor will seldom be allowed to attack the license at the licensee's
expense. See Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678 (D.
Mass. 1953).
14 7. See Halliday, "Safeguarding the Integrity of Licensed Marks," 49
Trademark Rep. 602 (1959); Lahart, "Control-The Sine Qua Non of
a Valid Trademark License," 50 Trademark Rep. 103, 107 (1960);
Shniderman, "Trade-Mark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy and Fact,"
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 248, 262-68 (1949). Control limited to
the nature of the goods is insufficient. Baxter Laboratories, Inc. v.
Don Baxter, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q. 122 (Comm'r 1950), juris. retained, 38
C.C.P.A. (Patents) 786, 186 F.2d 511 (1951); see American Junior
Aircraft Co. v. L. M. Cox Mfg. Co., 107 U.S.P.Q. 260 (S.D. Cal. 1955)
(alternative holding); Consolidated Dairy Prods. Co. v. Albers Milling
Co., 104 u.s.P.Q. 407 (Comm'r 1955).
148. Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
Failure to include appropriate provisions in the license is likewise
not determinative. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267
F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); accord, Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehman Bros.,
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limited to display of the mark is enough.149 By the same token,
a license will not necessarily be jeopardized by failure of the licensor to control the licensee's display of the mark.150 Although
the Lanham Act does not particularize as to what constitutes adequate control over the nature and quality of the goods, there is
general agreement that the Coca-Cola program is an acceptable
model. 151 The Coca-Cola Company specifies the nature of the
goods on which licensees can use its mark, prescribes standards
for both the bottling process and the bottled product, polices licensees' plants to ensure conformity with these standards, and institutes prompt corrective measures whenever deviations are discovered.152 Appropriate license provisions have accordingly been
described as including
(Footnote continued)
110 U,S.P.Q. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 252 F.2d
945 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 (1958).
149. Societe Comptoir v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, 299 F .2d 33 (2d Cir.
1962); accord, Bellbrook Dairies Inc. v. Bowman Dairy Co., 114 U.S.
P.Q. 450 (Comm'r 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 47 C,C.P,A.(Patents)
763, 273 F.2d 620 (1960); Reddy Kilowatt, Inc. v. Mid-Carolina Elec.
Co-op, Inc., 240 F .2d 282, 289 (4th Cir. 1957) (dictum).
150. In 1958 the Assistant Commissioner of Patents took issue with Celanese and ruled that display of notice of license was necessary ~
perfect a license under the Lanham Act. Ex parte C. B. Donald Co.,
117 U.S.P.Q. 485 (Comm'r 1958). However, the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board subsequently repudiated this gloss on the statute, Tetra
Pak Co. v. Schneider, 125 U.S.P.Q. 460 (Tm. Bd. 1960); see Woodward, "Some Observations on Legitimate Control of the Nature and
Quality of the Goods," 49 Trademark Rep. 609, 613-15 (1959), and an
effort to amend the Lanham Act in this respect failed of enactment.
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute, 1962 Senate Hearings at 194.
Despite the reaffirmation of Celanese, it is better and common practice for the licensor to make sure that the licensee gives notice of
license in order to avoid the twin dangers of public deception and
loss of trademark rights to the license. See Vandenburgh, note 140
supra, at 180-81; Diamond, note 135 supr::t, at 306. See "Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv.
L. Rev. 814, 872-73 (1955) for discussion of the possible loss of
rights to the licensee. The basic proposition, echoed by the Assistant Commissioner in the Donald case, 117 U.S.P.Q. 485 (Comm'r
1958), is that failure to give notice of license leads to the mark's
connoting the licensee, rather than the licensor.
151. See Diamond, note 135 supra, at 298; Halliday, note 147 supra, at
602-03; Lahart, note 147 supra, at 128-29. The Coca-Cola program
was utilized as an example of what section 45 required during hearings on the Lanham Bill. 1944 Senate Hearings at 150-51. See also
Reynolds, note 141 supra, at 1145.
152. For similar programs see Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley
Knitting Mills, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1962); E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp., 35 c.c.P.A. (Patents) 1061,
167 F .2d 484 (1948).
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1. A statement of the precise nature of the goods or
services in connection with which the mark is to be used
and a requirement that additional goods or services may
not be introduced under the mark without the consent of,
and quality standards promulgated by, the licensor in advance of production.
2. The quality standards to be adhered to must be set
forth. This may be specified as the quality of the same article or service of the licensor, or of other licensees, or of
a designated competitor.
3. A requirement that pre-production samples be submitted to the licensor for approval and that production samples be submitted at specified intervals.
4. An agreement that the licensor has the right to enter
the premises of the licensee without notice during business
hours and inspect production.

Other licenses include such provisions as the requirement by the licensor of the display of the mark on packages,
labels, cartons and other containers and in advertising, so as
to indicate singleness of responsibility for the goods.
Ordinarily, the license contract contains a statement of
the licensor's right to terminate the license for failure to
comply with any of the provisions of the contract.153
The Lanham Act's dual control requirement has diminished
the precedent value of the common-law decisions sustaining licenses. The fact that a licensor supplies a principal ingredient
of the trademarked product or a formula or patent license necessary for its production may indicate control over the nature of
the goods sold by a licensee but does not necessarily establish
control over quality.154 The existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship or evidence of careful selection of licensees is similarly no guaranty that both types of control in fact exist.155 These
circumstances have greater continued utility, however, because in
appropriate factual situations they may justify an inference that a

153. Restatement (Second), Torts § 756A, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1963); Diamond, note 135 supra, at 299-300. 154. See, e.g., Lahart, note 147 supra, at 127-28 (patent licenses). See
generally Halliday, note 147 supra. The Coca-Cola system implicitly
assumes that ingredient control is not enough.
155. See Halliday, note 147 supra, at 604-05. Cases involving the parentsubsidiary relationship so indicating are R.C. W., Supervisor, Inc. v.
Cuban Tobacco Co., 220 F. Supp. 453 (S.D,N.Y. 1963); Evelyn Wood
Reading Dynamics Institutes v. Zimmerman, 134 U.S,P.Q, 475 (N.D.
Cal. 1962); Johnson & Johnson v. Medicraft Pharmacal Co., 130 U.S.
P.Q. 373 (Tm. Bd. 1961); cf. Huntington Nat'l Mattress Co. v. Celanese Corp., 201 F. Supp. 938, 945 (D. Md. 1962) (dictum).
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licensor controls both the nature and quality of the goods sold by
a licensee.156
The requirement that licensing involve both "legitimate" control and use is a latent Pandora's box. If the idea was to insert
a remainder that a licensing arrangement must be legally permissible and reconcilable with defined public policy, the "requirement"
is a truism.157 On the other hand, if, as one commentator has
suggested,158 the rationale was that a person who has used a mark
to violate the antitrust laws should ipso facto be denied the privilege of trademark licensing, the requirement would raise anew the
bugbear of subsection 33(b) (7)159 with attendant possibilities of irrational forfeiture of trademark rights at the expense of the consuming public.160
The legislative history is uninformative beyond tracing the
language to the Senate161 and disclosing the following cryptic statements by the House Managers:
This amendment makes clear that, under section 5 of the
House Bill, the use by related companies of a registered
mark or a mark sought to be registered must be legitimate.162
This amendment amends the definition of the term "related
company" to exclude any person who does not legitimately
control or is not legitimately controlled by the registrant
or applicant for registration in respect to the nature and
quality of the goods or services in connection with which
the mark is used.163
The very blandness of the legislative history is, however, perhaps
the best guaranty that the "legitimate" terminology does not add
156. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc., 322 F .2d 968 (7th
Cir. 1963) (parent-subsidiary relationship); Land 0 1 Lakes Creameries,
Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 221 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Wis. 1963)
aff'd, 330 F .2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964) (careful selection of licensee); see
Lahart, note 147 supra, at 116-27.
157. Cf. Hopkins, Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Competition 4-9
(4th ed. 1924); Restatement (Second), Torts § 715 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1963). This has been advanced as the intent of the requirement,
Whitman, "You Can License Your Trade-Mark, If-," 38 Trademark
Rep. 639 (1948), and as its practical result. Diggins, "The Lanham
Trade-Mark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 305, 322 (1947).
158. Timberg, "Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition,"
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 323, 355-56 (1949).
159. § 33(b) (7), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (7) (1964); see text
accompanying notes 235-84 in Chapter II supra.
160. Cf. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 260 (1955).
161. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1-2 (1946).
162. H. R. Rep. No. 2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4 (1946).
163. Id. at 7.
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automatic vitiation of trademark licensing to the sanctions for violation of the Sherman Act. Since the antitrust interpretation of the
requirement derives solely from informal commentary, 164 judges
wary of the literal language of subsection 33(b) (7) are unlikely to
adopt an extreme interpretation of a single word. The lack of authoritative legislative history as well as the verdict of quiescent
years indicate that if "legitimate" has any specific antitrust content, it is a simple declaration that trademark licensing will not
immunize conduct otherwise violative of the antitrust laws.165
C. Partial Territorial Assignments, Limited Territorial Licenses
and the Antitrust Laws
The major impact of the assignment and licensing provisions
of the Lanham Act on consensual allocation of territorial trademark
rights derives from the purported validation of partial territorial
assignments and the vast increase in the number of limited territorial licenses brought about by these provisions. Prior to the
Lanham Act the feasibility of partial territorial assignments was
in doubt as was the propriety of widespread licensing.
The assertion has been made that assignment of trademark
rights for a limited area was possible under the Act of 1905.166
However, insofar as this contention is predicated upon cases upholding assignment of American trademark rights to exclusive distributors of foreign manufacturers, it is submitted that the statement is incorrect. The platitude that trademark rights do not
exist in gross is susceptible to many implications,167 but one that
is often overlooked is that trademark rights are dependent upon
legal protection for their existence.168 It follows that assignment
in toto of American trademark rights, whether before or after the
Lanham Act,169 is not a partial territorial assignment but a transfer of all of the trademark rights accorded by the American legal
164. E.g., Shniderman, note 147 supra, at 252 & n. 25; Taggart, note 116
supra, at 242.
165. See Taggart, "New Statutory Concepts of Trade-Mark Ownership," 38
Trademark Rep. 125, 129 (1948). Cf. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540,
§ 46(a), 60 Stat. 445; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951).
166. Halliday, "Assignments Under the Lanham Act," 38 Trademark Rep.
970, 975 (1948).
167. See Grismore, "The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names,"
30 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1932).
168. See Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,"
35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814-15 (1935).
169. E.g., A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); Watson v.
E. Leitz, Inc., 254 F .2d 777 (D,C. Cir. 1958).
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system in the entire territory subject to that system,170 Moreover, cases involving the grant of exclusive territorial rights in
part of the United States in conjunction with an exclusive distributorship1 71_ are equally inapposite because the grant is seldom
more than a license which terminates with the distributorship. 172
With the exclusive distributor cases excepted, the validity of partial territorial assignments can hardly be regarded as a settled
point of trademark law prior to the Lanham Act, 173 not withstanding a few suggestive cases. In Griggs, Copper & Co. v. Erie Preserving Co., 174 decided in 1904, plaintiff's predecessor, Griggs,
had begun using "Home Brand" on canned fruits and jellies only
to discover a prior use in a different trade area. Griggs thereupon obtained an assignment of the prior user's rights in Grigg's
own trade area subject to the assignor's right to use the mark in
conjunction with a distinctive label. As there was no evidence that
the assignor had acquired any good will in Grigg's trade territory,
the assignment could only have been effective to estop the assignor
from asserting rights in Griggs' trade area,175 a consequence precluded by the reservation of rights. In any event, the court enjoined a third party from infringing the mark in Griggs' territory
relying on both the assignment and the secondary meaning that the
plaintiff's mark had acquired. The Griggs case is shorn of meaningful precedent value, however, by its lack of analysis 176 and its
early date. The assignment would have been doubly unnecessary
after 1918 because Griggs would have qualified as a bona fide concurrent user under the Hanover and Rectanus cases. Another

170. See Roger & Gallet v. Janmarie, Inc., 44 C,C.P,A. (Patents) 965, 245
F.2d 505 (1957); Steed & Hunter, "Trademark Assignments and Restraints of Trade," 45 Trademark Rep. 886, 894 (1955).
171. E.g., California Wine & Liquor Corp. v. William Zakon & Sons, 297
Mass. 373, 8 N.E.2d 812 (1937).
172. United States Ozone Co. v. United States Ozone Co., 62 F .2d 881 (7th
Cir. 1932); accord, Progressive Welder Co. v. Collom, 1:25 F. Supp.
307 (D. Minn. 1954). A license is not even necessary if the distributor merely resells the trademarked product. Cf. Rimmel, Inc. v.
Nelson, 102 U.S.P,Q. 258 (Comm'r 1954); see Shniderman, note 147
supra, at 252 n. 27 (1949).
173. See 3 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 1284-85 (2d ed.
1950); Steed & Hunter, note 170 supra, at 894-95; Willcox, "Territorial
Extent of Trademark Rights and the Partial Sale of a Business," 25
Ill. L. Rev. 485-86 (1931).
174. 131 Fed. 359 (C,C,W.D.N.Y. 1904).
175. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
176. See Hopkins, Trademarks, Tradenames, and Unfair Com petition 59
(4th ed. 1924).
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suggestive case was Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 17 7
which upheld a contract in which the Coca-Cola Company granted
the exclusive right to use its mark on bottled "Coke" within a defined territory. The arrangement was more akin to a license than
an assignment, however, because the Coca-Cola Company manufactured the syrup which was the basic component of the bottled product and controlled the nature of the bottling process. 178
Though the validity of partial territorial assignments was
unadjudicated prior to the Lanham Act, commentators have assumed
that partial territorial assignments were theoretically permissible
at least in situations in which concurrent territorial rights could
have been acquired under the doctrine of the Hanover and Rectanus
cases and that the new language concerning partial assignment of
good will in section 10 of the Lanham Act validated these assignments.179 Neither proposition has yet been authoritatively resolved
although there have again been suggestive decisions. In Huber
Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co.180 the plaintiff had used a
component of a cooperative's registered collective mark 181 as his
own mark until he joined the cooperative and adopted its mark.
After joining the cooperative and participating in a quality control
program, 182 the plaintiff had assigned his former mark to the cooperative subject to a reservation of "full and unrestricted" rights
within his trade area. The Second Circuit held that the terms of
the assignment indicated that the plaintiff's license to use the collective mark within his trade territory was meant to be exclusive
or, alternatively, that the terms of the assignment estopped the
assignee to dispute the plaintiff's rights within the reserved area.
The territorial reservation in the assignment was found to have a
legitimate business purpose consonant with the public interest because the reservation, in effect, preserved the connotation that the

177. 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920). The Coca-Cola case has been referred
to in dictum as establishing the validity of partial territorial assignments. Holley Milling Co. v. Salt Lake & Jordan Mill & Elevator Co.,
58 Utah 149, 164, 197 Pac. 731, 736 (1921) (dictum).
178. See Jones v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 223 F. Supp. 650 (D. Neb. 1963); Steed
& Hunter, note 170 supra, at 893-94.
179. Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 28 (1947); Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 190 & n. 23 (1959).
180. 252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 (1958).
181. A collective mark is a trade or service mark used by members of
a group to indicate that membership. § 45, 60 Stat. 644 (1946), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964).
182. The cooperative analyzed samples of members' bread and flour,
periodically inspected members' premises, and furnished advice on
optimum baking methods.
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plaintiff's former mark had acquired in his trade territory.183
This is precisely the reason why Huber sheds little light on the
validity of partial territorial assignments. Because the area that
the plaintiff reserved in the assignment was slightly larger than
the area in which he had used and advertised his mark, there was
no good will outside of that area that the assignment could convey
to the cooperative. At most, the "assignment" constituted a declaration that the plaintiff would not thereafter expand territorial
use of the mark.184 Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice
Cream Co., 185 on the other hand, did involve a potentially valid
partial territorial assignment for good will did exist in the assigned territory. The assignor was an ice cream manufacturer
who initially operated two plants, each plant supplying "Maola"
ice cream to distinct but bordering trade territories in North
Carolina. One plant was sold to the assignee with the understanding that his use of the "Maola" mark would be restricted to the
territory previously served by that plant. After the assignee began to sell "Maola" ice cream outside this territory the assignor
sued to enforce the restrictive terms of the assignment, and the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the restrictions were
unreasonable and unenforceable at common law because the assignee was not doing business in all of the reserved territory .11 6
The court did not pass on the validity of the partial territorial assignment itself or on the effect that the illegality of the territorial
restrictions would have on that validity, yet it seems obvious that
the policy against purchaser deception should be considered.
The inference in both Huber and the pre-Lanham Act CocaCola case that partial territorial assignments with respect to competing goods are nondeceptive is limited to a context of overall
quality control which maintains a mark's ability to identify like
183. The district judge had conversely held the plaintiff estopped to assert
that the license was exclusive on the ground that the public would
otherwise be misled into believing that the plaintiff's use of the collective mark identified goods approved by the cooperative. Huber
Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros., 110 U,S.P.Q. 349 (S.D.N.Y, 1956).
He apparently considered that an exclusive license would exempt the
plaintiff from the cooperative's quality control program.
184. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756, comment £ (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1963).
185. 238 N.C. 317, 77 S.E.2d 910 (1953). The Maola case is analyzed in
Steed & Hunter, "Trademark Assignments and Restraints of Trade,"
45 Trademark Rep. 886 (1955).
186. This was an alternative holding. The court also considered that the
restrictions were invalid because (1) they were not in writing as required by North Carolina law and (2) they were a naked restraint of
trade and void at common law.
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goods despite multiple users. In the absence of quality control, a
partial territorial assignment which results in the assignor and the
assignee selling in adjacent markets may well be found to be invalid.187 Since both an assignor and an assignee have a privilege
to vary the quality of their products, there is no assurance that
the assigned mark will continue to identify like goods to consumers
exposed to both brands.188 Unless dispelled by experience in the
use of the marks, this probability of confusion should only be discounted for a cogent reason. For example, a partial territorial
assignment that is used in lieu of litigation to adjust the colorable
territorial claims of rival concurrent users should generally be
upheld regardless of the creation of a common border. This type
of partial territorial assignment functions like those judicial decrees which accept a common boundary between concurrent users
as a border of convenience in reaching an equitable accomodation
of conflicting trademark rights.189 In both cases the common
border is tolerated, not because some confusion of purchasers may
not result, but because it would be inequitable and noncompetitive
to foreclose a person who already has concurrent territorial rights
from extending those rights to the utmost. These considerations
do not exist with respect to a partial territorial assignment which
creates initial concurrent territorial rights and the policy against
assignments which produce deception can therefore be given greater
weight. Partial territorial assignments used to create concurrent
territorial rights should generally be restricted to situations where
an assignor has used a mark in several remote markets and has
transferred all of his rights in one or more of the markets to an
assignee.
Territorial restrictions on a partial assignee's area of use
should not materially affect the validity of a partial territorial
assignment. Restrictions which forbid invasion of the assignor's
markets are superfluous because the remedies for trademark infringement are adequate to protect the assignor's and the public's
interests in this regard.190 Moreover, it would be impolitic to
encourage assignors to specify in an assignment the area in which
their assignees cannot use the assigned mark due to the assignors'
187. Snodgrass v. Welle, 11 Mo. App. 590 (1882) (mem.) (alternative holding); cf. Ex parte Chadbourn Hosiery Mills, Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q. 12
(Commir 1955); Flintkote Co. v. Merriam & Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 390
(Comm 'r 1951).
188. See Steed & Hunter, note 185 supra, at 895-96. The assignee's display of notice of successorship would be a questionable palliation
where the assignor continued to use the mark.
189. E.g., Tillman & Bendel, Inc. v. California Packing Corp, 63 F .2d
498 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 290 U.S. 638 (1933).
190. Cf. A Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
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continued use. The contours of an assignor's market may change
with the ebb and flow of trade so that territorial restrictions which
initially accurately reflected an assignor's retained trade territory
could eventually bar an assignee's expansion into an abandoned
market. Should this occur, the territorial restrictions will have
become mere restraints on the assignee's business activities which
are unsupported by the policy against deception of purchasers and
should be unenforceable at common law. As the Maola case suggests territorial restrictions that mediately or immediately preclude a partial assignee from entering areas unoccupied by the
assignor should not be tolerated.
Partial territorial assignment of trademark rights remains
a questionable commercial expedient despite the theoretical validity of some partial transfers. A settlement of conflicting territorial claims through a partial territorial assignment is probably
unexceptionable but the potential validity at common law of certain
partial territorial assignments used to create concurrent territorial rights is not necessarily determinative of the validity of these
transfers under the Lanham Act.191 It remains open to question
whether a Congress that endeavored to stamp out the doctrine enunciated in the Hanover and Rectanus cases through the constructive
notice provision can reasonably be assumed to have authorized
wholesale resurrection of concurrent territorial rights through the
consent of the parties to a partial territorial assignment.192 The
Justice department served notice during the hearings on the Lanham Bill that partial territorial assignments sustainable under the
Lanham Act would also have to pass muster under the antitrust
laws. 193 Furthermore, the terse declaration in section 10 of the
191. See contra, Robert, note 179 supra, at 28.
192. The concurrent registration provisions do not necessarily raise a
contrary inference since they were principally intended to apply to
concurrent territorial use exempted from the constructive notice provision on equitable grounds, e.g., good faith use commenced prior to
registration on the Principal Register. See Diggins, "The Lanham
Trade-Mark Act," 37 Trademark Rep. 305, 316-17 (1947). The basic
issue is whether Congress was opposed to concurrent territorial use
because it was a noncompetitive as well as an inexpedient doctrine.
193. 1944 Senate Hearings at 64. See also Restatement (Second), Torts
§ 756, comment .f. (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). The Justice Department
recommended that the "accordion term good will," see Timberg,
"Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition," 14 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 323, 357-58 (1949), be deleted from section 10 in
order to preclude assignments unaccompanied by the physical assets
associated with the assigned mark or marks. 1944 Senate Hearings
at 146. The apparent purpose of this suggestion was to make assignability sufficiently onerous to be an inconvenient cloak for conspiratorial activity. It is interesting to note that the Justice Department
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Lanham Act that "A registered mark. • .shall be assignable.
with that part of the goodwill of the business connected with the
use of and symbolized by the mark ••. "194 contains no discernible dispensation from ordinary antitrust standards. Section 10,
for instance, does not expressly condone territorial restrictions
in partial territorial assignments nor should it be construed to do
so implicitly in light of the noncompetitive potentialities of such
restrictions. This means that section 1 of the Sherman Act 1s per
se ban on horizontal market allocation should apply in full force
to territorial restrictions which prohibit a partial assignee 1 s use
on competing goods in areas unoccupied by the assignor .195 Partial territorial assignments may have a function to perform as an
alternative to litigation with respect to territory claimed by several concurrent users, but the combined strictures of trademark
and antitrust law confine other risk-free partial territorial assignments to a narrow compass indeed.
In contrast to the dubious status of partial territorial assignments, territorial limitations in trademark licenses are both frequent196 and unquestionably valid as a matter of trademark law.197
A license with territorial limitations must, however, expressly
forbid sales to third persons who intend to resell the goods outside the licensee's territory if that is the intent of the parties.
The covenant will not ordinarily be implied or inferred due to the
restraint imposed on trade.198
The interaction between limited territorial licenses and the
antitrust standards applicable to territorial restrictions is presently
(Footnote continued)
proposal was in line with the common-law view of assignments, e.g.,
Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 Fed. 448 (C.C.D.N.J.
1910) (alternative holding), and common law conditions for a reasonable restraint of trade. See Bork, "Ancillary Restraints and the
Sherman Act," 15 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 211, 219-24 (1959).
194. § 10, 60 Stat. 431 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1964).
195. Cf. Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C.
317, 77 S.E.2d 910 (1953). A bona fide partial territorial assignment
would merely convey the good will in an area without limiting the
assignee's ability to expand territorial use of the mark.
196. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756A, comment b (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1963).
197. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir.
1958); accord, Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d
945 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 (1958).
198. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., note 197 supra; nor
will territorial limitations generally be inferred. Pacific Supply Corp.
v. Farmers Union Central Exch., Inc., 318 F .2d 894 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. den., 375 U.S. 965 (1964). But see Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 (1958).
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the major point of friction between territorial trademark rights
and the antitrust laws.199 The constructive notice provision substantially delivered business from the noncompetitive divisions of
trade territory that could result from multiple good faith adoptions
of a mark, but a noncompetitive principle of trademark law may
have been replaced by an anticompetitive principle if the licensing
provisions of the Lanham Act sanction territorial allocations that
would otherwise violate the antitrust laws. The incidence of good
faith concurrent territorial use was haphazard and coincidental,
whereas the licensing provisions permit the broad territorial rights
created by registration to be deliberately apportioned. Calculated
manipulation of territorial trademark rights manifestly holds greater opportunities for anticompetitive abuse.
Trademark licensing arrangements may be horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate depending on the commercial relationship between a licensor and a licensee. If they are or become competitors, the arrangement is horizontal. If the licensee is or becomes
a customer or supplier of the licensor, the arrangement is vertical. On the other hand, if there is no business relationship between the licensor and the licensee apart from that occasioned by
the trademark license, the arrangement can be considered conglomerate. Conglomerate licensing typically extends use of a mark
to new products or services 200 or into previously unexploited geographical areas. 201
Proper characterization of a licensing arrangement is sometimes obscured by trademark licensing's intimate, yet indeterminant, relationship to franchise selling-a generic term for contractual arrangements concerning the distribution of goods and services.
Although franchise programs can involve all levels of distribution,
there are three principal types: (1) manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer exclusive sales outlet arrangements; (2) sponsor-retailer
representation arrangements; and (3) retailer or manufacturer joint
ventures.202 The traditional franchise, an exclusive sales outlet
199. As the Justice Department representatives prophesied during the legislative hearings, Cf. 1944 Senate Hearings at 143 (remarks of Eliott
H. Moyer), the issue has been brought to a boiling point by the boom
in trademark licensing induced by the Lanham Act.
200. See Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa.
1959); Finchley, Inc. v. George Hess Co., 24 F. Supp. 94 (E,D.N. Y.
1938); cf. Panel Discussion, "New Frontiers in Section 7 Enforcement," A.B.A. Antitrust Section Transcript at 9 (1963).
201. See Medd v. Boyd Wagner, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1955);
Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. F. N. Johnson Maple Syrup Co., note
129 supra; cf. Panel Discussion, note 200 supra.
202. See Hall, "Franchising-New Scope for an Old Technique," 42 Harv.
Bus. Rev. 60, 62-63 (1964); statement of Daphne Leeds, 1961 Senate
Hearings at 7.
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arrangement between a manufacturer and a wholesaler or retailer ,203
seldom requires a trademark license because the franchisee merely
resells the manufacturer's product.204 However, if the franchisee
participates in the processing of the product, like the wholesaler bottlers in the soft-drink industry,205 a trademark license is necessary
for the distributor to vend the processed product under the manufacturer's mark~ 06 In the typical sponsor-retailer representation arrangement the sponsor develops an idea for marketing a distinctive
product or service, establishes marketing standards, selects a trademark or service mark, engages in advertising and promotional campaigns, and authorizes businesses in different areas to market the
product or service subject to the sponsor's quality contro1? 07 The
sponsor-retailer arrangement is the fastest growing type of franchising including operations like Howard Johnson restaurants, Hertz auto
rentals, and Kelly Girl part-time employment agencies.208 In variants of the arrangement, a sponsor, like the Independent Grocers Alliance (IGA), may select goods and authorize certain wholesalers
or retailers to sell them, or a sponsor-wholesaler, like Western
Auto Supply Company, may authorize certain retailers to sell
goods selected by the sponsor.209 These variants may or may
not involve trademark licensing depending on whether the sponsor
adopts a trademark to identify the goods which it selects. Finally,
joint venture franchising customarily concerns a group of manufacturers or retailers who join forces to establish an umbrella
corporation which in turn franchises the joint venturers.210 If manufacturers are participants, the umbrella corporation typically engages
in product research, develops product specifications, selects a trademark, engages in national advertising and licenses the joint venturers
to use the mark in connection with the sale of the franchised product.211
203. See Phillips & Duncan, Marketing 574 (3d ed. 1956).
204. See statement of Daphne Leeds, 1961 Senate Hearings at 7.
205. See Hall, note 202 supra, at 62-63.
206. E.g., Coca-Cola Co~ennett, 238 Fed. 513 (8th Cir. 1916). Absent
contractual restrictions a distributor would not, however, need a license to advertise that a bottled drink was made from trademarked
syrup. Cf. Prestonnettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
207. See 1961Senate Hearings at 7.
208. See Hall, note 202 supra, at 63.
209. Ibid.
210. A joint venture exists where the following factors are present: (a)
contribution by several persons of money, property, effort, knowledge,
skill, or other assets to a common undertaking; (b) a joint property
interest in the subject matter of the venture; (c) a right of mutual
control or management of the enterprise; (d) expectation of profit;
(e) a right to participate in profits; (f) customarily the objective is
limited to a single undertaking. 2 Williston, Contracts § 318A (3d
ed. 1959).
211. See 1961 Senate Hearings at 7.
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On the other ha¢, retailer joint ventures usually set up wholesale organization in order to aggregate the participants' purchasing power
and may or may not adopt a trademark to identify goods purchased
through the umbrella corporation.212 Aside the exclusive sales outlet
arrangement, which primarily serves to inspire dealer loyalty and
effort,213 the attractiveness of modern franchising lies in the economies of scale in advertising and purchasing made available to the
franchisees.
An exclusive sales outlet arrangement is usually vertical,
whereas joint venture franchising is generally horizontal. Sponsorretailer arrangements may fall into the conglomerate category because they are widely used to obtain geographical dispersion of a
hopefully unique marketing scheme, and the franchisees may be
neither customers nor competitors of the sponsor apart from the
franchising relationship. Whether horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate, combined with franchising or not, trademark licensing
programs generally involve limited territorial licenses. 214
In the wake of White Motor Co. v. United States 215 a number
of persons have suggested that the existence of a limited territorial trademark license should require application of the rule of reason to vertical216 and __ even horizontal217 territorial allocations.
These views contradict those expressed by other commentators
shortly after the Supreme Court declared in the Timken case that
"a trademark cannot be legally used as a device for Sherman Act
violation." 218 Nevertheless, one present-day commentator asserts
that "a solid front of precedents" prove that limited territorial
trademark licenses do make a difference,219 Analysis of this
212. See Hall, note 202 supra, at 63,
213. See Phillips & Dwican, note 203 supra, at 574-75. Exclusive sales
outlets may also reduce distribution costs by restricting the number
of sales points to be serviced, minimizing risk of dealer insolvency,
and providing more reliable estimates of future sales. See "Some
Doubts About Franchising," 8 Cartel 61, 62 (1963),
214. See Hall, note 202 supra, at 66; Restatement (Second), Torts § 756A,
comment b (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
215. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
216. See LeBlanc, "Antitrust Ramifications of Trademark Licensing and
Franchising," 53 Trademark Rep. 519, 544 (1963); Stewart, "Exclusive
Franchises and Territorial Confinement of Distributors," 22 A.B.A,
Antitrust Section 33, 43-44 (1963).
217. See Groen, "Trade-Marks and Copyrights," 7 Antitrust Bull. 249, 257
(1962); Panel Discussion, 7 Antitrust Bull. 275, 278 (1962) (remarks
of Robert Bork).
218. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951);
e.g., Wortmann, "Trademark Licensing and Use by Related Companies,"
44 Trademark Rep. 1257, 1265-67 (1954).
219. Stewart, "Franchise or Protected Territory Distribution," 8 Antitrust
Bull. 447, 461-65 (1963).
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"solid front of precedents" will reveal the effect that the licensing
provisions of the Lanham Act have had upon the relatio~ip between territorial trademark rights and antitrust laws.flt?surprisingly.,__ the most unequivocal precedent concerns horizontal licensing
arrangements.
The 1964 decision of the Northern District of Illinois in United States v. Sealy, Inc., presently on appeal to the Supreme
Court, 220 and the 1962 decision of the Fifth Circuit in Denison
Mattress Co. v. Spring-Air Co.221 are the ranking authorities for
the proposition that the rule of reason should be applied to limited
territorial licenses involving competitors. Sealy, Inc., Spring-Air
Co., and several other corporations were organized by small bedding manufacturers in order to bolster their competition with the
"majors" of the industry. These umbrella corporations designed
uniform specifications for lines of branded bedding products to be
manufactured by their stockholders, licensed the stockholders to
manufacture and sell the trademarked goods in specified areas, and
pooled stockholder funds in order to finance national advertising
campaigns. The territorial restrictions on manufacture and sale
applied only to products sold under the licensed marks. Licensees
were free to sell goods under other marks whenever and wherever
they chose. In 1960 the government filed civil antitrust complaints
against four of the "mattress companies" engaged in trademark licensing, including Sealy and Spring-Air, alleging that the limited
territorial trademark licenses constituted horizontal territorial allocations that were per se violative of the antitrust laws. SpringAir and one other mattress company signed consent decrees abandoning the territorial limitations on licensee sale and manufacture,222
but the other two companies elected to go to trial. One case is
still sub judice.223 In United States v. Sealy, lnc.224 the court
found for the defendant. Judge Austin summarized his conclusions
as follows:

220. 1964 Trade Cas. ,r 71258 (N.D. Ill. 1964), juris. statement filed, ATRR
205:A-2 (6/15/65).
221. 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962).
222. United States v. Spring-Air Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 11 70402 (N.D. Ill.
1962) (consent decree); United States v. Restonic Corp., 1960 Trade
Cas. 11 69739 (N.D. Ill. 1960) (consent decree).
223. United States v. Serta Associates, Inc., 29 F .R.D. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1961)
(mem.) (motion to quash subpoena).
224. 1964 Trade Cas. ,r 71258 (N.D. Ill. 1964). The Federal Trade Commission dismissed a complaint against the Sealy group of bedding
manufacturers in the halcyon days when the Commission was "soft"
on territorial allocations. Sealy, Inc., 45 F, T ,C. 730 (1944).
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Plaintiff's evidence, read as a whole, conclusively proves
that the Sealy licensing arrangements were developed in the
early 1920's for entirely legitimate business purposes, including royalty income to Sugar Land Industries, which owned
the Sealy name, trademarks and patents, and the benefits to
licensees of joint purchasing, research, engineering, advertising and merchandising. These objectives were carried out
by successor companies, including defendant, whose activities
have been directed not toward market division among licensees
but toward obtaining additional licensees and more intensive
sales coverage.225

It seems evident from the foregoing statement that Judge Austin
did not believe that the presence of a limited territorial trademark
license in and of itself materially affected the antitrust status of
the Sealy territorial restrictions. He considered that the rule of
reason was applicable to the Sealy system because the territorial
restrictions were reasonably ancillary to the joint venture of the
small bedding companies in marketing a national brand. Although
as an abstract proposition the pooling of funds to finance largescale advertising is possible without restricting the areas in which
the advertised goods can be sold, 226 it has been forcefully maintained that joint venture licensing cannot attract adequate capital
without the quid pro quo of territorial exclusively, 227 and Judge
Austin specifically so found in Sealy. He stated:
It is obvious that an essential inducement to prospective licensees-

to get them to undertake the obligations of a Sealy license-was
the grant of exclusive rights in the territories in which Sealy
asked them to manufacture, distribute, and pay royalties.228
In sum, Sealy appears to be one of several instances in which
the lower federal courts have, in effect, sustained a joint venture
defense to an allegation of per se violation of the antitrust laws~29
Denison Mattress Co. v. Spring-Air Co.230 was a private
action which was sub judice at the time that the Spring-Air Co.
225. 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71258, at 80083 (N.D. 111. 1964).
226. See Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Elec., Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 11 70639
(S.D. Ind. 1962).
227. 1961 Senate Hearings at 34 (remarks of Sigmund Timberg).
228. 1964 Trade Cas. ,r 71258, at 80078 (N.D. 111. 1964).
229. See United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp.
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa.
1953); "Joint Ventures and Boycotts: Some Suggestions on Per Se,"
15 Stan. L. Rev. 638 (1963).
23 0. 308 F .2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962).
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conceded to the Justice Department and agreed to abandon its territorial restrictions. In 1957 Denison attempted to withdraw from
the Spring-Air group without paying accrued liabilities for advertising and fees. When Spring-Air brought suit for the money due,
Denison asserted that the license agreement was void under the
federal antitrust laws. Several unlawful restraints of trade were
alleged, including collusive division of markets. The trial court
brushed aside this defense, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. The appellate court stressed the limitation of the territorial restrictions to the sale of Spring-Air brand products and
the duty of a trademark licensor to police his licensees in support
of this result. Supreme Court precedents condemning horizontal
territorial allocations were distinguished on the ground that division of markets was not the central purpose of the Spring-Air
contracts. This conclusion was supported by a mishmash of
cases, the bulk of which applied the rule of reason to vertical
territorial allocations.231
The result of Denison seems correct. The Supreme Court
has disavowed antitrust defenses to contractual obligations unless
payment would involve "one of the very restraints forbidden by
the Sherman Act," 232 and the legality of the territorial restrictions did not seem so intimately related to Denison's liability for
advertising fees.233 However, the Fifth Circuit's rationalization
of this result in terms of the rule of reason seems more questionable than the approach taken by the federal district court in
Sealy. The crux of the matter is whether, as the Fifth Circuit
held, the legal obligations imposed upon a trademark licensor provide a sufficient business purpose for territorial limitations in
horizontal trademark licenses to justify a finding that division of
markets was not the central purpose of the territorial restrictions.
The limitation of the restraints to products sold under the SpringAir brand is immaterial if this business purpose fails to remove
the incubus of per se illegality. 234
231. 308 F .2d 403, 409-410. The Hanover case and Tricontinental Fin.
Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, Inc., 265 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.
1959), which sustained a restrictive convenant accompanying the sale
of a boat, were also cited. For criticism of Tricontinental see
Bork, "Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act," 15 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 211, 219 (1959).
232. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959).
233. Compare Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 197 F.
Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. den.,
372 U.S. 929 (1963) (the successor to a party to a contract which illegally allocated world markets can not bring an action for profits
due under the contract).
234. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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The Fifth Circuit's conclusion was grounded on twin propositions: (1) a trademark license without territorial restrictions will
be deemed coextensive with the whole country; (2) a licensor can
lose rights in a mark that he permits others to misuse.235 The
first proposition is reasonable but hardly a justification for allocation of markets by competitors. The licensor's quality control
should have adequately guaranteed the integrity of the licensed
mark regardless of the number of licensees selling in the same
territory.236 The second proposition was questionably analogized
from cases which involved loss of trademark rights because of
failure to institute prompt suits for trademark infringement. If
the court intended on oblique reference to potential loss of a licensor's trademark rights through a licensee's improper display
of the licensed mark, territorial restrictions are by no means
necessary, or even adequate, antidotes. A commonly encountered
license provision requiring the licensor's approval of the licensee's
mode of display of the licensed mark seems more appropriate and
effective.237 Denison's limited rationale does not, of course, exhaust the argument that the legal obligations of a trademark licensor warrant resort to the rule of reason. It can also be contended that territorial restrictions are justified by a trademark
licensor's duty to control the nature and the quality of the goods
sold by a licensee.238 It is doubtful, however, that quality considerations would ever in fact require restriction of the area in
which a licensee may produce a product. The specification of
production and product standards should almost invariably be
enough. In the context of the "mattress cases," for instance, a
quality mattress can presumably be made in any of the fifty states
as long as adequate production and product standards are applied.
By the same token, because purchasers from one licensee might
resell the goods in another licensee's territory, 239 a system of
exclusive sales territories would be of less assistance in tracing
defective goods back to slipshod licensees than a simple requirement that every licensee place his individual trade name or trade235. Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409-10
(5th Cir. 1962).
236. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 154 F. Supp. 823 (E.D.
Pa. 1957), aff'd, 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958).
23 7. See Restatement (Second), Torts § 756A, comment _!!: (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1963).
238. § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (1964); see "Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing," 53 Trademark
Rep. 1130, 1162 n. 188 (1963).
239. E.g., Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 154 F. Supp. 823
(E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd 255 F .2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958).
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mark, in addition to the licensed mark, on goods produced under
the license.240 Endeavoring to maintain the quality of a licensee's
production through restricting the areas in which he can manufacture and sell goods is akin to cutting down an elm in which a cat
has been treed in order to prevent the cat from falling and being
hurt. The desired result may or may not be achieved, and there
are more direct and less drastic ways to achieve it. Justifications
unique to licensing aside, a trademark user's interest in avoiding
tarnishment of his mark's reputation might support a stipulation
forbidding a licensee to locate in "low class" or nonprestiguous
areas; but this is a far cry from prohibiting all licensee operations in blocks of territory where suitable locations exist as was
done by the mattress companies.
The weakness of the theory that the legal obligations of a
trademark licensor justify territorial limitations in horizontal licenses is only exceeded by the inappropriateness of the other two
cases billed as supporting territorial limitations in horizontal licenses. It has been contended that Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf 241 "in effect, allocated one territory for use of the trademark "Tea Rose" for flour to one competitor, and assigned another
territory for use of the same trademark on like goods to the
other." 242 This interpretation, however, glosses over the "peculiar facts" of Hanover.243 The case did not involve the calculated
apportionment of trademark rights. Hanover merely held that where
two person coincidentally adopt the same mark in different territories, the prior user has no common-law right to compel the junior user to abandon use of the mark. Moreover, in contrast to
the typical limited territorial license, Hanover did not place any
arbitrary limits on the territorial rights that the concurrent users
could attain. Under Hanover, each concurrent could market his
goods wherever he wished as long as he did not come into conflict
with the other. Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co.,244 the
other principal case advanced as sustaining limited territorial licensing among competitors, is equally inapposite. Quality Bakers
of America, a bakers' cooperative, had a policy of granting nonexclusive limited territorial licenses which ordinarily left the licensor free to authorize overlapping territories but prevented the
240. This has been an aspect of the "Ban-Lon" quality control program.
Joseph Bancroft & Sons v. Shelley Knitting Mills, 212 F. Supp. 715
(E.D. Pa. 1962).
241. 240 U.S. 403 (1916). The Hanover case is discussed in Chapter I
in the text accompanying notes 24-28.
242. Stewart, "Franchise or Protected Territory Distribution," 8 Antitrust
Bull. 447, 464 (1963).
243. 240 U.S. 403, 420.
244. 252 F .2d 945 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 358 U.S. 829 (1958).
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licensees from soliciting sales outside their territories without the
licensor's permission,245 When the licensor allowed Stroehmann
Bros. to sell in Huber's territory, Huber objected. The Second
Circuit upheld the objection sustaining Huber's contentions that the
licensor had granted Huber an exclusive territorial license or, alternatively, that the licensor was estopped to authorize another
licensee to sell in Huber's territory by the terms of a trademark
assignment accepted from Huber. No antitrust issues were raised
or discussed. The case turned on niceties of trademark law and
the parole evidence rule, The court's comment that "the divisionof territory was not designed to, and in fact did not, work a fraud
on the public . • . " but rather had "a legitimate business purpose" 246
was limited to a trademark context-the idea being that granting
Huber the exclusive right to sell "Sunbeam" bread in an area in
which Huber had previously used a similar mark served the commendable purpose of preserving the former connotation of the mark
to the public. Laudable as this function may be when antitrust
principles are not considered, this "business purpose" should not
be entitled to as much weight in an antitrust suit as in a suit on
a contract. A licensor's quality control should safeguard the integrity of a licensed mark regardless of the number of licensee's
selling in the same territory,247 and confusion as to the identity
of the trademark users can be adequately dispelled by requiring
that licensees couple their individual trade names or trademarks
with display of the licensed mark.248
Inasmuch as Hanover dealt with an unrelated point of trademark law and Huber was premised upon contract rights to which
no antitrust challenge was raised, the case for application of the
rule of reason to territorial limitations in horizontal licenses because of considerations derived from trademark law is based on
Denison's faulty reasoning insofar as adjudications are concerned.
Recognition of the deficiencies in this approach is evidenced by the
mattress companies' abortive attempts to amend the Lanham Act so
as to specifically require application of the rule of reason to limited
territorial licenses.249 Sealy was on far sounder ground in holding
245. The territorial restriction in Huber was the equivalent of a closed
sales area.
246. 252 F .2d 945, 956.
247. Parkway Baking Co. v, Freihofer Baking Co,, 154 F. Supp. 823 (E,D.
Pa. 1957), aff'd 255 F .2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958).
248. The significance of the fact that each licensee. displayed his individual trade name in conjunction with the licensed mark was not discussed by the Second Circuit in the Huber case because the presence
of likelihood of purchaser confusion was conceded by both parties.
252 F .2d at 950-51.
249. S. 1396, § 5(k), 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 1396, § 5(b), 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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that the joint venture of the small bedding manufacturers in marketing a national brand, rather than a talismanic trademark license,
merited application of the rule of reason.
The assertion that territorial limitations in vertical licenses
are invariably tested by the rule of reason has no clear-cut decisional support. A number of older decisions cited for the proposition either dismissed allegations of a plaintiff's antitrust violations as immaterial to the merits of a trademark infringement
suit250 or applied the pre-White Motor Co. view that all vertical
territorial restraints were tested by the rule of reason.251 The
other cases, Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. F. N. Johnson Maple
Syrup Co.252 and Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co.253
turned on points of trademark and contract law respectively.
Vermont Maple Syrup held, without a passing reference to antitrust law, that trademark law did not prohibit the introduction of
a mark into new territory through licensing. On the other hand,
Parkway narrowly construed a territorial limitation in a trademark
license because of antitrust considerations. The licensor urged
the district court that a license which designated but did not expressly limit the licensee's sales territory should be interpreted
to interdict sales within the licensee's territory if the licensee
knew that the goods were to be resold elsewhere. The district
judge flatly rejected this contention and indicated that an express
provision for geographical customer allocation might raise an antitrust question.254 He also refused to imply the restriction from
250. E.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 Fed. 513 (8th Cir. 1916); accord,
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 Fed. 720 (6th Cir. 1912), c ~
den., 229 U.S. 613 (1913); see Coca-Cola Co. v. J. G. Butler & Sons,
229 Fed. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916). See generally Nicoson, "Misuse of
the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits," 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 76,
96 (1962).
251. E.g., Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 59 F. Supp. 429 (M.D. Pa. 1945),
affld, 155 F .2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946) (alternative holding); accord, CocaCola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920).
252. 272 Fed. 478 (D. Vt. 1921).
253. 154 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958).
Parkway involved a sponsor-manufacturer representation arrangement
with an independent sponsor. If the sponsor is not controlled by the
franchisees, a sponsor-manufacturer representation arrangement is
analogous to a vertical arrangement because restraints are imposed
on persons- at the same level of manufacture or distribution by a
person divorced from that level. On the other hand, if the sponsor
is controlled by the franchisees, the arrangement is horizontal. Cf.
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 267, 279-80 (1963).
254. 154 F. Supp. 823, 826 citing United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), which invalidated a private licensing system
used to fix resale prices.
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the conduct of the parties because "courts are reluctant to construe a contract in a way which would give it the effect of restricting the free and unlimited exchange or sale of commodities. "255
The Third Circuit's affirmance of Parkway256 has been interpreted by Judge Barnes of the Ninth Circuit as establishing that
"where there is no express grant of exclusive territory in a contract or franchise, none will be impliedly read into the cont:r:act,
as a general rule." 257
The dearth of federal authority suggesting that the existence
of a trademark license affects the validity of vertical territorial
restraints is not surprising. In most vertical relationships a
trademark license is unnecessary because the purported licensee
merely resells the "licensor's" products. Even if a license is
required, control of a licensee's sales area is not essential to
quality control however useful it may otherwise be to the licensor. 258 Yet, hope springs eternal and Texas decisions upholding
territorial limitations in vertical trademark licenses under the
Texas antitrust laws 259 have been thrown into the potpourri of
cases alleged to sustain a rule of reason test for territorial limitations in vertical licensing arrangements. These cases are of
considerable importance in Texas because that state's antitrust
laws generally outlaw per se both horizontal and vertical territorial allocations.260 The rationale, however, has little transfer
value at either the federal or state level. In the leading Texas
case of Coca-Cola Co. v. State 261 the Court of Civil Appeals premised its discussion upon the following principle:

25,,. IlJid.
256. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F .2d 641 (3d Cir.
1958).
257. Pacific Supply Cooperative v. Farmers Union Central Exch., Inc., 318
F .2d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 375 U.s. 965 (1964).
258. See note 238 supra and accompanying text.
259. Coca-Cola Co. v. State, 225 S,W. 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), CocaCola was followed in Shaddock v. Grapette Co., 259 S.W,2d 231 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953) (disallowing antitrust defense to a suit on a note and
a chattel mortgage).
260, E.g., Climatic Air Distrib. v. Climatic Air Sales, 162 Tex, 237, 345
S. W.2d 702 (1961); 8 Baylor L. Rev. 295 (1961); see Hanson & Van
Kalinowski, "Status of State Antitrust Laws with Federal Analysis,"
L, W. Res. L. Rev. 9, 26-27 (1963). The Texas Attorney General
has ruled 1hat the exception is limited to legally required trademark
licenses. 1940-43 Trade Cas. ,r 56112 (1941).
261. 225 s.w. 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
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The Constitution of the United States . • . expressly provides for the creation of monopolies in the matter of patent
rights, trade-marks, and copyright. Article I, § 8. Congress has legislated under this provision and no state can
nullify its acts. "The very object of these laws is monopoly. 11 262

Since the foregoing analysis has suggested that the federal trademark laws do not include the privilege of imposing territorial limitations in trademark licenses within the trademark "monopoly"
conferred by registration, the propriety of territorial limitations
should be as open to question under state antitrust laws as under
the federal statutes. 2 63 Indeed, the principal virtue of the Texas
cases is that they avoid conflict with the federal antitrust laws,
not the federal trademark laws. The Sherman Act and the Federal
Trade Commission Act do not parallel the Texas antitrust laws'
blanket proscription of territorial restraints. 264
D. Conclusion
The Antitrust Division's concern that the assignment and licensing provisions of the Lanham Act could be used to facilitate
collusive divisions of territorial markets was clearly exaggerated.
Partial territorial assignments are of limited feasibility and there
is nothing in the Lanham Act which should give them preferred
antitrust status. Moreover, the "solid front of precedents" allegedly validating limited territorial licenses under the antitrust laws
is singularly insubstantial. The legality of these restrictions appears to be controlled by conventional antitrust factors, notably
the horizontal, vertical, or conglomer·ate character of the licensing
arrangement. Horizontal restrictions are generally invalid per se
whereas it seems probable that stringent vertical territorial restraints
on buyers will be difficult to justify. Conglomerate restraints for
which business reasons can be evinced are probably valid as long
as the possibility of market competition between a licensor and a
licensee, or between licensees, is remote. Upon the development of a
262.

Id. at 793; accord, Shaddock v. Grapette Co., 259 S.W.2d 231, 235
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953). The Court of Civil Appeals was, of course,
erroneous in assuming that federal trademark legislation is based
upon the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution. United
States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
263. Cf. Temperato v. Horstman, 321 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959).
The problem does not arise with respect to state trademark legislation because statutory trademark licensing is a federal phenomenon.
264. Application of the strict Texas rule to interstate trademark licenses
might be invalid as a burden on interstate commerce. See Denison
Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 413 (5th Cir. 1962);
see generally Flynn, Federalism and State Antitrust Regulation (1964).
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probability of competition these restrints assume either a horizontal or a vertical character and should be tested by the antitrust
principles applicable to those classifications. The Sealy case
raises the problem of the extent to which a distributive joint ven-=
ture should moderate the per se rule with respect to horizontal
territorial allocations. Whatever answer the Supreme Court may
give, the existence of limited territorial trademark licenses should
not figure in the result.

CONCLUSION
The saga of territorial trademark rights with respect to competing goods and the antitrust laws indicates that the debate between
proponents and opponents of strong trademark protection has engendered exaggerated claims and counterclaims which have obscured
the basic legal problems. The doctrine of concurrent territorial
rights expounded in the Hanover and Rectanus cases was noncompetitive, but it was also consonant with a respect for good faith
conduct which is deeply ingrained in our law. The Lanham Bill
was strong protectionist legislation, but the Justice Department
permitted this fact to goad it into blind opposition to trademark
law revision. Limited territorial licenses are in widespread use,
but neither prevalence nor the Lanham Act immunizes territorial
restrictions in trademark licenses from challenge under the antitrust laws. Amidst, perhaps because of, the welter of extreme
positions, it is heartening to observe the development of a legal
structure which facilitates procompetitive delineation of territorial
trademark rights with respect to competing goods.
The doctrine of the Hanover and Rectanus cases was a natural
response by the Supreme Court to the plight of junior users who
innocently adopted marks similar to those already in use. It was
unfair to penalize these junior users for failure to discover the
existence of prior rights for there was no reliable method by which
they could do so. Nor was the protection of good faith junior use
unduly burdensome to a senior user at the time that the doctrine
of concurrent territorial rights was formulated. Before the advent
of television, radio, and national magazines, territorial trademark
interests were confined to smaller areas than was true after the
revolution in commercial communication engendered by these phenomena. Although chain operations were often embarrassed and annoyed by the discovery of good faith concurrent users, the absence
of expensive conduits to mass markets meant that the advertising
investment in a mark by a senior user was less substantial, the
expense of popularizing a new mark to avoid concurrent territorial
rights was less onerous, and the simultaneous use by a senior user
of several marks for the same goods was less likely to require
duplication of costly advertising, l It was not until the emergence
1. E.g., General Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 F .2d 891 (1st Cir.), cert. den.,

268 U.S. 705 (1925).
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of mass media advertising that the latent noncompetitive potentialities of recognition of concurrent territorial rights became readily
apparent. Thereafter, broad territorial markets were more easy
to exploit and senior users were more apt to find that concurrent
territorial rights were an obstacle that it was prohibitively costly
to surmount. 2 Nevertheless, the advertising expenditures and good
will of bona fide junior users could not be ignored so the courts
contented themselves with expanding a senior user's territorial
trademark rights where a junior user's good faith was doubtful,
e.g., where a senior user's advertising, popular reputation, or
steady expansion of operations made it unlikely that a junior user
was unaware of the existence of the senior use when he adopted
his mark. Because the courts would go no further, solution of the
problem of concurrent territorial use was left to the legislature.
Resolution of the problem by state legislation would have been
cumbersome at best. Concurrent territorial rights could arise anywhere in the United States so that a satisfactory solution to the
problem had to take into consideration the interests of both senior
and junior users throughout the length and breadth of the country.
State trademark registration statutes might have constituted a vehicle for providing notice of senior rights but the endeavors to
enact substantive state registration statutes generally constituted
attempts to abuse the state capacity for trademark law revision,
and interstate commercial interests understandably favored a single
federal registration statute. The ultimate result was the enactment
of the Lanham Act.
The Lanham Act provides an adequate framework within which
to balance the legitimate interests of junior and senior users. A
senior user who foregoes registration assumes the risk of concurrent territorial rights and is properly subjected to them. Converse·
ly, a senior user who acquires registration has given junior users
an opportunity to discover the fact of his use through examination
of the records in the Patent Office and is entitled to the privilege
of nationwide trademark rights made possible by the constructive
notice provision. Utilization of the federal trademark registry is
not unduly burdensome on either senior or junior users. Numerous
law-firms in Washington, D.C. specialize in searching the federal registry and obtaining registration for local or out-of-town businessmen, and registration of a common-law trademark is possible after

2. See "Trademarks in the Marketplace," 53 Trademark Rep. 687, 696-97
(1963) (good faith concurrent user asks $1,000,000 settlement from Colgate-Palmolive).
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nominal use plus token use in commerce.3 Although secondarymeaning marks require a greater amount of use for registrability,4
everyday language should not be as easily removed from unrestricted
commercial usage as coined, arbitrary, or suggestive words. The
frequency with which multiple adoptions of these marks occur and
the potency of descriptive words as advertising devices dictate that
the prize of registration should only be bestowed on a person with
a substantial interest in the mark. If one is primarily interested
in obtaining quick registration, he can adopt a common-law trademark.
As a general proposition, the existence of the federal trademark registry makes it reasonable to penalize both senior users
who fail to secure registration and junior users who fail to check
the registry before adopting a mark. Nevertheless, "general propositions do not decide concrete cases. 115 Because the Lanham Act
may trench hard upon unsophisticated local trademark users and
because judges are reluctant to impose needless penalties, the Second Circuit's interpretation of the Lanham Act definition of trademark infringement in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc. 6
should figure prominantly in future attempts by senior users to invoke the constructive notice provision. The proposition that junior
users are not to be deprived of their marks until market conflict
develops with a registrant is a fair reading of section 32{1){a) which
should have a wellnigh irresistable appeal to consequence-conscious
judges. The other side of the coin is that junior users temporarily
sheltered by the Dawn interpretation may be lulled into increasing
their advertising investment in a mark in which they have subordinate rights. This undesirable consequence can, however, be mitigated by realistic advice from trademark counsel, by senior users
who warn junior users of the risk that they run in failing to adopt
a new mark, and, when conflict does occur, by judicial decrees
which temper the blow to junior users who have had no warning of
a possible day of reckoning.
The strong territorial trademark protection with respect to
competing goods made possible by registration is in the public interest insofar as persons who initiate use after constructive notice
begins are concerned. Section 22 should have no effect on the
3. E.g., Seiberling Rubber Co. v. Dayton Rubber Co., 110 U.S.P.Q. 556
(Comm'r 1956). "Use in commerce" is a jursidictional prerequisite of
the Lanham Act. § 1, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1051
(1964).
4. See Knox Gelatine, Inc. v. Gelatin-Plus, 143 U.S.P.Q. 72 (Tm. Bd. 1964).
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Holmes).
6. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1958).
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capacity of a person to extend already acquired concurrent territorial rights. It is unduly restrictive of the development of commerce to consider that a person with an unquestionable right to
use a mark cannot extend his area of protectable use where this
does not produce a clash with a registrant, but the situation is
radically different with respect to persons who start use following
the applicability of section 22. The noncompetitive potentialities
of the doctrine of concurrent territorial rights make it sound public
policy to deny those rights to junior users who have had fair warning of senior use as long as there is no other practicable way to
avoid a substantial likelihood of purchaser confusion. This is not
to say that a registrant may not estop himself to challenge certain
of these junior users through express or implied acquiescence in
their continued use; 7 nevertheless, every registrant should be entitled to an opportunity to expand in preference to a recognition of
junior concurrent territorial rights to the extent that the registrant
diligently endeavors to expand.
The possibility of obtaining broad territorial trademark rights
through federal registration has obvious implications for attempts
to broaden territorial trademark rights through other federal or
state legislation. The predication of strong territorial trademark
protection on registration is in the public interest because potential junior users can discover the marks which qualify for nationwide protection by checking the federal registry. A statutory expansion of the territorial trademark protection accorded unregistered marks would not give junior users an equivalent opportunity
for notice of superior rights and might even discourage federal
registration. Although it may be expected that the courts would
narrowly construe this type of legislation in any event, the presence of the opportunity to obtain extensive territorial trademark
rights through Lanham Act registration should give them an additional reason for doing so.
Because territorial restrictions accompanying trademark licenses, partial territorial assignments, and concurrent registration
can constitute an antitrust violation, it may superficially appear that
the Justice Department properly opposed the Lanham Bill on this
ground. On reflection, it seems clear that the substitution of controlled for coincidental concurrent territorial use was a desirable
modernization of the law. A highly integrated economy can ill afford fragmentation of territorial trademark rights through happenstance. The law facilitates the efficient marketing of goods and services by making possible nationwide trademark rights. To the extent
that these right may be abused, the Lanham Act does not impinge on
the operation of the antitrust laws.
7. See Restatement (Second), Torts

§

754 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).

APPENDIX
It is necessary to have a general understanding of Patent
Office practice in trademark cases in order to be able to evaluate
Patent Office decisions respecting trademark rights. The following
sketch should provide an adequate perspective.

A. Basic Patent Office Proceedings
When an application for registration on the Principal Register
is received by the Patent Office, a trademark examiner initially
determines ex partel whether the mark is registrable.2 The examiner may request additional information before coming to a decision 3 or may finally dispose of the application on the first examination. 4 One of the most frequent grounds for rejection of an
application is that the mark
consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a
mark registered in the Patent Office or a mark or trade
name previously used in the United States by another and
not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to the goods
of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive . . . . 5

If an examiner believes that a likelihood of confusion exists between
marks, final rejection will usually follow unless the applicant can
dissuade the examiner. 6 However, if the likelihood of confusion is
caused by a prior application or a prior registration that has not
become incontestable 7 and the applicant alleges a date of use prior
1. Ex parte Patent Office proceedings involve a single party and take

place before a trademark examiner.
2. 37 C.F.R. § 2.61(a) (1960). Ex parte issues generally involve the registrability of a mark under section 2 of the Lanham Act. Universal
Overall Co. v. Stonecutter Mills Corp., 122 U.S.P.Q. 324 (Comm'r
1959).
3. 37 C.F.R. § 2.61(b) (1960).
4. 37 C.F.R. § 2.64 (1960).
5. § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1964); see
Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 253 (1959).
6. Vandenburgh, note 5 supra, at 253-56 suggests various arguments that
may be essayed.
7. The Lanham Act forbids declaration of an interference between an application and an incontestable registration. § 16, 60 Stat. 434 (1946),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1066 (1964); Robert Hall Clothes, Inc. v.
Comm'r of Patents, 145 U.S.P.Q. 256 (D.D.C. 1965). But see Koeppel
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to the filing date of the ear lier application, the examiner, or in
the case of a registration issued before the pending application was
filed, the Commissioner, may declare an interference. 8
An interference proceeding is an inter partes proceeding 9
before the Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Boardl0 employed to determine the right to registration as between two or
more parties at least one of whom is an applicant. 11 Since the
Commissioner will usually refuse to declare an interference, 12 as
a practical matter interference proceedings are limited to interferences declared by an examiner between pending applications or
between a pending application and a registration issued after the
application was filed. Before an interference will be declared it
must be determined that the relevant marks are registrable except
for the issue of likelihood of confusion.13 If a junior applicant establishes superior rights in an interference proceeding, he is entitled to registration but must first obtain cancellation of any impugned registrations.14 On the other hand, if a junior applicant
cannot demonstrate superior rights or absence of confusing similarity, his application will be rejected.1 5 This does not necessarily
mean that the other party will obtain or retain registration. Although a junior applicant must allege use of a mark before the
filing date of a conflicting prior application in order to obtain a
declaration of interference, the outcome of the proceeding does not
(Footnote continued)
Metal Furniture Corp. v. Dunleavy Co., 51 C.C.P .A. (Patents) 1221,
328 F .2d 939 (1964) (failure to appeal erroneous declaration of interference constitutes waiver of objection).
8. 37 C.F .R. § 2.91 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1964).
9. Inter partes proceedings involve more than one party and at least one
applicant or registrant. See Vandenburgh, note 5 supra, at 259. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to inter partes proceedings to
the extent that the Patent Office deems them appropriate. 37 C.F .R.
§ 2.117(a) (1964); R.H. Macy & Co. v. Richter & Phillips Co., 115
U.S.P.Q. 342 (Comm'r 1957).
10. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, composed of the Commissioner
of Patents, the Assistant Commissioners, and other Patent Office employees designated by the Commissioner, hears all inter partes proceedings. § 17, 60 Stat. 434 (194G), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1067
(1964). Cases must be heard by at least three members of the board.
Ibid; Foodland, Inc. v. Foodtown Super Mkts., Inc., 138 U.S.P,Q. 591
(Tm. Bd. 1963). See generally Law, "The Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board," 50 Trademark Rep. 1019 (1960).
11. See Vandenburgh, note 5 suprl!-, at 295.
12. In re Hot Shoppes, Inc., 141 U,S.P.Q. 302 (Comm'r 1963).
13. Soule-Gibbs & Co. v. Hearn Bros. Super Food Mkts., 118 U.S.P.Q. 383
(Comm'r 1958).
14. 37 C. F .R. § 2.96 (1964).
15. E.g., United States Plywood Corp. v. Trieb, 114 U.S.P.Q. 343 (Comm 1r
195 7).
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turn upon this factor alone but rather upon a determination of the
respective rights of all the parties,16 Thus in United States Plywood Corp. v. Trieb17 the junior applicant failed to establish a
right to registration but introduced sufficient unrebutted evidence
to cause denial of registration to the other applicant as well.
If an examiner concludes that a mark is registrable on the
Principal Register, the mark will be published for opposition in
the Official Gazette of the Patent Office. IS Publication may take
place even though an interference is to be declared or a concurrent
use proceeding instituted, although the ultimate registrability of the
mark is, of course, dependent on the outcome of those proceedings.19 Anyone who believes that he would be damaged by registration of the published mark has thirty days from the date of
publication to seek an opposition proceeding by filing a verified
opposition in the Patent Office.20 An opposition proceeding is an
inter partes proceeding before the Patent Office Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board initiated by a person objecting to issue of registration on the Principal Register. An opposer is generally the
user of a mark or trade name that is similar to the mark sought
to be registered. An applicant whose application is opposed usually endeavors to establish prior use, absence of likelihood of confusion, or an equitable defense.21 The validity of a conflicting registration asserted by an opposer22 can, however, only be attacked
by a request for cancellation.23 If an opposition is sustained, the
applicant will, of course, be refused registration;24 but dismissal
16. 37 C,F,R. § 2.96 (1964); Grand Bag & Paper Co. v. Tidy-House Paper
Prods., Inc., 109 U.S.P,Q. 395 (Comm'r 1956); accord, Bunny Bear,
Inc, v. Dennis-Mitchell Indus., 104 U,S.P.Q. 116 (Comm'r 1955).
17. 114 U.S.P.Q. 343 (Comm'r 1957).
18. § 12(a), 60 Stat. 432 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a) (1964).
19. Ibid.
20. 37 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1964). A request for extending the time for filing
an opposition must be received in the Patent Office before the expiration of the thirty-day period. 37 C.F .R. § 2.102 (1964). Grant of an
extension is discretionary with the Commissioner. General Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Petron Corp., 137 u.s.P.Q. 600 (Comm'r 1963).
21. E.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Electronics, Inc., 50 C,C.P.A. (Patents)
1518, 317 F .2d 397 (1963); see Vandenburgh, note 5 supra, at 260. See
generally Panel Discussion, "Trademark Oppositions," 52 Trademark
Rep. 1053 (1962).
22. An opposer can only rely upon his own registrations as grounds for
opposition. He cannot champion the rights of third parties. Parke,
Davis & Co. v. Diamond Laboratories, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 551 (Tm.
Bd. 1963).
23. 37 C.F.R. § 2.106(b) (1964); Contour Chair-Lounge Co. v. Englander
Co., 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 833, 324 F .2d 186 (1963).
24. Trak Electronics Co. v. Rustrak Instrument Co., 141 U.S.P.Q. 841
(Tm. Bd. 1964).
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of an opposition does not ensure registration. Section 18 of the
Lanham Act 25 authorizes the Patent Office to refuse registration
on the basis of evidence adduced in the opposition that would have
led a trademark examiner to initially refuse registration ex parte.26
If an ex parte ground of irregistrability appears to exist, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board will accordingly recommend that registration be withheld pending reexamination of the application by a
trademark examiner who may thereupon refuse registration.27
A published mark that survives all inter partes and ex parte
challenges is registered in due course. 28 The certificate of registration is, however, subject to later cancellation in various proceedings: 29 an inter partes cancellation proceeding can be brought
by a person who will be damaged by the continued existence of the
registration;30 cancellation may be requested in a counterclaim in
another inter partes proceeding;31 the Patent Office may cancel
registration on an ex parte ground 32 or because the registrant fails
to file an affidavit of continued use within six years after the issuance of registration,33 cancellation may be ordered by a court
in an action involving a registered mark;34 or cancellation proceedings may be brought by the Federal Trade Commission.35 The grounds
25. § 18, 60 Stat. 435 ( 1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1068 (1964).
26. Common ex parte grounds of irregistrability are found in the prohibitions of section 2 of the Lanham Act. Universal Overall Co. v. Stonecutter Mills Corp., 122 U.S.P.(~. 324 (Comm'r 1959). The Patent Office may also raise ex parte objections to registration after the conclusion of other inter partes proceedings involving an application.
37 C.F.R. § 2.131 (1964); e.g., La Jolla Sportswear Co. v. Maskuline
Underwear Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 130 (Comm'r 1957) (interference proceeding).
27. 37 C.F.R. § 2.131 (1964); Polaroid Corp. v. Anken Chem. & Film Corp.,
138 u.s.P.Q. 327 (Tm. Bd. 1963).
28. 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.82, 2.151 (1964).
29. See generally Stoughton, "Cancellation of Trademarks," 50 Trademark
Rep. 890 (1960).
30. 37 C.F.R. § 2.112 (1960).
31. 37 C.F .R. §§ 2.97, 2.106 (1964); e.g., Robert Hall Clothes, Inc. v.
Stern-Slegman-Prins Co., 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 792, 285 F.2d 816
(1961).
32. See Stoughton, note 29 supra, at 894-95. The validity of ex parte cancellation of registration after dismissal of a cancellation proceeding has
been questioned, Vandenburgh, note 5 supra, at 285 & n. 2 and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has recently scored the practice.
Golden Gate Salami Co. v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 51 C.C.P,A. (Patents) 1391, 332 F .2d 184 (1964) (supplemental register registration).
33. § 8(a), 60 Stat. 431 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (1964).
34. § 37, 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1964); e.g., Proxite Prods.,
Inc. v. Bonnie Brite Prods. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N. Y. 1962).
35. § 14, 60 Stat, 433 (1946), as amended, 15 U ,S,C. § 1064 (1964); Bart
Schwartz Internat'l Textiles, Ltd. v. F.T.C,, 48 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 933,
289 F.2d 665 (1961).
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on which registration can be cancelled vary depending on the period
of time that has elapsed since registration on the Principal Register or republication.36
B. Review of Patent Office Proceedings

1. Patent Office Review
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board hears appeals from
final decisions of trademark examiners in ex parte cases,37 As
in the past when these appeals were heard by an Examiner-in-Chief
or an Assistant Commissioner on behalf of the Commissioner of
Patents, 38 the Board generally decides the case on the basis of
the record made before the examiner ,39 Although most decisions
of examiners in ex parte cases must be appealed to the Board, a
petition for review may be filed with the Commissioner (1) if an
examiner has persisted in course of conduct not subject to appeal
to the Board, (2) if a statute or rule specifically provides for such
review 40 or (3) if appropriate circumstances exist for invocation
of the Commissioner's general supervisory authority,41 Failure
of an examiner to follow a prior decision of the Board might, for
instance, be a proper object of petition,42 but a petition for review
addressed to the Commissioner cannot ordinarily be used as a substitute for an appeal from a decision of the Board itself,43
Prior to August 8, 1958 an inter partes case was initially
heard by the Examiner of Interferences 44 and an administrative
appeal could be taken to the Commissioner of Patents with the actual decision generally being rendered by an Examiner-in-Chief or
an Assistant Commissioner. 45 A 1958 amendment to the Lanham
Act, however, vested the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with

36. See text accompanying notes 141-69 in Chapter II supra.
37. § 20, 60 stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S,C, § 1070 (1964); a final
decision is a decision stated to be final or a second refusal of an application on the same ground. 37 C.F.R. § 2,141 (1960).
38. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 20, 60 Stat, 435,
39. E.g., In re Flintkote Co., 128 U,S,P.Q. 12 (Tm. Bd. 1960), rev'd on
other grounds, 132 U.S,P.Q, 295 (Tm. Bd, 1961).
40. See Vandenburgh, note 5 supra, at 331-32.
41. 37 C.F.R. § 2,146(a) (1960). The Commissioner also has authority to
suspend certain rules in extraordinary situations. 37 C.F.R. § 2,148
(1960); In re W. D. Byron & Son, 139 U,S.P .Q. 550 (Tm. Bd. 1963).
42. Cf. Ex parte Barley, 116 U.S,P .Q. 592 (Patent Bd. 1957).
43. In re Celotex Corp., 121 U.S.P,Q. 44 (Comm'r 1959); accord, In re
Celotex Corp., 120 U,S.P.Q. 493 (Comm'r 1959),
--44. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 17, 60 Stat. 434.
45. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 20, 60 Stat. 435,
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original jurisdiction of inter partes proceedings,46 An appeal from
a decision of the Board in an inter partes case must ordinarily be
taken to the courts, 47 although the Commissioner continues to entertain petitions for review of nonappealable interlocutory orders 48
and asserts statutory authority to pass on decisions of the Board
approving concurrent registration. 49 Where the evidence in an
inter partes case suggests to the Board that a mark is unregistrable on an ex parte ground, the Board must recommend that a
trademark examiner reexamine the application if the applicant finally prevails in the inter partes case. 50 Should an examiner
thereupon reject the application, an ex parte appeal may be taken
to the Board.51

2. Extra-Patent Office Review
An applicant denied registration by the Board or a dissatisfiedj
party52 in an inter partes proceeding can seek review of final Patent Office decisions 53 in either the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals or a federal district court.54 If a dissatisfied party in an
inter partes case chooses to proceed in the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, an adverse party has twenty days to file with the
Commissioner of Patents an election to have the review conducted
in a district court. 55 The appellant must then commence a civil
action within thirty days or the decision of the Board will govern
further proceedings.56 The appeal to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals must ordinarily be dismissed after an election in
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

§ 17, 60 Stat. 434 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1067 (1964). Prior
decisions by the Examiner of Interferences are not binding on the
Board. Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Pure Spring (Canada) Ltd., 50 C.C.
P.A. (Patents) 906, 311 F .2d 805 (1963).
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Merritt Corp., 120 U.S.P.Q. 94 (Comm'r 1959).
See Chicopee Mfg. Corp. v. Madison Research & Development Corp.,
134 U.S.P.Q. 261 (Comm'r 1962); Kroger Co. v. Country Club Ice
Cream Co., 130 U.S.P.Q. 34 (Comm'r 1961).
Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 208 (Comm'r
1963). This authority has not been successfully challenged to date.
Coastal Chem. Co. v. Hodges, 235 F. Supp. 1018 (D.D.C. 1964).
37 C,F .R. § 2.131 (1964).
Ibid,
A prevailing party may nonetheless qualify as a "dissatisfied" party.
Frostie Co. v. Sun-Glo Packers, Inc., 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 983, 300
F .2d 940 (1962) (per curiam).
E.g., Seamless Rubber Co. v. Ethicon, Inc., 46 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 950,
268 F .2d 231 (1959) (per curiam).
§ 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S.C. § 1071 (1964).
§ 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U,S.C. § 1071(a) (1) (1964).
There is not corresponding provision authorizing transfer of an action
begun in a district court to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Ibid.
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favor of a civil suit is made,57 However, if the appeal concerned
both ex parte and inter partes questions, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals has held that the election transfers only the inter
partes issues to a district court. 5S Since this permits two issues
flowing from the same Patent Office decision to be litigated simultaneously in two different courts, the Patent Office has modified its
procedure in an effort to avoid duplicative litigation. The Patent
Office rule which requires the Board to refer ex parte matters in
inter partes proceedings to a trademark examiner with a subsequent
right of appeal back to the Board is intended to result in Board
decisions on either ex parte or inter partes grounds but not on
both.59
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals considers only
questions raised in the reasons for appeal concerning the record
made in the Patent Office. 60 Issues that have not been passed on
by the Patent Office will not be heard.61 Decision of the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals in trademark cases were not reviewable until 1962 when the Supreme Court acknowledged the constitutional status of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
thus the existence of certiorari jurisdiction.62 A final decision in
a case heard by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals governs
subsequent Patent Office proceedings63 but is not necessarily
57. Ibid. But see Frostie Co. v. Sun-Glo Packers, Inc., 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 983, 300 F .2d 940 (1962) (per curiam) (case can not be transferred piecemeal).
58. Baxter Laboratories v. Don Baxter, Inc., 138 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 786,
186 F .2d 511 (1951).
59. 37 C.F .R. § 2.131 (1964); see Vandenburgh, note 5 supr:i,, at 337-39.
60. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (4) (1964).
Judicial notice may be taken of additional facts. E.g., Hancock v.
American Steel & Wire Co., 40 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 931, 203 F.2d 737
(1953).
61. E.g., In re Retail Clerk's Internat'l Protective Ass'n. 32 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 1004, 149 F .2d 153 (1945).
62. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); see Stern & Gressman.
Supreme Court Practice 56-59 (3d ed. 1962). The Judicial Code has
provided for Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction over trademark
decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals since 1948, 28
U,S,C, § 1256 (1964), but until 1962 it was unclear whether these controversies were justiciable in a constitutional sense, several precedents indicating that these decisions were administrative rather than
judicial. Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693
(1927); see Pacific Nw. Canning Co. v. Skookum Packers' Ass'n, 283
U.S. 858 (1931); Vandenburgh, "Review of Decisions of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals Under the Administrative Procedure Act,"
38 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 675 (1956). Despite implicit reccgnition of the
justiciable nature of trademark controversies in Zdanok the Court has
yet to grant certiorari.
63. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 1071(a) (4) (1964).
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binding in infringement suits. 6 4 In contrast, district court review
of a decision of the Board results in a trial de novo. 65 Although
the Patent Office record can be introduced on motion and enjoys
a presumption of validity, other evidence can be considered.66
Both ex parte and inter partes issues can be reviewed67 and general equitable relief may be obtained in inter partes cases in addition to appropriate directions to the Patent Office. 68 Any federal
district court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of review
proceedings;69 but only the District Court for the District of Columbia can serve process of parties residing anywhere in the United States or abroad. 70 A district court decision can be appealed
to the appropriate court of appeals, 71 and a decision by the court
of appeals is within the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction.72

64. E.g., Syncromatic Corp. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 174 F .2d 649 (7th
Cir.), cert. den., 338 U.S. 829 (1949). Decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals may be given greater weight in the wake of
the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that they are judicial decisions.
See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); "Developments in the
Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814, 842
(1955).
65. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
den., 351 U.S. 973 (1956); accord, Watkins Prods., Inc. v. Sunway Fruit
Prods., Inc., 311 F.2d 496 {7th Cir. 1962), cert. den., 373 U.S. 904
(1963).
66. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (1) & (3)
(1964). E.g., Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Crown Beverage Corp., 195 F.
Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); accord, Wilson Jones Co. v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 332 F .2d 216~(2d Cir. 1964) (dictum).
67. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (1) (1964).
68. See, e.g., Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co.,
330 F .2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964).
69. Jean Patou, Inc. v. Societe Anonyme Technique de Parfumerie, 124 F.
Supp. 145 {S.D.N. Y. 1954).
70. § 21, 60 Stat. 435 {1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (4) (1964).
71. E.g., Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F .2d 37 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. den., 351 U.S. 973 {1956).
72. Cf. Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U.S. 79 (1945).

